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Abstract 
How are we to understand dementia? The main argument involves an analysis (in 
Chapter 2) of intentional mental states, using Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following, 
which suggests that such states demonstrate an irreducible, transcendental normativity. 
This externalist account of intentional mental states highlights the worldly embedding of 
practices. In Chapters 3,4 and 5, this analysis is applied respectively to the disease, 
cognitive neuropsychology and social constructionist models of dementia. Whilst 
clinically and scientifically useful, none generates an adequate account of normativity. 
The Wittgensteinian analysis supplies a constitutive (as opposed to causal) account that 
supports the notion of dementia-in-the-world (Chapter 6). A full understanding of 
dementia requires the human-person-perspective in order to accommodate all that 
dementia amounts to in the normatively-constrained world. 
The sub-plot considers our understanding of the person. Rather than the Locke-Parfit 
view, which stresses psychological continuity, the Wittgensteinian analysis supports the 
situatcd-cmbodied-agent view of the person (Chapters I and 6). This view and the 
notion of the human-person-perspective are mutually supportive, so that main and sub- 
plot both encourage a broader understanding. 
The works of Wittgcnstein have acted as a primary source, with secondary literature 
commenting on his works. In discussing the models of dementia, I have cited primary 
sources. I have also considered philosophical works pertinent to the particular models, 
usually in connection with the mind-brain problem. 
The thesis concludes that there is no single way to understand dementia, but any 
understanding will be from the human-person-perspective, in accord with the situated- 
embodied-agent view and reflecting an externalist construal of intentional psychological 
states. This has implications for further research in philosophy, medical ethics and 
gerontology. The unique application of the Wittgensteinian philosophical analysis to 
clinical reality suggests an approach to people with dementia that stresses personhood in 
the context of embedded, embodied histories and continuing relationships with others. 
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Chapter 1. 
Understanding dementia: 
psychological phenomena and persons 
Introduction 
The question I wish to address is: how are we to understand dementia? Since the loss of 
certain sorts of psychological capacity is central to our conception of dementia, my main 
argument will comprise a philosophical analysis of the relevant psychological 
phenomena. This is the main plot of the thesis. The sub-plot concerns how we 
understand the concept of the person in the light of our understanding of dementia. The 
sub-plot is connected to the main plot in at least three ways. First, our understanding of 
the psychological phenomena affected by dementia is, in turn, suggestive of how we 
should understand persons. Secondly, one of the ethical issues surrounding dementia is 
whether people with severe dementia can still be considered as persons. My construal of 
psychological states will suggest they can be. Finally, taking a broad view of persons 
(suggested by a broad view of psychological phenomena) allows a context within which 
the models, which I discuss in the course of the thesis as possible ways of understanding 
dementia, should be understood. 
I shall now sketch the main argument (or plot) and the subsidiary argument (or sub-plot) 
as a guide to what follows. It is worth highlighting straightaway the implication of this 
philosophical thesis: we need to take a broad view of dementia. I This has practical, 
clinical ramifications that will be apparent in the final chapter. So the thesis is located 
within a tradition that approaches conceptual issues arising from the practice of medicine 
from a philosophical standpoint in order both to elucidate concepts and affect clinical 
practice. 2 
I What I mean by a "broad" view of dementia will become more apparent throughout the thesis and will 0 be explicitly discussed in Chapter 6. Meanwhile, here I indicate that different people bring various views 
to our attention, which we need to incorporate within our overall understanding of dementia. 
2 Recent exemplars of this tradition include Fulford (1989), Hundcrt (1989) and Bolton and all (1996), 
but the tradition goes back at least to Jaspers (1923). 
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This chapter has two broad sections before its conclusions. The first concerns the main 
theme, whilst the second section presents the subsidiary motif. Here I shall provide 
merely an anticipatory sketch of each section. 
The main plot starts, by way of a case vignette and historical survey, with a description 
and definition of dementia. This leads to the view that central to dementia is the loss of 
certain cognitive capacities. There arc good grounds for thinking, therefore, that to 
understand dementia we must understand those psychological states that describe a 
particular involvement of the person's mental state with the world. This initiates the main 
task of the thesis, which is an analysis of intentional psychological phenomena in order to 
understand dementia. It is worth noting, however, that the "cognitive paradigm", 
suggested by the historical survey and incorporated into much modem thinking about 
dementia, is shown to be too narrow by the characterization, which I shall be suggesting 
throughout the thesis, of intentional psychological phenomena. 
Another substantive conclusion of the first part of this chapter, which comes from my 
discussion of the case vignette, is that the sort of understanding I seek in the thesis is a 
constitutive, as opposed to a causal, understanding of dementia. I shall say more about 
this, but (briefly) when I ask 'how are we to understand dementiaT, I am not seeking 
causal explanations. Part of the reason for the thesis is to justify this point: there is 
another account of dementia to be given which is not empirical, but which can have 
practical relevance and which emerges from philosophical thought about clinical practice. 
Understanding what constitutes dementia broadens the view within which research, 
clinical practice and personal engagement take place. 
This constitutive account leads to the sub-plot, which concerns our understanding of 
persons in the light of our understanding of dementia. There is an argument that people 
with dementia, precisely because of their deficits in psychological functioning, are 
thereby less than persons. For instance, what I shall call the Locke-Parfit view of the 
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person gives a narrow construal of psychological phenomena and, therefore, of persons. 
As an alternative, I shall consider the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. The 
practical importance of these different views of the person is seen in their differing ethical 
implications. In this chapter I shall only note these'different views and their implications 
in order to initiate the sub-plot. 3 
I shall contend that the Wittgensteinian analysiS4 offered in the main argument of the 
thesis supports the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. Meanwhile, the sub-plot 
supports the main plot by contributing to the context in which ive should regard the 
models of dementia, which I shall be discussing in Chapters 3,4 and 5 of the thesis. In 
addition, seeing how we should understand dementia and how we should, accordingly, 
understand personhood, will both contribute towards our approach to people with severe 
dementia. In short, the main plot and the sub-plot are entwined. 
This chapter, therefore, justifies the need for a constitutive understanding of dementia and 
initiates two lines of inquiry, which I shall pursue in this thesis: 
- the main plot: an analysis of intentional psychological states as a way of 
understanding dementia; 
- the sub-plot- an account of how we understand the person in the light of our 
understanding of dementia. 
1.1 The main plot: towards a constitutive understanding of dementia 
I shall now, first, present the case of Mr. Z, as a way of anchoring my argument to the 
reality of dementia; secondly, I shall give a brief historical survey of the notion of 
dementia; thirdly, I shall consider a modem definition of dementia; fourthly, by way of 
clarification, I shall specify the type of psychological phenomena in which I am interested 
and the method I employ to understand them; finally, I shall make a distinction between 
3A fuller discussion of the sub-plot is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
4 The use of the definite article, in 'the Wittgensteinian analysis', throughout the thesis does not preclude 
the possibility of other analyses. 
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the causal and constitutive understanding of intentional psychological phenomena. By 
the end of this section, therefore, I shall have introduced dementia and the main plot. It 
will be clear that the task is an analysis of intentional psychological states as a way of 
gaining a constitutive understanding of dementia. ' 
Clinical vignette 
Mr. Z was a 77 year old man with moderately severe Alzheimer's disease (AD), as 
shown by a score of 9 on the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE). 5 He had led an 
active life working in a technical trade, but over the course of four years had shown 
increasing problems with his memory. He had become steadily more unsure of the day 
of the week and date, which was parallelled by a tendency to lose his way. His 
behaviour had worsened too: he was getting up in the middle of the night and wandering. 
He had started to become incontinent of urine, possibly because he could not find the 
toilet. By the time he was assessed, it was impossible to hold a nor-Mal conversation with 
him. He could not follow some simple instructions. When asked to write about a picture 
presented to him, he wrote: 
'WATER - ovcr-flowing - Young pcpul - girl & Boy: 2.6 
Mr. Z spent much of his day sitting in a chair in the corner of his room handling an 
assortment of objects which his wife had placed there in a box to entertain him. He did 
not address his wife and did not always seem to know her. He needed help with 
dressing. Although he was not personally distressed, the situation was upsetting for his 
wife: he had become a dependent stranger to her. 
His wife, Mrs. Z, was 74 years old. She had attended school for the same number of 
years as her husband and when presented with the same picture as her husband, she 
wrote: 
5 Folstein el al. (1975). The maximum score on the NIMSE is 30 and the usual "cut-off" for dementia is 
less than 24 (but see Hodges, 1994). 
6 The "Cookie Theft" picture from the Boston Diagnostic and Aphasia Rxamination. In Goodglass and 
Kaplan (1983). 
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'Mother washing-up at the sink, also the sink is ovcr-flowing. Son and 
daughter are helping her to get at a cookie-tin out of the cupboard, the son 
appears to be heading for a fall from a stool that has slipped from under 
his feet. ' 
Mrs. Z showed no evidence of dementia. Her MMSE score was 29. She was able to 
care for herself and her husband. 7 
This vignette, in addition to its sad consequences, also brings out various features of 
dementia: the impact on cognitive abilities, such as the effects on memory, orientation, 
understanding, spoken and written language; along with the disturbed behaviour, the loss 
of social Skills and the change in personality. The reality of dementia can be catastrophic 
for all those concerned. Hence, in answering the question 'How are we to understand 
dementiaT, I shall need to give an account that can encompass this reality. 
Historical survey 
The term "dementia", from the Latin "demens", has probably been used in its vernacular 
form in the Western World since the late seventeenth century. 8 Earlier uses of the word 
are recorded, such as that by Richard Cosin in 1592. Cosin describes a person who 
became forgetful of almost all things, including the names of things, 'and beginning to 
speake, forgetteth what he had saide afore, and what hee meant to say after'. 9 Willis, in 
1684, in connection with the concept, speaks of 'the imagination and the memory being 
hurt'. 10 In the Eighteenth Century there are notable references to 'd6mence' in the 
Encyclqp6die Franfaise. Here it is regarded as a disease resulting from the 'abolition of 
7 Mr. and Mrs. Z were seen as part of a research project which investigated writing skills in patients with 
AD (Hughes et al., 1997). The comparison between ý&. Z and Mrs. Z lacks a scientific justification 
because of the sex and age difference, but is sufficient for my purposes. Although some details (age, sex, 
MMSE etc. ) are accurate, others are illustrative rather than exact, to honour confidentiality. 
8 Berrios (1987). 
9 Quoted in Berrios op. cit. (r-rom: Cosin, R. (1592). Conspiracie, for Pretended Reformation: viz. 
Presbyterial Discipline. Barker, London. ) 
10 Quoted in Berrios op. cit. (From: Willis, T. (1684). Practice of Physick. (Frans. S. Pordage) T. 
Dring, C. Harper and J. Leigh, London. pp. 209-214. ) 
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the reasoning faculty'; those affected 'exhibit foolish behaviour and cannot understand 
what they are told, cannot remember anything, have no judgement, arc sluggish and 
retarded... '; under the legal aspects of ddmcncc it was stated that those affected were 
'incapable of informed consent'. 11 
These historical references are mentioned here for two specific reasons. First, the 
descriptions show that the concept of dementia has always been broader than just 
memory impairment and cognitive dysfunction. As Berrios comments, the 'invariant 
core meaning' of the concept has included 'cognitive failure, chronic behavioural 
dislocation and psychosocial incompetence'. 12 Historical research elsewhere has 
reinforced the growing recognition of and research into the 'non-cognitive' aspects of 
dementia. 13 In a striking case history from 1785, of a 75 year old man with progressive 
cognitive decline, a clear description is given of the persecutory delusion, "THAT HE 
SHALL BE SLAUGHTERED AND THAT SAUSAGES SHALL BE MADE FROM 
HIS FLESH". 14 Similarly, in the original case described by Alzheimer, a 51 year old 
woman, with memory and writing problems (like Mr. Z), developed delusions, 
hallucinations, and behavioural disturbances. 15 So dementia is a broader condition than 
just one of cognitive decline. 16 
Secondly, the historical material helps to demonstrate the extent to which theories or 
models of dementia have inevitably reflected and reinforced background beliefs. Having 
surveyed the breadth of the dementia concept in the historical literature, Berrios notes: 
'The term "dementiaý' and the concept of cognitive failure came together sometime during 
the eighteenth century. '17 By the start of the next century, 
11 All quotations from the French Encyclopaedia are from Berrios op. cit.; trans. also by Berrios. 
12 Berrios op. cit. 
13 Katona and Levy (1992). (See chapters by Berrios, Wertheimer, Gustafson & Risberg, and Bums. ) 
14 Fbrstl et al. (1991). 
15 Alzheimer (1907). 
16 For more recent work on the non-cognitive aspects of dementia, see Lawlor (1995). 
17 Berrios op. cit. 
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'experimental psychology and the growth of Associationism provided laws and 
principles, in terms of which the concept of cognitive failure could be given a 
quantitative definition. In due course, intellectual impairment became the invariant 
around which the nineteenth century "cognitive model" of dementia was 
formed. '18 
The tendency to seek a "cognitive model" in the last century, therefore, stemming from 
the writings of Locke (which inspired Associationism), has in turn in this century 
encouraged cognitivism in psychology (and the cognitiveneuropsychology model, which 
I shall discuss in Chapter 4). 19 
Bcrrios summarizes the problems thus: 
'Traditional diagnostic instruments for dementia have relied unduly on what has 
been called the "cognitive paradigm"... -the view that an impairment of cognition 
(in practical terms, a memory deficit) is sufficient to define dementia. ... 
The major disintegration which is characteristic of dementia is likely, though, to 
involve other systems such as perception, motility, personality organisation, 
emotional experience, and volition. The descriptive and epidemiological literature 
refers to a gamut of non-cognitive symptoms, among which delusions, 
hallucinations, and behavioural. and motility disorders feature prominently. 
These reports notwithstanding, research workers persist in their efforts to refinc 
instruments with a very narrow cognitive compass, which can only 
(tautologically) confirm that dementia is but a dismantling of cognitive 
function. '20 
Berrios then makes the point that there can be stages of dementia where the cognitive 
deficits are not the dominating symptoms. It is now apparent, indeed, that non-cognitive 
symptoms occur in AD at various levels of cognitive decline and at various stages of the 
18 ibid. 
19 For a brief, but enthusiastic, review of Associationism and its links to modem cognitivism see 
Spitzer (1994). 
20 Berrios (1989). 
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disease. 21 It is certainly the case that some non-cognitive features (e. g. wandering or 
aggression) cause more distress to the carers of people with dementia and lead to 
institutionalization more readily than cognitive impairment on its own. 22 
So, this brief historical survey reveals that the notion of dementia includes more than just 
deficits in cognitive function. Nevertheless, although recognition of such non-cognitivc 
symptoms of dementia has again come to the fore, it remains true that background beliefs 
do tend to emphasize a "cognitive paradigm", as is seen in modem definitions of 
dementia. 
A modern definition of demenlia 
A modern definition, from the Tenth International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10), 
runs as follows: 
'Dementia is a syndrome due to disease of the brain, usually of a chronic or 
progressive nature, in which there is disturbance of multiple higher cortical 
functions, including memory, thinking, orientation, comprehension, calculation, 
learning capacity, language, and judgement. Consciousness is not clouded. 
Impairments of cognitive function arc commonly accompanied, and occasionally 
preceded, by deterioration in emotional control, social behaviour, or motivation. 
This syndrome occurs in Alzheimer's disease, in ccrcbrovascular disease, and in 
other conditions primarily or secondarily affecting the brain. '23 
Now, whilst non-cognitive features of dementia (loss of emotional control, social 
behaviour and motivation) are mentioned in this definition, the emphasis seems to be on 
cognitive function. Psychotic features (delusions and hallucinations) do not form part of 
the core syndrome of dementia in ICD-10, but may be added to it, as may depression. 
21 Hope et al. (1999). 
22 cf. McShane el al. (1998). 
23 World Health Organization (1992) p. 45. 
contained in Bums and Hope (1997). 
Further information on the syndrome of dementia is 
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The 'diagnostic guidelines' in ICD-10 show a much clearer emphasis on cognitive 
impairment. Impaired 'activities of daily living' are clearly placed as secondary to' a 
decline in both memory and thinking'. 24 The remaining criteria are all cognitive. 
Similarly, in the McKhann criteria for 'probable' AD, 25. which arc widely used and 
known to have high diagnostic sensitivity, 26 the main diagnostic features are again 
entirely cognitive, with 'impaired activities of daily living and altered patterns of 
behavioue being merely (non-essential) supportive features of the diagnosis. Psychotic 
features are 'consistenC with the diagnosis, but other actiologics must then be excluded. 
So, the "cognitive paradigm" still seemingly holds sway. 27 
Intenlional psychological phenonzena and concepts 
Before moving on, it is worth pausing to note, first, that I have spoken of certain sorts of 
psychological phenomena, without being more specific. The sort of phenomena I shall 
be concerned with are those listed in ICD-10: 'memory, thinking, orientation, 
comprehension, calculation, learning capacity, language, and judgemcnt'. 28 There arc 
other psychological phenomena, such as the capacity to perceive redness or pain, that do 
not concern me. A person with dementia does not lose the capacity to perceive redness, 
although they might lose their capacity to name something as red; they do not lose the 
sensation of pain, although they might not be able to describe it. Nor am I interested in 
the phenomenon of being conscious, which we share with animals. Clouding of 
consciousness tends to exclude the diagnosis of dementia, although it is a feature of 
dementia with Lewy bodies. 29 What is important about the psychological phenomena 
under consideration is that they all suggest a certain sort of involvement with the world. 
24 ibid. p. 46. 
25 McKhann et al. (1984). 
26 Bums et al. (1990) found a sensitivity of 88%. 
27 In this context 'cognitive paradigm' refers to the primacy of cognitive impairment as a way of 
characterizing dementia noted in the historical sketch. It does not refer to the sort of cognitive 
neuropsychology model used to explain dementia, which I discuss in Chapter 4, although it may have C, 
encouraged the development of such models. 
28 WHO op. cit. 
29 McKeith el al. (1996). 
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These psychological phenomena arc interesting philosophically because they demonstrate 
intentionality. That is, they demonstrate 'aboutness'. I do not just remember, my 
memories arc about (or of) something. Similarly, Farn orientated with respect to 
something, my judgements and speech are about something. Nor do I simply 
comprehend, calculate or learn, but I comprehend, calculate and learn something. Other 
phenomena too - reading, writing, copying, attending and concentrating (amongst others) 
- can all be construed in intentional terms. Whilst avoiding the complexities involved in a 
discussion of intentionality, in the next chapter I shall concentrate on the point 
demonstrated by Wittgenstein, namely that these psychological states exhibit normativity. 
The result of this calculation (say) is already prescibed at this moment, even before it is 
completed. Normativity makes a particular link between the possessing of such and such 
an intentional mental state and the world. The connection is made through rules, which 
govern the use of intentional psychological concepts (since normativity is akin to rule- 
following), and which are instantiated in worldly, embedded practices. Noting the 
normativity of intentional psychological states is to see them as part of the world, rather 
than as something separate. This is to anticipate and to summarize. The point is that 
non-intentional psychological states are simply not interesting in the same way. There is 
no similar normative connection to be made with the world; even though, of course, it 
remains true for all concepts (such as 'chair') that they are bound by normative rules of 
usage. 30 What is unique about intentional psychological states is that when I am in this 
particular state, for this state to be satisfied, something in the world is prescribcd. 31 
Secondly, before continuing, I should also note a point of method. I am interested in 
psychological phenomena. But this philosophical study will proceed by conceptual 
analysis. Therefore, I might speak of psychological phenomena or of psychological 
concepts. What is being considered will be the same. Again, there are philosophical 
concerns here that I must pass by, but it was certainly Wittgenstein's later view that an 
30 1 shall clarify the connection between intentional mental states, word-meaning and rule-following in 
Chapter 2. For further comment on non-intentional mental states, cf. p. 31 below (footnote 8). 
31 To save confusion I shall normally specify that I mean intentional mental phenomena. 
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understanding of psychological phenomena would be achieved through an analysis of 
concepts. For, according to Wittgenstein, 'It shcws a fundamental misunderstanding, if I 
am inclined to study the headache I have now in order to get clear about the philosophical 
problem of sensation. 32 Of course I can study the pathophysiology of headaches. The 
philosophical problem, however, (e. g. about the nature of thought) is, in Wittgenstein's 
view, a conceptual one. 33 What is at issue is Wittgcnstein's whole conception of 
philosophy, which is beyond my remit, but which moved finally towards an emphasis on 
anthropological description of ordinary language and concept USC. 34 From this 
perspective, the distinction between phenomena and concepts makes little odds. As 
Wittgenstein says in the following quotation, we are still talking about the same thing; 
but, as he also says, the notion of a psychological phenomenon might lead us to think in 
terms of some Ming: 
'One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines 
anything, but how the word "imagination" is used. But that does not mean that I 
want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature of the 
imagination is as much about the word "imagination" as my question is. And I 
am only saying that this question is not to be decided - neither for the person who 
does the imagining, nor for anyone else - by pointing; nor yet by a description of 
any process. The first question also asks for a word to be explained; but it makes 
us expect a wrong kind of answer. '35 
Interestingly, Schulte discusses the move in Wittgenstein's manuscripts at the end of 
1947 from talk of psychological phenomena to talk of psychological conceplS. 36 
32 PI § 314. 
33 cf. PI p. 212, where Wittgenstein discusses what happens when a physiological explanation of seeing 
is offered: 'The psychological concept hangs out of reach of this explanation'. 
34 For a fuller discussion of Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy see, for example, Lazerowitz 
(1967), Kenny (1982). Fogelin (1996) and Hacker (1996). An unsympathetic account of Wittgenstein's 
method is offered by Grayling (1991). There is, of course, an extensive literature on Wittgenstein and 
language. I have mostly referred to: Linsky (1967), McGinn (1984), Gaita (1991), Stem (1995) and 
Garver (1996). 
35 PI § 370. 
36 Schulte (1993) pp. 24-27. The quotations from Wittgenstein's manuscripts which foliov., (MS 134, 
2.4.47 and MS 135,14.12.47 respectively) are given in these pages by Schulte. 
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Initially Wittgenstein discussed wishing to have a 'perspicuous way of looking' at 
psychological phenomena, but shortly afterwards he wrote about 'a genealogical trec of 
psychological concepts ... an order 
in which one ought to discuss them and explain their 
connections' (emphasis added). Schulte suggests Wittgenstein's talk of "phenomena" 
indicates 'he is not yet sufficiently clear about those factors which are constitutive of our 
concepts' (emphasis added). 37 Having clarified the type of psychological concepts I 
shall be discussing (intentional ones) and the fact that understanding phenomena is a 
matter (on a Wittgensteinian approach) of understanding concepts, I shall now pick up 
Schulte's point by focussing on the need to give a constitutive account. 
Constitutive versus causal accounts 
From the case vignette, the historical survey and the definition of dementia, I wish to 
draw two points that will lead me to consider the type of account I shall give. First, there 
are good reasons for asserting that the answer to the question 'How are we to understand 
dementiaT must be broad. It is certainly broader than the "cognitive'paradigm", since the 
syndrome of dementia has always included non-cognitive features. Moreover, kow we 
understand dementia will vary depending on our perspective. The perspective of a 
spousal carer, such as Mrs. Z, will be quite different from that of a neuroscientiSt. 38 
Mrs. Z is certainly not only concerned by loss of memory, but also by the change of 
personality and difficult behaviour exhibited by her husband. In trying to understand 
dementia, the answer I shall give will aim to be broad enough to include all such 
perspCCtiVCS. 39 
37 ibid. p. 25. 
38 Mrs. Z might, of course, have been a neuroscientist. Even then, her engagement with her husband 
would give her a different perspective to the one she would have in her laboratory. My question is 
intended to encompass all perspectives. 
39 In this I can claim an alignment with Fulford (1989), whose 'reverse view' emphasizes action failure 
and illness, rather than dysfunction and disease. In the account I am suggesting, the 'cognitive paradigm' 
would be supplanted by a broader view, which would encompass the whole disintegration that 
characterizes dementia. As in Fulford's analysis (cf. pp- 262-263), the experience of dementia (illness 
rather than disease) becomes centre stage. 
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Secondly, even though dementia involves more than the "cognitive paradigi-n" suggests, 
it is nevertheless reasonable to answer the question about understanding dementia by 
turning to an analysis of intentional psychological states. Focussing on such states is 
plausible if, in the end, the account given is itself broad and able to accommodate more 
than is suggested by the narrow understanding of the "cognitive paradigm". This is a 
promissory note. Suffice it to say (for now) that the account I shall give will be 
extcrnalist, by which I intend, broadly, 'that what is thought or said (content) depends in 
part on factors external to the mind of the thinker or speakcr. '40 Furthermore, whilst 
recognizing the importance of the non-cognitive aspects of dementia, it is none the less 
true that the loss of psychological capacities is the feature, both popularly and (as we 
have seen) in modern definitions and diagnostic criteria, perceived to be central to 
dementia. Thinking about how we are to understand intentional psychological 
phenomena, therefore, seems a reasonable starting point. 
So, if I must give a broad answer to the question about understanding dementia and if I 
am yet going to proceed by focussing on intentional psychological phenomena, I cannot 
now give a causal account. I can justify this asscr-tion by considering what a causal 
account of intentional psychological phenomena would involve and what this might mean 
to Mrs. Z. Memory failure, for instance, might have several causes. These might be 
physical, psychological or social. Even if, however, these causes were fully specified, it 
is not clear how this would provide the sort of understanding Mrs. Z requires. That 
understanding will be rooted in Mr. and Mrs. Z's shared lives. In this context, however 
useful the causal explanations, Mr. Z's failure to recognize Mrs. Z as his wife is also a 
matter of deep personal meaning. Understanding the meaning of cognitive deficits in 
dementia will require something other than causal explanations. But 'understanding 
dementia' will require such understanding of meaning, otherwise it will not offer the 
broad answer required by my question. 
Over against the causal account, I shall offer a constilittive account of intentional 
40 Davidson (1995). 
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psychological phenomena. This involves saying what it actually is to remember or to 
forget. A constitutive account will flesh out the phenomena. I might forget who my wife 
is for various (causal) reasons, but ivhat it is to forget my wife is only understood in a 
particular historical, cultural, value-laden and personally meaningful context. By 
pursuing a constitutive account I can discuss intentional psychological phenomena and 
yet not forget the non-cognitive aspects of dementia. If a constitutive account brings into 
play context and meaning, then not only 'cognitive failure', but also 'chronic behavioural 
dislocation and psychosocial incompetence'41 are in view. A constitutive account will, 
moreover, allow room for a causal account, because understanding what constitutes 
memory failure does not preclude a discussion of causes. What it does preclude is both a 
narroiv discussion of causes and a discussion that only looks at causes and not at the 
phenomenon itself as something of meaning and significance in a person's life. 42 
The distinction I am drawing between causal and constitutive accounts parallels the 
distinction found in Jaspers between Erkldren (the explanation of natural sciences) and 
Verstehen (the understanding of human sciences). 43 According to this distinction, 
explanation (typical of the sciences) helps us to see causal connections, whereas 
understanding (which relies on empathy) helps us to perceive meaning. Not everyone 
agrees that there is a distinction here to be made, 44 but whether or not the distinction is 
philosophically robust, there is certainly a difference between the understanding Mrs. Z 
(qua wife) has of her husband's state and the understanding of a neuroscicntist (even if 
this turns out to be Mrs. Z too). I shall suggest a broad answer to the question about 
understanding dementia that will allow causal (scientific) explanations, but will involve a 
41 Berrios op. cit. 
42 In praising the notion of a constitutive account, over against a causal one, I should signal that a 
constitutive account will not always be the solution. There will come a point in the analysis at which a 
further constitutive account just cannot be given. Having seen, for instance, that mental states arc 
constitutively normative, it will not then do to ask what constitutes normativity. This is the point for 
Wittgensteinian quietism, where no more explanations can be given. I shall discuss this further in 
Chapter 2. 
43 Jaspers (1923) p. 27. 
44 Bolton and Hill (1996), for instance, wish to argue that causal explanations are meaningful and the 
distinction between explanation and understanding is undermined by the commitment of cognitive 
psychology to meaningful states (cf. pp. 32-34). 1 discuss this view in Chapter 4. 00 
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constitutive account of intentional psychological phenomena, one that brings in context 
and mcaning. 
Summary 
One way to understand dementia - under the influence of the historically rooted "cognitive 
paradigm", which in turn is enshrined in modern definitions of dementia - when faced 
with the reality of a case such as Mr Z's, is to offer causal explanations of the symptoms. 
The cognitive symptoms have generally been the easiest to explain (as I shall demonstrate 
in Chapters 3 and 4) in causal terms. This fails, however, to offer the sort of 
understanding required by Mrs. Z. Her perspective is rooted in a meaningful context. 
What is required, to give what I am calling a broad view, is a constitutive account. 
Although it might seem countcr-intuitive to focus, for this broad view, on just the 
cognitive phenomena that encourage the narrower causal account, a conceptual analysis 
of intentional psychological phenomena (in chapter 2) will lead me to a (broader) 
constitutive account of such concepts and phenomena. Providing such an account, in 
order to understand dementia, is the main plot of the thesis. It is a plot that will be 
worked out by considering, in Chapters 3,4 and 5, the implications for various models 
of dementia. 
1.2 The sub-plot: dementia and persons 
For now, however, I turn to the sub-plot: an account of how we understand the person in 
the light of our understanding of dementia. I shall, first, sketch a-vicw of the person 
suggested by the writings of Locke and Parfit. This will be contrasted, secondly, with 
the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. These views will necessarilly be 
described briefly, although I shall say more about the situated-embodicd-agent view in 
the final chapter. Thirdly, I shall show the importance of these different views by 
discussing issues from the medical ethics literature relating to dementia. These ethical 
issues show the practical importance of the view taken of the person. I shall contend that 
\1 
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the situated-embodied-agent view of the person is supported by the constitutive account 
of intentional psychological concepts. In turn, if the argument presented here is correct, 
the practical implication is that people with severe dementia, in contradistinction to 
arguments that derive from the Locke-Parfit view, retain personbood. The argument of 
the main plot, therefore, has an impact on our view of the person and, consequently, on 
our view of the person with dementia. 
77ie Locke-Parfit vieIV45 
Locke describes the person thus: 
'a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself 
as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only 
by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and ... essential to 
it'. 46 
The person is the being with thoughts, intelligence, reason, reflection and consciousness. 
My 'thinking conscious self' is bound up with my body, but - as Locke makes clear by 
considering what happens if a person's hand is cut off47 - it is the conscious self that is 
the person: 'without consciousness there is no person'. 48 Locke makes an important 
distinction between "man", on the one hand, and "person" on the other. "Man" refers to 
the living human body, whilst "person" is tightly tied to consciousness. 49 But 
"consciousness" for Locke is 'inseparable from thinking, and ... essential to it'. 50 As 
these quotations make clear, according to Locke, to be a person is to be a being with 
these psychological attributes. 
45 The views of Locke and Parfit on the person are not exactly the same, so it might seem unfair to 
lump them together as the "Locke-Parfit view", but Parfit talks of his view as if it were a revision of 
Locke's view. Hence, it seems licit to join the two names in this way. cf. Parfit (1984) pp. 205-206. 
46 Locke (1690) (11. xxvii. 9) p. 211. 
47 ibid. (11. xxvii. 11) p. 213. 
48 ibid. (11. xxvii. 23) p. 218. 
49 ibid. E. g. (11. xxvii. 20) p. 217. 
50 ibid. note 2. 
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This Lockean view of the person stands behind the views expressed by Parfit. 51 For 
instance, Locke writes: 'as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any 
past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person'. 52 Parfit, like Locke, 
feels that a person's identity is maintained by the links which join that person's former 
state with his or her present state. In Parfit's terminology, what is meant by personal 
identity is covered by 'psychological continuity', which involves 'psychological 
connectedness'. 53 Just as Locke suggested, my personal identity now is linked to my 
personal identity last week by psychological continuity between the two. Psychological 
continuity is maintained by memories, but also by beliefs, desires and by intentions 
which are later enactcd. 54 The consequence of these views is that personal identity is not 
what matters for Parfit, but psychological connectedness and/or continuity. 55 
Elsewhere Parfit admits to being a "Bundle Theorist", according to whom: 
C we can't explain either the unity of consciousness at any time, or the unity of a 
whole life, by referring to a person. Instead we must claim that there are long 
series of different mental states and events - thoughts, sensations, and the like - 
each series is unified by various kinds of causal relation, such as the relations that 
hold between experiences and later memories of thcm. '56 
Bundle Theorists, according to Parfit, are all those who have not believed, as "Ego 
Theorists" have, that the person is some separately existing thing, 'distinct from our 
brains and bodies, and the various kinds of mental states and events'. 57 Hume, as a 
successor of Locke, would be counted as a Bundle Theorist. He wrote that when he 
attempted to find himseff, he found 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
51 Parfit (1984) cf. pp. 205-207. 
52 Locke op. cit. 01. xxvii. 9) pý 212. 
53 Part it op. cit. p. 206: 'Psychological connectedness is the holding of particular direct connections. 
Psychological continuity is the holding of overlapping chains of strong connectedness. ' 
54 ibid. p. 205. 
55 ibid. p. 262. This is called by Parfit 'Relation R'. It is this that matters, but the psychological 
connectedness and/or continuity in Relation R must have 'the right kind of cause'. 
56 Part-it (1987). 
57 ibid. 
perccptions'. 58 Later Hume wrote: 
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'Had we no memory, we never should have any notion of causation, nor 
consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or 
person. '59 
It is clear, therefore, that for Parfit, no less than for Lockc (or Hume), to be a person is 
just to have certain psychological states. For Parfit it is the connections between these 
states that amount to the person; or, rather, there is (strictly speaking) no person, there 
are just bundles of connected memories, intentions, thoughts, sensations, beliefs and 
desires which achieve continuity. When we speak of persons we speak of no more than 
these continuing and connected psychological states. 
77ie silualed-embodied-agent view 
The alternative view, which I shall advocate at greater length in the final chapter, is the 
situated-cmbodied-agent view of the person. According to this view in its most general 
form, psychological phenomena are properly understood only in a contextually embedded 
manner: they cannot be characterized independently of the situated context. This marks a 
major distinction between this view and the Locke-Parfit view. According to the Locke- 
Parfit view, a person is constituted solely by psychological phenomena. So this view is 
reductive of the notion of the person. Given the situated-embodied-agent view of the 
person, it is not possible to charactcrize psychological phenomena independently of an 
embedding context. So psychological phenomena are given a broad construal and the 
notion of the person is not reduced, but enlarged. As I shall show, such intentional 
mental states involve factors that might otherwise seem external to the psychological 
phenomena themselves. To anticipate, we are partly situated as human beings by our 
bodies, which place us in a historical context of time and place. So, in contradistinction 
to Locke, the concept of the person constitutively involves what Anscombe called the 
58 Hume (1739) (1. iv. section vi) p. 302. 
59 ibid. p. 311. 
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'living human body'. 60 In addition, the situated context involves human agency, itself 
pervaded by psychological phenomena, because we act and interact with our 
surroundings in a way that can be interpreted humanly. According to Toulmin, having 
cgoals, purposes, and interests of their own', makes human beings 'agents', and gives 
them a certain moral status. 61 That agency is manifest in bodily action and used in 
historical and cultural human contexts. Although more needs to be said about this view, 
it is clear that the situated-embodied-agent view of the pe. rson is predicated on a broad 
(externaliSt62) view of psychological phenomena. 
Gillett points to this sort of conception of the person too: 
'The understanding of mental predicates is tied to our experience of identifiable 
and reidentifiable persons. ... 
To know that I am a person is to know that I fit, in a 
reciprocating way, into those forms of life where interpersonal discourse 
occurs. '63 
For Gillett it is true both that our conception of persons is closely tied to psychological 
phenomena and that to be a person is to be situated in a certain form of life. Gillett later 
derives some support for his view from clinical practice: 
'A pertinent empirical fact is that a person with dementia rctains a sense of self 
and the ability to make simple verbal and conceptual judgements longer than other 
cognitive abilities and well after spatio-temporal orientation is lost. ... self- 
identification and self-awareness go hand in hand with making judgements. '64 
He argues that making judgements conceptually entails T thoughts. It seems right to 
notice that even the severely demented, in showing mastery of some concepts, can 
60 It is worth giving the full quotation: '... when I use the word "person" here, I use it in the sense in 
which it occurs in "offences against the person" At this point people will betray how deeply they are 
infected by dualism, they will say: "You are using 'person' in the sense of 'body' " --and what they mean 
by "body" is something that is still there when someone is dead. But that is to misunderstand "offences 
against the person" None such can be committed against a corpse. 'The person' is a living human 
body. ' (Anscombe (1975) pp. 60-61. ) 
61 Toulmin (1990). 
62 See Davidson (1995) op. cit. 
63 Gillett (1992) pp. 38-39. 
64 ibid. p. 45. 
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thereby be reaffin-ning a sense of self. Gillett goes on to say: 
'... the T who is a subject of conceptual thought is not only the "subject of these 
conscious states", but also an objectively identifiable and engaged member of a set 
of conceptual practices, or, as Strawson Puts it, "a person among others"'. 65 
Now this sort of conception of the person is in contrast to the Locke-Parfit view, which 
takes no account of other persons, or the context in which a person is embedded. 
Indeed, an externalist account argues, contrary to the Locke-Parfit view, that a person's 
mental states are to a large degree constituted by his or her environment. Again, the 
distinction between a causal and constitutive account must be kept in view. Locke and 
Parfit would not deny the importance of the environment as the causal source of our 
mental states. They would not regard, however, those mental states as being in any way 
constituted by external factors. I shall argue that intentional psychological concepts have 
to be understood constitutively as potentially involving others on account of their 
normative nature. Whether this means that other people must actually be involved will 
need to be discussed. This need not be the case if the normativity is regarded as 
transcendental. As I shall suggest, our mental states at least require the potential 
involvement of other people and the world. But if it is correct to argue that intentional 
psychological concepts can be understood constitutively as culturally and historically 
embedded, then the situated view of the person is supported. A causal account is still 
relevant, none the less, to the pcrson's. embodied nature. The agentivc nature of persons 
is relevant in that, to be an agent acting in a context, the person requires a body. If 
persons are regarded as agents, therefore, then personhood cannot simply be conceived 
as consciousness, for consciousness must be embodied in order to act. So the causal 
account comes into play in the constitutive account, but the constitutive account I shall 
give involves an externalist stance. 
Having briefly presented two views of the person, I shall now note that the view taken of 
the person has practical and ethical implications in dementia. So getting our views right 
65 ibid. p. 39. The reference to Strawson is to his (1959), p. 103. 
is a matter of some imperative. 
Different perspectives on ethical issites 
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Both of the views just sketched of the person have implications for dementia. To take the 
Locke-Parfit view first, it seems that if a person's thoughts at one time are disconnected 
from his or her thoughts at another, for instance because of problems of memory, Locke 
and Parfit would claim that the person is, properly speaking, not one, but two. As 
Glover puts it: 
'The psychological unity of a life is not all-or-none. Memories or intentions can 
fade or disappear. I can be linked psychologically to other stages of my life to a 
greater or lesser degree. If I am hit in old age by scnile dementia, perhaps nearly 
all my present self will have faded out. '66 
Locke said quite explicitly, comparing the "mad man" to the "sober man", 
'... if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable 
consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different 
times make different persons'. 67 
Parfit has suggested that as psychological connections are reduced, 
4 when there has been any marked change of character or style of life, or any 
marked loss of memory', someone might say 'It was not I who did that, but an 
earlier self'. 6- 
And such thoughts have practical relevance, as is seen in discussions of advance 
directives in dementia. 69 The problem is to decide how much psychological continuity is 
necessary to ascribe any sense to personal identity. With these thoughts in mind, for 
instance, Hope accepts (with reluctance) the thought that a man before and after dementia 
66 Glover (1988) p. 102. 
67 Locke op. cit. (11. xxvii. 20) p. 217. 
68 Parfit (1971). 
69 Dresser (1995). 
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is in fact a different person. 70 Similarly, but going one step further, Buchanan suggests 
(whilst discussing disputes about advanced directives) that the being with severe 
dementia, lacking the appropriate Locke-Parfit psychological continuities, is not a person 
at all. 71 Clearly, such a view will have implications for other end-of-life decisions. 
Thus, Parfit writes: 
' ... a person can gradually cease to exist some time before 
his heart stops 
beating. This will be so if the distinctive features of a person's mental life 
gradually disappear. This often happens. We can plausibly claim that, if the 
person has ceased to exist, we have no moral reason to help his heart go on 
beating, or to refrain from preventing this. '72 
Just as the Locke-Parfit view has ethical implications for dementia, so too with the 
situated-embodied-agent view of the person. There are some ideas that cannot be 
encompassed by the Lock-e-Parfit view of the person. For instance, Dworkin considers 
the notion of autonomy in connection with dementia. 73 Dworkin accepts an 'integrity- 
based theory of autonomy', which 
'focuses not on individual decisions one by one, but the place of each decision in 
a general program or picture of life the agent is creating and constructing, a 
conception of character and achievement that must be allowed its own distinctive 
integrity'. 74 
On the basis of this theory, Dworkin suggests that we should respect 'precedent 
autonomy': if we cannot respect a demented person's autonomy now, we can respect (if 
made clearly) the autonomous decisions arrived at before the dementia. 
The general philosophical point is that precedent autonomy is predicated on the view, 
distinctly acknowledged and accepted by Dworkin, that personal identity survives serious 
70 Hope (1994a). 
71 Buchanan (1988). 
72 Parfit (1984) p. 323. 
73 Dworkin (1986). 
74 ibid. 
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dementia. 75 If this were not the case, then the integrity view would lose its purchase in 
the case of dementia. But the suggestion that personal identity survivcs serious dementia 
is not one compatible with the Locke-Parfit view of the person since, according to this 
view, the demented self is not the same as the earlier non-dcmented self. What I wish to 
bring out is that the view of the person is crucial to discussions of ethical issues relating 
to dementia. The integrity view of autonomy, in keeping with the situatcd-cmbodicdý 
agent view of the person, stresses the importance of a person's agency and history (in 
which the person is situatcd). 76 
Sticking to the same theme, Agich claims that "autonomy" cannot be precisely defined 
and raises for psychiatry 'conceptual and theoretical questions such as the nature of the 
self or consciousness'. 77 Elsewhere he corrimends the idea that 'human beings attain 
autonomy only through human relationships'. 78 Even if this could be interpreted as a 
causal claim, that human relationships cause autonomy, persons arc best understood, 
according to Agich, in t6rins of a shared social world which, 
'gives form and substance to the individual's actions and also provides a way to 
understand persons as concrete agents who exhibit complex experiential relations 
with the world and othcrs'. 79 
This sounds more like a constitutive claim, in that it suggests the 'shared social world' 
provides 'a way to understand persons', as if part of what it is to be a person is to be 
embedded in the shared world. Although Agich's account lays all the emphasis on 'the 
social' - which would be in keeping with the social constructionist model that I criticize in 
Chapter 5- it is the situated-embodied-agent view. of the person, rather than the Locke- 
Parfit'view, which squares more readily with Agich's account of autonomy in dementia. 
75 Dworkin (1993) p. 237. 
76 Exactly what will count in the characterization of the view of the person I am commending will 
largely depend on the characterization of psychological phenomena, which I shall pursue in Chapter 2. 
Any suggestions about what will count in my characterization of psychological phenomena are merely 
illustrative at present. 
77 Agich (1994). 
78 Agich (1993) p. 46. 
79 ibid. p. 153. 
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So, again, the view of the person is crucial for ethical issues relating to dementia. 
If autonomy is affected, so too is consent. On the Locke-Parfit view, it would seem that 
the possibility of someone like Mr. Z ever giving consent (say, to a brain scan) is ruled 
out. This is not because of ordinary problems to do with the criteria for valid consent 
(which mainly concern autonomy), but because Mr. Z is never the same person for very 
long, and may not be a person at all. On the situatcd-embodied-agent view of the person, 
it would be possible to argue that other things in Mr. Ts life would incline one to think 
that he would consent to the brain scan (e. g. he was technically-mindcd and scientifically 
inquisitive and, when competent, always agreed to investigations). In addition, if part of 
the view of his personhood (by virtue of the implied embeddedness) included his 
relationship with his wife, there could (arguably) be reasons for taking her consent as 
sufficient (although this is not accepted in English law). A general point might be that the 
interests of family carers, who are integral to the contextual situation of the person with 
de! nentia, should be given sufficient weight in clinical decisions. 80 Such a view is more 
easily squared with an account of persons that brings into play external features, as does 
the situated-embodicd-agcnt view, rather than the Locke-Parfit view, which confines 
itself to a narrow understanding of psychological phenomena. Without further argument, 
it seems to me that other issues relating to dementia, such as the limits of confidentiality, 
the need for long-term care and cnd-of-lifc decisions, might all be decided differently 
precisely because of differing views of the person. 81 
71e conneclion beliýeen the main plot and the sub-plot 
Having presented two views of the person and noted that the view taken actually makes a 
practical (ethical) difference, I now wish to tic this sub-plot into the main plot. For, as I 
shall argue more fully in Chapter 6, the main plot supports the situated-embodied-agent 
view of the person. What will emerge, in the discussion in Chapter 2, is the way in 
80 Hughes (in press). 
81 See, e. g., Roth (1996) who discusses the treatment or non-treatment of people with severe dementia, 
along with the possibility of euthanasia, and the relevance of the personality. 
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which intentional psychological states constrain the world normatively. If I correctly 
remember, something must be the case. The Wittgensteinian analysis shows how 
normativity makes this link between intentional psychological concepts or phenomena 
and the world, through their embedding in worldly practices. 
So, if intentional psychological phenomena have to be understood as embedded in the 
cultural and historical world of meaning, then, since persons are conceived as 
psychological beings, they must be understood in this situated context, in which they act 
and interact as bodily agents. Hence, the main plot supports the situated-cmbodied-agcnt 
view of the person. And note, it supports this view of the person even if we start by 
focusing on the psychological status of the person. In other words, even if we start with 
the Locke-Parfit view - that persons are constituted solely by their psychological states - 
the Wittgcnstcinian analysis of the main argument broadens our understanding of 
psychological states in a way that supports the situated-embodied -agent view. I shall 
leave further discussion of this point until Chapter 6. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have introduced the notion of dementia. I have, more substantively, 
introduced the two arguments of the thesis, which concern, first, an analysis of 
intentional psychological states as a way of understanding dementia; and, secondly, an 
account of how we should understand the person in the light of our understanding of 
dementia. 
I have, in addition, advertized two arguments in the course of this chapter. First, the 
account of intentional psychological states that I sball give, in order to understand the 
reality of Mr. Z's dementia, must be a constitutive account. Thus, part of the point of the 
thcsis is to demonstratc the possibility that thcre is anothcr account to bc givcn, in 
addition to the causal account. The understanding derived will be broader, but, as I have 
suggested, a constitutive account can acconunodate a causal explanation. Secondly, 
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through the analysis of psychological phenomena that is the business of the main 
argument and, in particular, through the understanding of the normative nature of 
intentional psychological states that I shall present, it turns out that the main argument is 
consistent with the view of the person as a situated embodied agent. It does this by 
expanding the constitutive account of intentional psychological states, otherwise offered 
by the Locke-Parfit view, to involve the historical and cultural context of the world in 
which such concepts are embedded. 
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Chapter 2. 
Rule-following and intentional psychological states 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to derive from Wittgenstein's rule-following discussion an 
account of intentional psychological states. This is a continuation of the main plot, which 
concerns an analysis of such states in order to understand dementia. The chapter gains its 
point from Wittgenstein's observation that concept-use and rule-following have 
something in common, especially as regards intentional psychological states. I shall 
derive a Wittgensteinian account of intentional psychological states, which can be used as 
a critique of mod6ls of dementia. This account will be central to the main aim of the 
thesis: a broad understanding of dementia. In addition, the Wittgensteinian account will 
affect our understanding of what it is to be a person, which is the concern of the sub-plot. 
The chapter concentrates on Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following., This will 
involve a certain amount of exegesis. I should emphasize that the point of the exegesis is 
the practical need to understand dementia. Thus, having decided that dementia is best 
understood by considering intentional psychological states, it is imperative to understand 
such states. The insight I derive from Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations is that 
these states are normative, which is best understood in terms of their being rule- 
governed.. Of course, it is possible to take a thoroughly sceptical approach towards rules. 
This route is blocked by rules being considered as practices, but this only works if these 
practices are embedded in the world. In outline, then, the overall stages of the argument 
arc as follows: 
" Intentional psychological states show nonnativity; 
" Normativity is a matter of being rule-govcrned; 
" Rules and rule-following involve practices and customs; 
" Practices and customs are embedded in the world. 
I PI §§ 138-242. 
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There arc five further sections to the chapter, which expand the above outline, before the 
conclusion: 
1.1 need to establish that intentional psychological states are normative; and, in 
addition, normativity is a matter of rule-following. Thus, here I present the first two 
stages of the argument above as the basis upon which the rest of the chapter stands. The 
question then is, what actually constitutes rule-following? 
2. Wittgenstein dismisses various suggestions about what might constitute rule- 
following. It is not a matter of metaphysical tracks leading us. Neither is it a matter of 
causal processes, nor of internal mental processes. Each of these possibilities can be 
thought of as supporting a different view of intentional psychological states and, 
therefore, different ways of understanding dementia. 
3. Another possibility, advocated famously by Kripke, is that a thoroughly 
sceptical view of rule-following can be adopted. Kripke interprets Wittgenstein as saying 
that no account can be given to justify our insistence on the reality of rules. In this 
section I establish the strength of the sceptical challenge. Scepticism is erroneous (we 
are, after all, able to distinguish cognitive impairment from its absence) but, none the 
less, its challenge has philosophical force. 
4. Kripkc's sceptical challenge is met by emphasizing the role of practices and 
customs. Here I shall consider the community view (of Kripke and Malcolm) and 
constructivism (advocated by Wright) as two possible accounts of what this emphasis on 
practices amounts to. I shall, however, level arguments against both accounts. 
5. Instead, I shall commend the notion that these practices must be understood as 
embedded in the human world. This embeddedness amounts to a transcendental account 
of normativity, as suggested by Luntley. It suggests externalism with respect to 
intentional mental content. It is in keeping with McDowell's quietist interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's comments on intentional mental states. The relevance of this literature to 
my thesis is that it provides an interpretation of Wittgenstein, which suggests normativity 
has to be understood as constitutive of intentional psychological phenomena, as well as' 
being irreducible and transcendental. 
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This chapter will show that the norinativity of intentional psychological states is a matter 
of worldly embedded practices. Normativity, as a fact about the world, is related to other 
features of the world, but cannot be further explained in terms of such facts. It is a given 
in the human world of practices. I shall then use the Wittgensteinian account of 
intentional psychological states as a critique of the various models of dementia, which I 
consider in subsequent chapters. 
2.1 Psychological states, rules and normativity 
In this section I shall set out two of the premýisses that motivate the rest of the discussion. 
The first needs some explanation; the second is more like an analytical truth. They are: 
* Intentional psychological states are nonnative; 
* Normativity is a matter of being rule-following. 
Psychological states and normativily 
As a preliminary to the discussion of rules, Wittgenstein points out that the experience of 
understanding is something that can occur 'in a flash', but this seems contrary to the 
notion of meaning as use, which implies a process in tiMe. 2 He amplifies this by 
asking, 'can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand 
it 
... ? '. 3 This central question concerns the problem of intentionality as 
it relates to 
understanding. The problem is that understanding is about something and it seems, 
therefore, as if the something should 'come l5efore my mind' when Lhavc understood. 
Furthermore, if in the present I say, 'Now I understand', I am comrnitted to certain 
things in the future. So how does the thing before my mind now constrain the future? 
Given that 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language'4 Wittgenstein's question is: 
2 PI § 138. 
3 PI § 139. 
4 PI § 43. 
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how can all the future uses come before my mind when I understand the meaning of a 
word or phrase? But when it is said that I have understood, say, the meaning of the 
word "chair", it is implied that I shall call a chair "a chair" and not "a table", notjust 
today, but tomorrow and for the foreseeable future. 'This just is what it is to understand 
the word "chair". In which case, it might seem ('in a queer way's) that I must have the 
potential uses of "chair" already in mind, otherwise it will not be the case that I 
understand its meaning. All of this follows from the intentional nature of the concept of 
69 understanding", but also from the supposition that understanding involves something 
coming 'before my mind'. 
For the sake of clarity, I should obsene that there is a trivial sense in which all concept- 
use is normative. It is trivially true that the concept "chair" refers to some things and not 
others. Similarly, a word such as "understand" must retain its meaning. But intentional 
psychological states, such as "my understanding that p", seem to involve a further 
commitment. For when I say 'I understand the Cyrillic alphabet' the mental state of 
understanding at once determines something in the world, namely what must be the case 
when I am presented with a text written in the Cyrillic alphabet. What is true of 
understanding is also true of intending and remembering. The unique aspect of 
intentional psychological states is the way in which they make contact with and constrain 
the actual instances that justify my saying I understand, intend or mean something, even 
when these instantiations are not yet in existence. The normativity thus demonstrated is 
absent, however, in a starkly contrasting way when I consider the physical state of being 
a chair. There is nothing more to being a chair than being a chair! But an intentional 
psychological state constitutively and normatively involves something else being the case. 
Often what is constrained will be in the future. But the temporal relationship is not 
crucial. Rather, the point is that being in a mental state normatively constrains the 
5 PI § 195. 
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world. 6 All intentional psychological states, that is, raise the question that motivates 
Wittgcnstein's discussion of rulc-following: how can it be that something that happens 
'in a flash' (the meaning of a word occurring to me, i. e. a mcntal state) fits something 
extended over time (namely, my actual use of the word, i. e. something that features in the 
world)? 7 
There is the potential for confusion since the nonnativity that governs the usage of ally 
word is ultimately a matter of meaning; and meaning something involves an intentional 
psychological state. So, when I say 'That's a chair', the meaning of the phrase is 
constrained intentionally because it is a way of connecting a mental state (viz. meaning 
"chair') to a state of the world. It can be argued that, in itself, the mental state involved 
in seeing and naming a chair (aside from the intentionality of meaning) is similar to other 
non-intentional psychological phenomena, such as experiencing redness. If I say 'I see a 
red patch', the mental state in itself does not constrain the world. If anything, on this 
view, matters are the reverse: redness in the world constrains my mental state. In 
intentional mental states, the mental states constrain the world. 8 
When Wittgenstein starts to consider understanding, the notion of normativity 
immediately comes into view. My understanding of the meaning of "chair" determines 
(for me) how I should use the word "chair" and this is determined for as long as I am 
able to use this language. Wittgenstein notices that, rather than this sort of fact being 
shocking, it is expected and accepted in our everyday use of language. In normal cases 
6 Nevertheless, the constraining of the future is the alerting and striking feature of these states. In the 
case of remembering, when I say 'I remember... ', I constrain the future inasmuch as I cannot then act in a 
way that does not confonn to that which I said I remembered. But, additionally, the state of remembering 
(unlike the state of being a chair) normatively involves something's having been the case in the world. 
7 PI §§ 138-139. 
8 More needs to be said about non-intentional states and normativity. McDowell (1991) argues that the 
relevant non-intentional concepts cannoVbe understood simply from the subject's point of view. The 
concepts set up normative links both with the mental states and with the 'publicly accessible 
circumstances' (p. 160) in which the normal expression of the concepts takes place. Whilst I am leaving 
aside the complication of non-intentional mental states, which I should have to discuss further if my 
main focus %vere on the mind-brain problem, I discuss this passage again between pp. 188-190. 
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'the use of a word is clearly prescribed, 9 and people generally 'apply Ihis picture like 
this'. 10 We expect, as we do when we weigh things, constancy and prcdictability. 11 
Normativity is, at least, expected in normal cases. But if normality did not hold, 
'if rule became exception and exception rule ... this would make our normal 
language-games lose their point'. 12 
Wittgenstein inuTiediatelY sets about considering a language-game in which signs are used 
in accordance with a rule in response to orders. This takes the discussion into the main 
body of the rule-following considerations. 
In passing, however, it is worth noting that I have raised a difficult issue regarding the 
connection between normativity and the normal. Later in the chapter I shall discuss 
whether normativity, through its connection to practice, might either be a matter of the 
normal practice of the community, or a reflection of the normal unfolding of human 
propensities and conventions. I shall prefer the stance that takes normativity not to be a 
matter of (e. g. ) normal diýpositions, although there is a connection between what we 
normally do and normativity. The normal and abnormal use of words is the stuff of 
normativity. But this refers to the normativity that governs all word usage, rather than 
the normativity of intentional mental content. The view I shall endorse, however, takes 
the normativity of intentional psychological phenomena to be a transcendental matter; that 
is, a matter of the preconditions for normal usage. 13 
What needs to be kept in rnind is that the normativity relevant to intentional Psychological 
states is constitutive. It is not something that is optional: I cannot allow that my pupil has 
understood how to 'add 2' when he or she continues the series by saying '1004' after 
9 PI § 142. 
10 PI §141. 
11 PI § 142. 
12 ibid. 
13 Some important questions about the relationship of the normal to the normative are well teased out by 
Eldridge (1986). His answer emphasizes naturalness: 'our selves are partially determined by the practices 
we find natural'. This sounds almost trivially true. Since he does not draw out a transcendental account 
of normativity I prefer not to pursue his argument. 
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'1000'. The meaning of 'add 2' is powerfully constraining. It is poiverfully 
constraining because it is constitutive of 'add 2' that only by adding 2 have I acted in 
accord with the meaning of 'add 2'. Luntley puts the point thus: 
'The normativity of content means that understanding the meaning of an 
expression requires that you grasp certain patterns of use. These are patterns of 
use that you have to grasp if you understand the concept. ... Understanding the 
concept places certain obligations upon the speaker to use the concept in a 
patterned manner. '14 
Intentional psychological states involve normativity as a constitutive feature. This 
particular mental state (e. g. understanding, intending or remembering) that I now 
experience involves the norms that govern whether or not the mental state can be assessed 
as true or false, even if those norms will be realized in the future. 
The ride-governed nature of nonnalivity 
The claim that intentional psychological states are constitutively normative depends partly 
upon the analogy between rules and intentional psychological states. It clearly is 
constitutive of rules that they should constrain, that they should lay down norms. The 
point that Wittgenstein employs is that we can similarly think of psychological 
phenomena. In the example of completing an arithmetical series, indeed, the two things 
coincide: understanding how to complete the series (a psychological phenomenon) is the 
ability to apply the arithmetical rule. In Wittgenstein's discussion of reading, it is the 
way in which the written words ineluctably (or normatively) guide the reader that is 
crucially puzzling. Wittgenstein describes this in various ways: it is the experience, 
'of being influenced, of causal connexion, of being guided ... I as it were feel the 
movement of the lever which connects seeing the letters with speak-ing. '15 
Or, I might describe it by saying that, 
'the written word intimates the sound to me. S Or again, ... letter and sound form 
14 Luntley (1999) p. 16. 
15 PI § 170. 
a unity - as it Nvere an alloy. '16 
Wittgenstein adds: 
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'In the same way e. g. the faces of famous men and the sound of their names are 
fused together. This name strikes me as the only right one for this face. '17 
The normative relation between the face and the name, or (in the case of reading) between 
the word and its sound, can be discussed in terms of rules. It is worth noting, in 
passing, that failure to recognize familiar faces is a symptom in dementia which I shall 
discuss in Chapter 3. Understanding what constitutes face-recognition, therefore, is 
important for our constitutive understanding of dementia. 
It is the normativity of intentional psychological states, such as understanding and 
reading, that interested Wittgenstein. Recognizing that this normativity is a matter of 
intentional psychological states (and not just concepts) being rule-governed gives point to 
the rule-following considerations. 18 Thus it is natural for Wittgenstein to link an account 
of understanding to an account of what it is to follow a rule, as in an arithmetical series, 
for cxample. 19 Moreover, normativity is a feature of intentional psychological 
phenomena that is generalizable: 
'A wish seems already to know what will or would satisfy it; a proposition, a 
thought, what makes it true - even when that thing is not there at all! Whence this 
determining of what is not yct therc? This dcspotic dcmand? '20 
In this section I have established the basis of the argument that follows. Intentional 
psychological states arc normative. This is a constitutive feature: they constrain how the 
world will be. What is special about intentional psychological concepts is that they 
involve, constitutively, a link being made between a particular mental state and something 
16 PI § 171. 
17 ibid. 
18 Hence, for instance, the point of the discussion about A giving B an order that has to be written down 
according to a rule (e. g. PI §§ 143-147). 
19 PI §§ 151 -154. 
20 PI § 437. 
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constrained in the world to satisfy the mental state. This constraining works in the way 
that rules work. What is at issue, therefore, is the nature of rule-following. 
2.2 The negative conclusions 
Normativity is the crucial, but puzzling, feature of intentional psychological states. The 
rulc-following discussion is largely concerned with the negative task of undennining a 
number of possible explanations of the normativity of understanding. How it is that 
something we 'grasp in a flash' can constrain the future might be explained by underlying 
metaphysical, mental or causal processes, but the rule-following discussion shows that 
such explanations are deficient. In the rest of this section I shall briefly consider the 
negative arguments used by Wittgenstein to show what does not constitute rule- 
following. 21 On the way, I shall advertize some possible implications of the discarded 
theories for our understanding of dementia. This is a move, therefore, in the direction of 
the main argument, which will require the rule-following considerations to furnish a more 
positive account. 
Rides and Platonism 
Platonism makes normativity a metaphysical notion. It postulates fixed rails of correct 
usage. The rails are laid out in advance and somehow guide the intentions implicit in my 
use of concepts. The idea that there is some ideal (a fixed track-) to which concepts 
conform has, at least, some intuitive appeal in mathematics. Wittgenstein considers the 
idea (only to reject it) in his discussion of rule-following in connection with the giving of 
the order to 'add 2'. 22 The suggestion is that, having given this order, it is somehow 
predetermined that when the pupil reaches 1000, the next number will be 1002, and not 
1004, even if this possibility has not actually occurred to the teacher. Wittgenstein's 
description of the Platonist's thought is as follows: 
21 See Thornton (1998) pp. 3048. 
22 cf. P1 H 185-187. 
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your idea was that that act of meaning the order had in its own way already 
traversed all those steps: that when ), on meant it your mind as it were flew ahead 
and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one. 
Thus you were inclined to use such expressions as: "the steps are really already 
taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought. " And it seemed 
as if they were in some unique way predetermined, anticipated - as only the act of 
meaning can anticipate reality. '23 
Before indicating what is wrong with this view, it is illuminating to consider the 
implications for our understanding of dementia. Say that following a rule is a matter of 
adhering to metaphysical tracks, then intentional psychological phenomena would have to 
be accounted for constitutively in such terms. Therefore, when I calculate something I 
am (in some sense) steered as I make the calculation towards the solution. I might take a 
wrong turning, because I have not latched on to the rails sufficiently. But there is a 
metaphysical sense in which, once I have the track in view, I can be sure that my 
calculation is correct. Because others will have access to the same metaphysical rails, 
they will agree. What makes a calculation correct is not the agreement, but the Platonic 
ideal to which we all conform. In which case the person with dementia, who used to be 
able to calculate but can no longer, must be - in some sense - derailed. He or she has lost 
track and dementia amounts to a metaphysical loss of mind. 
Although the thought that normativity is present as some sort of 'superlative fact'24 is 
tempting as a way of accounting for its force, it is problematic. The main problem is that, 
even if there were a Platonist realm containing the standards to which we had to conform 
to follow a series or use a word with meaning, there would be within that realm another 
standard according to which, having reached 1000, the pupil ought to say '1004' rather 
than '1002'. The question then becomes how will Nve know which standard to choose? 
That is, the Platonic realm, which is supposed to supply normativity, requires some 
23 PI § 188. 
24 PI § 192. 
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normatively-constrained means of choosing within it. It just is not possible to track a 
metaphysical standard without already having some notion of what is and is not correct, 
but this is the account of normativity that the metaphysical standard is intended to 
SUpply. 25 
Pears takes an approach which emphasizes that speaking a language is a practice: 
'Wittgenstein's objection to [Platonism] is that it removes the basis of the 
distinction between obeying and disobeying a linguistic rule. Speaking a 
language is a practice and it is an essential feat of any practice that its followers 
cannot slavishly conform to any fixed paradigm, even a metaphysical one. What 
they actually do necessarily makes some contribution to determining what counts 
as what they ought to do. '26 
The underlying point is the same. It will be, 
t completely mysterious how the one-off attachment of a word to a thing puts it in 
a position to pick up all and only the possibilities inherent in the thing. '27 
Rather than pursue Wittgenstein's thoughts about Platonism further, I simply wish to 
note that, despite its intuitive appeal as a way of describing the phenomenological 
experience of normatiVity, 28 Platonism cannot provide a coherent account of normativity. 
So intentional psychological states arc not a matter of a metaphysical attachment and, 
however appealing as figurative speech, dementia is not some sort of metaphysical 
derailment. 
Rules and mental processes 
What, then, of the possibility that rule-following is a matter of an internal mental process? 
25 cf. Thornton op. cit. p. 42. 
26 Pears (1988) p. 363. For a fuller account, Pears devotes two chapters to the rule-following V 
considerations, the second of which (pp. 460-501) specifically concerns the rejection of the Platonic 
Theory in PI. 
27 ibid- p- 364. 
28 cf. PI §§ 218-221. 
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A comparison can be made between following a rule and understanding a series. 
Wittgenstcin points out various ways in which a pupil might go wrong when asked to 
write down a series of numbers. He suggests (ironically) the impossibility of stating for 
certain when the series has been mastered. 29 Understanding how to go on in a series 
may lead to an exclamation: "Now I can go on! ", 30 as if the understanding appeared in a 
flash, but it is not the case that just one thing may have happened in this flash. It may be 
that a formula has occurred to the person, or it may be that the pupil simply rcalised that 
he knew the series (say he had seen it before, but did not recall it until this instant). 
Thus, "'He understands" must have more in it than: the formula occurs to him'. 31 
Wittgenstein suggests, ironically, that what we do is try 'to get hold of the mental process 
of understanding which seems to be hidden' behind more readily apparent 
accompanimentS. 32 Even if we found, however, some one thing that happened in all the 
specific examples of understanding, why should that be the understanding? Wittgenstein 
points out, too, that the talk of understanding being hidden is odd, since I can say that I 
have understood when I have understood! 
I might find particular circtunstances which justify my saying "Now I can go on". I learn 
the meaning of a word under particular circumstanceS. 33 Hence, 
'Try not to think of understanding as a "mental process" at all. - For that is the 
expression which confuses you. ... 
In the sense in which there are processes 
(including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, . 
understanding is not a mental process. '34 
It is important to notice that Wittgenstein does not here deny mental processes. He denies 
that there is a particidar mental process meant by understanding. There may be various 
29 PI §145. 
30 PI §151. 
31 PI § 152. 
32 PI §153. 
33 Z§§ 114-116. 
34 PI §154. 
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mental processes occurring during an act of understanding, but none constitutes 
understanding. 
What it is to remember, therefore, is not fully given'by reference to inner processes. 
Wittgenstcin argues rather that remembering is something that takes place in particular 
circumstamces and, moreover, that these external circumstances give us grounds for 
ascribing mental capabilities. It would follow that an account of dementia that 
concentrates on internal, mental processes as a way of explaining intentional 
psychological phenomena would be too narrow. Understanding dementia also requires 
reference to be made to circumstances and to the world. I shall return to discuss 
problems surrounding inner processes during my discussion, in Chapter 4, of cognitive 
neuropsychology. 
Rides and causal processes 
Similar thoughts are relevant to the suggestion that rule-following is a matter of causal 
processes. Such a view suggests that the normativity of intentional psychological 
phenomena is just a matter of certain things being caused. For instance it can be argued, 
as in the disease model of chapter 3, that my being able to recognize someone is a matter 
of particular physical processes going on in my brain. 35 These neurons cause me to 
remember a face and their absence means I forget. If intentional psychological 
phenomena are constituted by causal processes, a narrow conception of the disease model 
of dementia would be true. Wittgenstein's discussion, however, suggests that causal 
processes provide an inadequate construal of rule-following. 
Wittgenstein discusses the topic of reading at some length, perhaps because, it allows him 
to consider the possibility of a reading machine. 36 Such a machine will work- along 
35 In the case of reading, which I discuss below, Wittgenstein considers the possibility that all we really 
need to be certain whether or not someone is reading is a better acquaintance with the nervous system. 
See PI § 158. 
36 PI § 157. 
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causal lines and it can be compared to the mechanistic processes that might go on in 
human readers. Written words can be regarded as imposing a rule on the reader. The 
beginner and the experienced reader may sound the same and they may even be conscious 
of the same things as they read particular words. Yet they are clearly radically different, 
which might tempt us to hypothesize a different mechanism at work in each case and, 
indeed, there is something different going on. But then, 'these mechanisms are only 
hypotheses, models designed to explain, to sum-up, what you observe. '37 Comparing 
the beginner to the competent reader allows the possibility that the underlying mechanism 
of reading might be identified: it could be the experience of the beginner speeded up, but 
only if there is some such causal mechanism at work in both cases. 
Wittgenstein considers the possibility that 'you derive the reproduction from the 
ofiginal'. 38 The notion of "deriving" might help us to explain the psychological 
mechanism that constitutes being compelled by a rule, in this case the rule that causes us 
to move from printed letters to particular sounds. As with understanding, it appears we 
are looking for the essence of what it is to derive - something hidden - whereas the 
meaning of "derive" is plain in its use. Still, deriving turns out not to get us any further 
than reading itself. There will be different circumstances in which we sh all say that 
someone can read. 39 Wittgenstein puts to himself the objection that 'reading is a quite 
particular proccss'. 40 But he is unable then to identify any particidar process, although it 
is clear that various different things occur when we read, as is shown by the difference 
between reading ordinary print and reading capitals. There is not one essential feature 
which occurs in all cases of reading. 41 
For both reading and understanding, the story is the same, as summarized by Anscombe 
thus: 
37 PI § 156 -a comment pertinent to Chapters 3 and 4. 
38 PI § 162. 
39 PI § 164. 
40 PI § 165. 
41 PI § 168. 
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an), of them. Similarly there is a variety of experiences connected with an 
occasion of understanding, but 'understanding' is not the name of any of thcm. '42 
Following a rule, as exemplified either by reading or understanding, is not a particular 
experience and is defined neither by some characteristic mental accompaniment (it is not a 
mental process), nor by a set, causal sequence of events (it is not a particular causal 
process). 
A sense of normative constraint is in evidence again when Wittgenstein discusses 
copying doodles on a piece of paper and the feeling that one is guided in so doing. We 
might say 'I did it because ... ' and that 'because' seems to have a special force; 
in other 
words, there was no other way. Wittgenstein called this experiencing the 'because'. 43 
He wishes to say 'I experience the because', 44 but he does not want to call any 
- phenomenon the 'experience of the because'. 45 There is no thing in the external world, 
nor in my internal world, requiring that that line or stroke should produce from me this 
line or utterance. However, it remains true that I felt I had to do it this way. I wish to 
say 'I experience the because', when I reflect on what I experience, since, 'I look at it 
through the medium of the concept "because" (or "influence" or "cause" or 
"connexion")'. 46 The notion of "the medium" emphasizes the causal power that is being 
described. There is a hypothetical mechanism acting through the "because", which 
thereby acquires the substantial status of a medium, to cause whatever it is that is caused 
(a copied doodle, or a spoken from a written word). 
We can gain a better purchase on Wittgenstein's point by making a comparison with 
Hume. Their arguments share certain features, but are importantly different. The 
similarities include Hume saying that in single instances of mental or physical activity 
42 Anscombe (1991) p. 7. 
43 PI § 176. 
44 PI § 177. 
45 PI § 176. 
46 PI § 177. 
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'there is nothing that produces any impression ... of power or necessary connexion'. 47 
Both philosophers state that there is no phenomenon in the world to cause the feeling of 
compulsion. McGinn makes a similar comparison by suggesting that both philosophers 
demonstrate 'epistemological naturalism', in that the y both note the importance of 
training, customs and practices in their attempts to understand (e. g. ) causation. 48 
On the other hand, there are important differences, in that Hume makes matters highly 
empirical: you just always have seen billiard balls react in this way; whereas 
Wittgenstein's point emphasizes language. Hence, for instance, his wishing to say that I 
look at the experience of 'the because' 'through the medium of the concept "because"'. 49 
Wittgenstein wishes to lead us back to ordinary language in which we use such concepts 
thus and so. For Wittgenstein, this use is a normative matter: our use of concepts is 
constrained and constraining. Hume, on the other hand, merely makes a descriptive 
epistemological point about regularly observed connections coming to be habitually 
expected. The contrast here is between the contingency of the epistemological point and 
the normativity of the conceptual point. In Hume's epistemology things might have been 
different, but in Wittgenstein's metaphysics, these concepts being thus and so, their use 
is constrained and constraining. This is not a contingent matter, but a constitutive one. 
Hume leads towards scepticism concerning causality, whereas Wittgenstein's discussion 
accepts causality but places it in a broader constitutive field. What is key for Wittgenstein 
is the thought that normativity is a constitutive feature of certain sorts of human practices, 
whereas Hume's account fails to sustain the normativity that a positive account of rule- 
following requires. If causal processes are also relevant, they cannot constitute 
everything that needs to be understood about intentional psychological states. 
47 Hume (1772) p. 78. 
48 McGinn (1984) pp. 40-41. 
49 PI § 177. 
Summary 
-43- 
In this section I have considered some of Wittgenstein's negative arguments about rule- 
following. His arguments demonstrate that rulc-following is not adequately described by 
a metaphysical account, nor by inner or causal processes. Models of dementia that 
depend on such construals of intentional psychological phenomena will, accordingly, run 
into problems too: dementia is not metaphysical derailment; nor can it be understood 
solely by reference to inner abnon-nal processes, in isolation from the external 
circumstances of the world; nor should dementia be considered merely in terms of an 
interruption to causal processes. Meanwhile, is it even possible to give an account of 
what constitutes rulc-following, given the negative flavour of Wittgenstein's discussion? 
Is it possible that the negative arguments might prove overwhelming and lead to total 
scepticism concerning rule-following? On this view, intentional psychological states 
simply cannot constrain reality, since what has one meaning one day might have a 
different meaning the next. But this is problematic for dementia. For what was a sign of 
cognitive impairment yesterday, might today be normal. It is to this sceptical 
interpretation that I now turn. 
2.3 The sceptical challenge 
Given the reality of dementia, and the fact that we do operate in a normatively constrained 
world, the sceptical challenge must be met. As I shall come on to discuss, one response 
to such scepticism has been to appeal to the cornmunity as a way of securing normativity. 
On such a view, the norms that allow a diagnosis of dementia to be made inhere in the 
conununity. It is a short step, then, to consider the possibility, which I discuss in 
Chapter 5, that dementia is a social construction. It is the sceptical challenge that 
motivates the community view, so here I shall demonstrate its power. 
The charge that no constitutive account can be given of rule-following (negative 
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conclusion5O) is made in connection with §198 of the Philosophical Investigations. That 
section starts by asking how a rule can show a person what to do at a particular point. 
Wittgenstein's interlocutor suggests that, on some interpretation, whatever I do is in 
accord with the rule. Wittgenstein prefers to say that interpretations of rules can be 
various, but hang in the air since, 'Interpretations by themselves do not determine 
meaning'. 51 Elsewhere Wittgenstein comments that the statement, 'Any sentence still 
stands in need of an interpretation', would have to mean, 'no sentence can be understood 
without a rider'. 52 This line of reasoning threatens to make language and communication 
impossible, because every statement would require an interpretation, ad inj7nilwn. 
The negative conclusion, with its suggestion of an infinite regression, lay behind 
Kripke's now famous sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Kripk-c argues that, whilst 
we suppose our language expresses concepts in such a way that, once grasped, all future 
applications of the concept are determined, in fact (whatever is in my mind), I remain free 
to interpret concepts differently. 53 This follows directly from Kripke', S consideration of 
Wittgenstein stating: 'this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule'. 54 Kripke 
maintains: '[T]here is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning a definite 
function by '+... and my meaning nothing at all. '55 Kripk-e's is a radically sceptical 
interpretation of Wittgenstein. 56 
Since Kripkc's sceptical challenge itself legitimizes recourse to the community view (and 
since that view has such influence) it is worth testing the strength of the scepticism. For 
50 Budd (1989) pp. 36-37. 
51 PI 198. 
52 M§ 47. 
53 Kripke (1982). 
54 PI § 201. 
55 Kripke op. cit. p. 21. 
56 Which many have criticised. E. g. Baker & Hacker (1984), IvIcGinn op. cit., Goldfarb (1985), Pears 
(1988) pp. 456-458,479-480 & 499-500, Boghossian (1989), Stem op. cit. pp. 178-179, Stroud (1996) 
pp. 306-307, Thornton (1998) pp, 70-79. Nevertheless, few would doubt the usefulness of 1,, fipk-e's 
account in stimulating thought. 
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instance, an exchange between Pettit and Summerfield demonstrates the thoroughgoing 
nature of Kripke's scepticism. In opposition to Kripke, Pettit offers a non-sccptical 
conception of rules and rule-following according to which, he feels, the 'phenomenology 
of rule-folloAving' could be saved. 57 He argues that under appropriate circumstances an 
individual might develop an inclination to follow the correct determinate rule. A 
compelling response comes, however, from Summerfield, who states: 'various 
interpretations of a linguistic sign are alivays possible'. 58 Pettit fails on her view 
because: first, he ignores the sceptical point that we cannot say 'what determines which 
rule is the'relevant rule? '; secondly, because he thinks an inclination or disposition might 
determine which rule is the relevant rule, ignoring that such inclinations themselves may 
be signs that can logically be interpreted in various ways. 59 Thus: 
'... if rules are to guide our actions, and so on, the linguistic expressions by 
which we represent them to ourselves need to be interpreted, and we cannot fix 
the interpretation merely by producing more linguistic signs that themselves 
require interpretation, or we launch the regress. '60 
This seems to me more cogent than the multiplicity of rules, which will yet be free 
(according to Pettit) of problems of interpretation. 61 
As Kripke realized, talk of inclinations (as used by Pettit) does not capture the sort of 
normativity that inheres in psychological concepts. Another thought, however, is that it 
might actually be right to say that the correct response to a demand for a constitutive 
account of rule-following is solely to point to examples of rule-governed practices. In 
other words, perhaps there is nothing to say constitutively about rules and normativity. 
But, over against Kripke, adverting to practices (as I shall discuss below) is by no means 
to be thoroughly sceptical, especially if it yields a normative account. 62 The whole point 
57 Pettit (1990a). 
58 Surnmerfield (1990). 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
61 Pettit (1990b). 
62 The quietist or minimalist interpretation of rule-following, which comes to the fore later, is what I 
have in mind in these sentences. 
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of Kripke's critique is that there is nothing to ensure normativity. This thought led 
Kripke to his form of the community view. Before considering communitarian views, I 
shall first consider the positive interpretation provided by an emphasis on practices. 
2.4 Positive interpretations: accounts of practice 
The way to avoid the sceptical trap is to focus on rule-following as practice. This needs 
to be fleshed out. But there are then different ways of taking practices. In this section, I 
shall consider two accounts: first, the community view, which implies that practices are a 
matter of community agreement; secondly, constructivism, which suggests that practices 
are a matter of people deciding as they go along. Just to relate this back to dementia, if 
intentional psychological states really do demonstrate normativity (which scepticism 
denies), then our understanding of dementia must similarly encompass a normative 
account of such mental states. A test which might be applied, therefore, to models of 
dementia, is this: does this model of dementia allow an account of intentional 
psychological phenomena that shows normativity? Now, if normativity is akin to rule- 
following and rule-following is a matter of practice, in seeking to characterize normativity 
further, I need to consider how practices help at all. 
Rule-follbiving and practices 
Wittgenstein uses the example of a pupil exclaiming 'Now I can go on' when trying to 
grasp an arithmetical series. He points out that this exclamation is not short for a 
description of all the circumstances which might surround such an utterance. 63 My 
understanding and (say) a formula occurring to me arc two different things. 64 It might 
be, for instance, that I can carry on the series without really understanding it, but just - as I 
it were - by applying some rule. As so often, Wittgenstein points to the variety of things 
that might occur- there is no one essential thing, except that I can actually go on. Another 
63 PI § 179. 
64 PI § 154. 
-47- 
tactic, already discussed, is to point to some sort of inner mental process. But 
Wittgenstein is more interested in 'the circiunstances under which' a person having such 
an experience is justified 'in saying ... that he understands, that he 
knows how to go 
on'. 65 Concerning the exclamation, 'Now I can go on', Wittgenstein emphasizes: Wds 
is how these words are used'. 66 The exclamation is not a description of a mental state, 
nor a matter of noting a regular occurrence, which has now become habitual (as Hume 
might have suggested). It is a fallible expression indicating that one has mastercd the 
norms, or normative patterns of use, that govern the practice of continuing the series and 
supply meaning to the notion of understanding. What is needed, as an antidote to the 
picture of the mental processes and states as merely internal goings-on, is an 
understanding of the role such expressions play in language. 67 
It is in worldly contexts that judgements are made about whether or not someone has 
really read or truly understood. Wittgenstein's remarks are intended to fracture the links, 
which seem to form habitually, between intentional mental states and the inner world and 
to forge instead links between intentional mental states and the outer world; that is, he 
wishes to draw our attention to the ways in which inner and outer are enmeshed. Hence 
the importance of looking, not just inwards, but at the circimistances. For me to claim 
that I can read the Cyrillic alphabet or understand how to play chess is, therefore, 
importantly linked (whatever "inner" things may or may not be happening) to external 
circumstances or contexts. It implies that I shall do certain things in the world under 
certain circumstances, not as a way of providing evidence that certain inner things are 
also occurring, but rather as a constitutive matter this is simply what it is to read Cyrillic 
or understand chess. 
The rule-following considerations focus on the intentionality of psychological verbs, the 
way in which 'the act of me4ning can anticipate reality'. 68 Again, this is a recognition of 
65 PI §§ 154-155. 
66 PI § 180. 
67 PI § 182. 
68 PI § 188. 
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the normativity of such concepts. Wittgenstein goes on to ask: 
,... what kind of super-strong connexion exists between the act of intending and 
the thing intended? --Where is the connexion effected between the sense of the 
expression "Let's play a game of chess" and all the rules of the gamc? '69 
His response is: 'Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the day-to- 
day practice of playing'. 70 This suggests that the understanding implicit in intending to 
play chess involves an acquaintance with the whole enterprise of chess-playing. The 
point is that we should look to the full context of chess-playing to locate the connection 
between intending to play and actual playing, which involves the use of rules. This does 
not specifically answer the putative problem of intentionality, but it shows where the 
answer is to be found, namely within the day-to-day practices surrounding our use of 
psychological concepts. And this again makes the point that the answer does not lie in a 
metaphysical realm, nor in causal or inner processes. 
Understanding the meaning of a word involves understanding its use. But another way 
to put this is to say that, as in the example of playing chess, to understand meaning is to 
take part in a practice. Part of what it is to understand is precisely to be able to take part 
in the practice; this is constitutive of the understanding. Again this is a reflection of the 
normative nature of understanding, which ensures that only certain things will count as 
true understanding and other things will not. As Wittgenstcin puts it towards the end of 
the rule-following discussion: 'there is a way of grasping a rule which ... is exhibited in 
what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. '71 
Thus, to be able to follow a rule and, more to the point, to understand something, are 
matters of grasping practices. But practices have a history and context. Intentional 
psychological phenomena, therefore, to be fully understood, require an eýternal context. 
If anything is going to prevent the slide to scepticism it is likely to be found in the account 
69 PI § 197. 
70 ibid. 
71 PI § 201. 
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of practices. Whether we are speaking of rule-following or the normativity that 
surrounds remembering, what makes the rule or the intentional mental state deten-ninate is 
the constitutive practice of which the rule or the intentional mental state are instances. 
Practices involve external circumstances and contexts and these at least hold out the 
possibility of being more resistant to scepticism than inner processes and the like. What 
is needed, however, is a fuller account of such practices. 
Kripke's sceptical interpretation of Wittgenstein (which emphasizes the start of § 201) is 
undercut by the appeal to 'actual cases' (also made in § 201) and by the realization that 
C99 obeying a rule" is a pmctice. 72 Nevertheless, however wrongheadedly, the sceptical 
challenge might persist and the appeal to practice might require further unpacking. I sball 
now consider the community view and constructivism as ways of unpacking "practice". 
What is at issue for me remains our understanding of dementia. Could it be that, as 
social constructionism suggests, dementia rests on judgements about intentional 
psychological states which amount to no more than social constructs? 73 Or should we 
accept the constructivist view that what is normatively constrained is, as it were, made-up 
in an unfolding process of decisions? Or is there, perhaps, an alternative view? 
77ie community view 
Kripke's 'sceptical solution' to the 'sceptical paradox' is a version of 
communitarianism. 74 It is not just that individuals must interpret signs themselves, a 
communal practice sets a standard of rightness. So, here, the practice in which rule- 
following or normativity inhere is the practice of the community. My linguistic 
community sets checks on my use of concepts. Several responses to this view are 
possible. For instance, one can accept the sceptical point that nothing connects the 
meaning of a word to its correct use, but then be sceptical about the community, and 
72 PI § 202. 
73 cf. Chapter 5. 
74 Kripke op. cit. 
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stress the ability of the individual to assign standards of corrcetneSS. 75 The key thing is 
that 'rules arc anchored in practiCC'. 76 Alternatively, it can be argued that there is nothing 
in Wittgenstein's argument involving a comn-titment. to a 'multiplicity of agenIs'. 77 
Baker and Hacker state: 
'What is here crucial for Wittgenstein's account of the concept of following a rule 
is recurrent action in appropriate contexts, action which counts as following the 
rule. Whether others are involved is a further question. '78 
Wittgenstein might say that the grammar of 'rule-following' entails that a practice of rule- 
following must be in principle public, but this involves (according to Baker and Hacker) 
no commitment to a social context. 
Kripke is not alone in his recourse to the community view. Whilst not sharing Kripke's 
scepticism (non-factualism) about meaning. 79 Malcolm similarly writes that 'for 
Wittgenstein the concept of a rule presupposes a community within which a common 
agreement in actions fixes the meaning of a rule'. 80 In a response to the Baker and 
Hacker view (a view shared by McGinn8l) that it might be possible for a solitary person 
to follow a rule, 82 Malcolm emphasizes Wittgenstein's repeated insistence that there can 
be rules 'only within a framework of overwhelming agreement'. 83 The tenor of 
Malcolm's argument is captured by these quotations: 
'A rule can exist only in a human practice, or in what is analogous to it. And 
what a rule requires and what following it is, presupposes the background of a 
social setting in which there is quiet agreement as to what 'going on in the same 
75 Blackburn (1984). 
76 ibid. 
77 Baker & Hacker ý1984) pp. 20. 
78 ibid. pp. 20-21. 
79 Boghossian (1989) refers to Kripke's 'non-factualist conception of meaning' according to. which there 
is nothing that a person could mean by a word or sign. 
80 Malcolm (1986) p. 175. 
81 McGinn op. cit. e. g. pp. 198-200 where he states that rule-following is individualistic. 
82 Malcolm (1989). 
83 ibid. 
way' is'; 84 
similarly, 
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'Wittgenstcin always puts emphasis on the fact that the words of language have 
meaning only because they are enmeshed in common patterns of human lifC'. 85 
The issue, for my purposes, is whether it is the case that nonnativity depends on some 
sort of community agreement. The general problem with Kripke's line is that if nothing 
connects a rule or the meaning of a word to its correct application, then all judgements 
lack factual truth. 86 In addition, there can be no such thing as the sort of normativity that 
the rule-following discussion picks out as being constitutive of such notions as 
understanding or reading. There is nothing to stop the sceptical turn once it has gained a 
purchase. In which case, as Blackburn suggests, 87 one can similarly be sceptical about 
the community. This means that one will have to be sceptical about any form of 
normativity whatsoever. Normativity, on this view, need not be normative, since rules 
are objectively indeterminate. The community merely dignifies something as a case of 
rule-following. This amounts to no more than 'a projectivist account of an ersatz version 
of normativity'. 98 
Turning to the account given by Malcolm, where a word has meaning by virtue of its use 
by a community over time, whilst this does not fall foul of the incoherence suggested by 
Kripke's non-factualism, it nevertheless does mean that normativity inheres in the 
practices of the community. There is something laudable about the emphasis in 
Malcolm's account on enmeshment 'in common patterns of human life', a background 
social setting and 'human practice'. The emphasis on the hwnan context is important, 
since it is this context that is intended to supply the possibility of going wrong (however 
the individual may judge matters). 
84 ibid. 
85 ibid. 
86 See e. g. Thomton (1998) pp. 76-79. 
87 Blackbum op. cit. 
88 Thomton op. cit. p. 74. 
-52- 
Malcolm's communitarian account of normativity, however, veers away from the 
non-nativity of the Wittgensteinian account that I am commending. The possibility of 
going wrong implies that there is something external to the individual (pace Blackburn) 
and, therefore, something which is potentially public. But the public (the community) 
does not provide, contrary to Malcolm's view, criteria for what it is to go wrong. 
Rather, the possibility of public scrutiny resultsfrom the nonnativity that constitutes what 
it is to follow (or go against) a rule. It remains true that rules (and the normativity of 
intentional psychological phenomena) are enmeshed in (and only properly understood 
within the context of) common patterns of human practicc. 89 
Before moving on, it is worth relating this to the main theme surrounding dementia. If I 
wish to understand dementia, I must understand the normative nature of intentional 
r, \p§yýhological 
states. Normativity is a matter of being enmeshed in the practices of the 
community. On the communitarian reading, this suggests my model of dementia should 
regard the loss of psychological capacities as a matter decided, at some level, by the 
community. It is not just that the community is in a position to say Mr. Z has lost his 
memory, but Mr. Z's loss of memory is, or (at any rate) amounts to, a decision made by 
the community. Put this way, it sounds as if the community might have decided 
otherwise; and that sounds as if the loss of memory (indeed, the illness itself) is a 
community construct. I shall consider social constructionsirn further in chapter 5. 
I have suggested that both sceptical (non-factualist) and non-sceptical appeals to the 
community can only provide an ersatz notion of normativity. The normativity of 
intentional psychological states is constitulive. The community view makes it seem as if 
normativity is simply a consequence of public opinion. 
89 For further discussion see Chapter 5. 
Constructivism and practices 
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I shall now provide another account (suggested by Wright) of practices. This is another 
way of understanding how practices counter the sceptical challenge and, therefore, 
another way of understanding the normativity of intentional psychological phenomena. If 
true, this furnishes us with an alternative account of how we might understand dementia 
and the loss of cognitive capacities which characterizes dementia. According to this 
view, practices - which are constitutive of understanding, reading and remembering - are 
a matter of people deciding as they go along. This gives us a different picture of 
normativity as akin to a disposition. Wright says: 
'All that I can effectively intend to do is to apply "green" only when it seems to 
me that things are relevantly similar; but that is not a commitment to any regularity 
- it is merely an undertaking to apply "green" only when I am disposed to apply 
44green". '90 
We simply have sincere dispositions, but there is no guarantee that we succeed in always 
applying the word in the same way. Elsewhere, Wright suggests that the rule-following 
discussion in Wittgenstein has 'objectivity of meaning as its general target'91 and he 
labels this view 'constructivism', 92 according to which we are 'the perennial creators of 
our concepts, not in the style of conscious architects but just by doing what comes 
naturally'. 93 
Wright has not been alone in stressing natural dispositions. Budd puts emphasis, in his 
90 Wright (1981) p. 37. 
91 Wright (1986). 
92 The suggestion that Wittgenstein is a constructivist has a significant lineage. For instance: 
'Intuitionists speak of mathematics in a highly anti-realist (anti-platonic) way: for them it is we who 
construct mathematics', it is not already there waiting for us to discover. An extreme form of such 
constructivism is found in Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics' ( Dummett 
(1958-9)). Constructivism is certainly a thread which can be discerned in Wittgenstein. For instance, 
Hacker, in discussing the putative effect on Wittgenstein of the main proponent of the intuitionist 
philosophy of mathematics, L. E. J. Brouwer, whom Wittgenstein heard lecture in Vienna in 1928, 
described Wittgenstein subsequently as moving from 'realism in semantics to constructivism' (See 
Hacker (1972) p. 104. ). 
93 Wright (1986) p. 294. 
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discussion of the positive conclusion of the rulc-following considerations, on a person's 
having a capacity or disposition to respond to a sign in a particular way. 94 Pcttit attempts 
to counter Kripke's scepticism by appealing to inclinations in particular circurnstances. 95 
McGinn, too, writes: 
'What has to be recognised is that at some level meaning is fixed by our nature: 
meaning something is not an achievement of a transcendent mind divorced from 
our 'form of life'. The basis of the normative is the natural. '96 
Similarly, Bloor suggests that 'we create meaning as we move from case to casc. '97 He 
continues: 
'The real sources of constraint preventing our going anywhere and everywhere, 
as we move from case to case, are the social circumstances impinging upon us: 
our instincts, our biological nature, our sense experience, our interactions with 
other people, our immediate purposes, our training, our anticipation of and 
response to sanctions, and so on through the gamut of causes, starting with the 
psychological and ending with the sociological. '98 
Now, it is not that these authors agree in their interpretations of Wittgenstein. Indeed, 
McGinn prefers to talk of a capacity to mean something rather than a disposition; 99 and 
Wright has been severe on McGinn's views. 100 But McGinn also describes 
Wittgenstein's fundamental thesis as being 'that meaning rests ultimately upon the 
bedrock of our naturalpropensifies' (my emphasis). 101 And Wright interprets 
Wittgenstein as saying that 'the requirements of rules exist only within the framework of 
institutional activities which depend upon basic hwnan propensities to agree in 
94 Budd op. cit. p. 38. 
95 Pettit (1990a and b) discussesd above. 
96 ibid. p. 86. 
97 Bloor (1997) p. 19.1 shall discuss Bloor further in Chapter 5. 
98 ibid. p. 20. 
99 ibid. p. 174. 
100 Wright (1989). 
101 McGinn op. cit. p. 138. 
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judgement' (my emphasis). 102 So, in these various authors we find a common recourse 
to natural dispositions, propensities or inclinations, with a greater or lesser emphasis on 
the social manifestations of such dispositions, as a way of explaining how it is that 
mcaning-normativity is maintained. In other words, I am normatively constrained by my 
nature. 
There is something reasonable about the appeal to natural dispositions, in the sense that 
this is how things actually appear to be. I use words with meaning, I intend things, I 
understand and in doing so I do not feel constrained by the invisible rails of platonism, 
over against which constructivism. stands. I have freedom to be inventive in my use of 
words, so that new meanings might (naturally) emerge. But it is not so clear that 
normativity itself can simply be a matter of my doing what comes naturally. Normativity 
must provide a way to discriminate between what is right and what seems right. Of 
course, I naturally use words in a way that seems right and when I understand the 
arithmetical series, it naurally seems to me that 1004 should follow 1002. But what 
guarantees that these thiný are right and are normatively constrained? 
Wright recognizes that there is more to normativity than is supplied simply by an appeal 
to human nature. Hence he notes that Wittgenstein reminds us that, 
'the requirements of rules ... are also, in any particular case, independent of our 
judgements, supplying standards in terms of which it may be right to regard those 
judgements, even if they enjoy consensus, as incorrcct'. 103 
As this makes plain, it is not just a matter of our deciding in each particular case how we 
should be constrained, otherwise normativity would be lost. McDowell certainly 
contends that Wright's view, relying on dispositions or reactions, abolishes 
normativity. 104 The point about normativity (exploited by Kripke) is precisely that 
inclinations and dispositions cannot capture normativity since that concerns how I ought 
102 Wright (1989). 
103 ibid. 
104 McDowell (1984)-, and see Thornton (1997a). 
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to behave, rather than just how I am inclined or disposed to behave. Wittgcnstcin's 
approach, on Wright's view, was 'analytical quietism' according to which 'the 
phenomenon of actual, widespread human agreement in judgement' is simply noted. The 
question remains: is there more to normativity than human nature? 
Criticism of Wright by McDowell pays attention to his anti-realism, according to which 
meaning is ratified by my on-going use of words. The ratification is dependent upon my 
use and hence the focus on my natural dispositions. But McDowell alleges that, 
'the denial of ratification-independence, by Wright's own insistence, yields a 
picture of the relation between the communal language and the world in which 
norms are obliterated. '105 
For McDowell, it is important to retain the picture, 'in which the openness of an 
individual to correction by his fellows means that he is subject to norms', 106 but since 
this requires that we have norms in 'the 
first place, rather than that the norms are merely a 
function of the disposition of a partiýlar fellow, it seems to be an argument (and a 
transcendental one, according to McDowell) against anti-realism. On McDowell's view 
(which was intended to steer between anti-realism and Platonism), 
'Understanding is grasp of patterns that extend to new cases independently of our 
ratification, as required for meaning to be other than an illusion ...; 
but the 
constraints imposed by our concepts do not have the Platonistic autonomy with 
which they are credited ... . 
1107 
The community view makes nonnativity a consequence of practice and constructivism 
makes it a matter of on-going practice constrained by human nature. Both accounts link 
normativity to practice, but a problem remains: from how we actually do act, it may seem 
that we cannot derive how we ought to act. From the fact that, when I say I understand 
the formula, I intend 1004 to follow 1002, it does not follow that this must be so for me 
105 McDowell op. cit. 
106 ibid. 
107 ibid. 
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the next time, nor for someone else who understands the fon-nula. Practice in ilseýf does 
not provide the forceful account of normativity required to understand intentional 
psychological states. Something more is required to make practice sufficiently robust to 
carry the normative commitments of intentional psychological phenomena. 
Understanding normativity will provide support to the broader understanding of 
dementia, which I commend. This broad understanding locates dementia not only in the 
biological, psychological and social realms, but also in the realm of norms. When Mr. Z 
cannot understand something, his failure to understand is a loss of intentional abilities 
too. So dementia involves normative concerns. And in our understanding of normativity 
the role of practices is - from my perspective - crucially important, because it leads to an 
understanding of what it is to be a person with dementia, the theme of the sub-plot to 
which I shall return in Chapter 6. 
2.5 The embedding of practices 
I have been pursuing the nonnativity of intentional psychological states. In order to 
avoid utter scepticism about normativity (and, therefore, meaning) I have been led to the 
importance of practices. Neither the communitarian, nor the constuctivist, reliance on 
practice can, however, provide the transcendental account of normativity that is required. 
To the notion of practice I shall here add the idea of embedding. Embedded practices 
provide the requisite account of normativity and suggest an cxternalist construal of 
intentional mental content. I shall make the point that normativity, once understood in 
terms of embedded practice, has to be regarded as transcendental. That is, pointing to the 
embedding of practices is pointing to the way in which practices - and therefore 
normativity - are part of the world. As I shall suggest, this way of describing the 
normativity of intentional mental states amounts to quietism or minimalism and it 
accommodates, with caveats, talk of internal relations between mental states and the the 
world. 
Vie transcendental account 
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In this section, I shall make a connection between a transcendental account of normativity 
and embedded practices. The connection is this: in order for practices to be normative, in 
order for them to be impervious even to a thoroughgoing scepticism, they just have to be 
a part of the world. These practices (which show normativity) are as worldly as rocks 
and rainbows. So, I want to say, the embedding of the practices that constitute 
intentional psychological states makes them simply a feature of the world. For the human 
world to be the human world it requires that the normativity which is shown in practices 
is already in place, as a transcendental and embedded feature. 
In Wittgenstein's discussion, the spectre of the sceptical infinite regression of 
interpretations, which (given the actual existence of languages used unproblernatically 
day to day) acts as a reductio ad absurdian, is dismissed by the positive conclusion of 
201: 108 * 
'... there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is 
exhibited in what we call "obeYing the rule" and "going against it" in actual 
cascs. '109 
Wittgenstein argues that 'following a rule' is a possible description of my behaviour 
under certain conditions precisely because there are norms embedded in practices and 
customs. Hence, interpretations are not needed and the danger of absurdity is avoided. 
Earlier, having suggested that interpretations do not determine meaning, 110 Wittgenstein 
talks about being trained to follow a sign-post in a certain way. To the objection that this 
is simply a causal connection, he says: 'a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as 
there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom'. 111 He returns to this thought in § 201 
when he speaks of a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation. 
108 Budd op. cit. p. 37. 
109 PI § 201. 
110 PI § 198. 
111 ibid. 
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Although § 201 links the nonnativity of intentional psychological states, through their 
rule-governed nature, to particular practices and customs, it is not clear how these 
practices and customs resist a sceptical challenge. However, the last step of the 
argument, which is that practices and customs are embedded in the world, provides a 
defence. Wittgenstein considers an analogy between following a rule and obeying an 
order. 112 If two people with the same training react differently to the order, who is right? 
Wittgenstein immediately switches to consider an explorer in an unknown country and 
asks in what circumstances it could be said that orders were being given or acted upon. 
He then says: 'The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means 
of which we interpret an unknown language. '113 The thought here is that, faced by 
different practices, it would not be possible to say which practice was right and which 
wrong. Once, however, practices arc embedded in a context - and the human context is 
the human world - then what we should call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' 
becomes clearer. In some circumstances (say when I am afraid of the person giving the 
order), 'I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does not trouble 
Me. '114 That is, the circumstances mean that the question of interpretation does not arise. 
It is the external embedding of the practices which obviates the need for interpretation. 
Kripke's scepticism questioned the basis of the justification of claims to normativity and 
it might be said that mcre contingent circumstances do not provide the sort of certainty 
that is required to underpin meaning. Practices embedded in the world, however, are not 
simply practices. The embedding means that they are normatively constrained: this is part 
and parcel of being embedded. By "being embedded", I mean that the practices are part 
of the world. But that world is multifarious. It occupies physical space and involves 
both biology and chemistry, but also geography; it involves history, cultural and spiritual 
traditions; it is the human world of ethical concerns and artistic endeavours. 
112 PI § 206. 
113 ibid. 
114 PI § 212. 
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Now, to dig deeper than bedrock is futile. 115 For I cannot get below what is 
fundamental and these practices are fundamental features of the world. Given that the 
world is this way, I simply obey the rule. When I understand the series and continue it, 
'I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly. 'l 16 To someone who wishes still to be 
sceptical, about the world being this way, it is not clear that there could be any further 
argument, other than to show that the position was nonsensical. It would be nonsensical 
to adopt such a radical scepticism if it denies the possibility of meaningful language 
(which it would do, given that for language to be meaningful it must follow rules). The 
fact that practices are not just, as it were, free-standing, but are part and parcel of a 
world, means that the), have a history, that they have a significance on account of their 
place in the world. Moreover, the more deeply embedded a practice, the more difficult 
for it to be any other way. Blue things just are blue. 117 Mathematical rules just are as 
they are: 'That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is 
based. 'I 18 
One way to put this, following Luntley, is to say that up to the step that stresses the 
embedding of practices in the world, the argument could be regarded as 
4contractualist'. 119 The linking of rules to practices could be seen as no more than a 
contract, which could be questioned. We would then have to resort to an infinity of 
contracts. The effect of embedding practices in the world is that no contract is required. 
Normativity is not built-in through a contract, it is already a constitutive feature of the 
world. The role of practices in the argument is just that they arc the way in which 
normativity shows itself. The key is that they are embedded practices, themselves 
already constituting part of the human world and already (as part of the world) normative. 
According to Luntley, the rule-following considerations can 'be thought of as offering a 
115 PI § 217. 
116 Pl § 219. 
117 PI § 238. 
118 PI § 240. 
119 Lunfley (1991). 
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transcendental argument for the existence of non-contractual norms'. 120 Luntley gocs on 
to press the thought that, 
'without the norms that constitutively shape our experience it would not be an 
experience of hearing someone say 'add 2'. The norms must already be present 
in the experience. And the 'must' here is a transcendental must, for unless we 
can say that such norms and obligations are already a part of that experience we 
will fail to describe it as an experience with content. '121 
The embedding of practices amounts to the recommendation of a non-contractual account 
of normativity. It can also be conceived as resulting from a transcendental argument. 
For, if non-nativity is to have the force that it requires to support meaning and the very 
possibility of language, it must pre-conditionally be a part of the human world, not 
something that may or may not be added on. In this sense it is a transcendental 
requirement. The embedding of the practices that constitute the rule-govemed 
nonnativity of intentional psychological states is itself a transcendental requirement if 
those states are to play the roles that they do in the world. 
In Chapter 1,1 referred to the externalist account of mental content, which now emerges. 
Externalism about content suggests that 'content is not characterizable independently of 
that (the environment) which it rcpresents'. 122 Externalism follows from the fact that, 
according to the transcendental account of normativity, which makes normativity a 
constitutive feature of embedded practices, intentional psychological phenomena cannot 
be conceived from a purely "psychological", or internal, perspective. If they are part and 
parcel of the world, involving normatively constrained, embedded practices, intentional 
psychological states cannot be regarded as simply "inner". Instead, understanding is 
linked to the criteria in the world which allow one to say that one has understood. My 
understanding something, therefore, is a matter open to public scrutiny. This is not to 
suggest that it is the public who decide whether or not I have understood. But whether or 
120 ibid. p. 171. 
121 ibid. p. 176. 
122 Luntley (1999) p. 9. According to Thornton (1998), *Externalism ... claims that mental (and linguistic) content depends upon, or is constituted by, states of the non-mental world! (p. 123. ) 
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not I have understood is not something that can only be judged privately. The 
externalism of intentional psychological states is a consequence of their normativity, 
because that normativity places them in practices embedded in the world. 123 Hence, 
there is no gap to be found between a psychological state and its instantiation, between 
my understanding something and the application of that understanding, between my 
ability to read and my actual reading. What is normatively constrained by the intentional 
psychological state (that is, what is involved in my claiming to understand or to be able to 
read) is realized in the entailed practice (that is, actual acts of understanding and reading). 
This link between the psychological state and the world has been described as an 'internal 
relation', reflecting the internal relation between a rule and its application. 124 The notion 
of an internal relation has also been used to explain the agreement between thought and 
reality, or between an expectation and its fulfilment. 125 The problem is that an emphasis 
is typically placed on the grammatical status of this internal relationship. This n-dght 
divert attention from the external circumstances, the context in which practices are 
embedded. It might seem as if we can understand the relationship between a word and its 
meaning, a rule and its application, without a grasp of reality, but purely in terms of the 
intra-grammatical logic. However, this is not sufficient to account for the relationship 
between, say, thought and reality. It is true that Wittgenstein wrote: 'Like everything 
metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of 
the language'. 126 But if it were just a matter of grammar, it would appear to suggest 
something like linguistic idealism, according to which the realization of my thought 
would depend upon the articulation of the thought in language. 127 What such an 
interpretation misses, however, is the crucial worldly background of practices, of what I 
actually do. 
123 For a careful account of Wittgenstein's externalism see Thornton (1998) pp. 123-137. 
124 See Hacker (1996) p. 128. 
125 Arrington (1991). 
126 Z§ 55; PG § 162. 
127 1 discuss linguistic idealism further in Chapter 5. 
Consider, for instance, McDowell: 
-63- 
'But suppose I form the intention to type a period. If that is my intention, it is 
settled that only my typing a period will count as executing it. Of course I am 
capable of forming that intention only because I am party to the practices that are 
constitutive of the relevant concepts. But if that is indeed the intention which - 
thus empowered -I form, nothing more than the intention itself is needed to 
determine what counts as conformity to it. ... So there is something for my 
intention to type a period ... to be: namely, precisely, my intention to type a 
period. '128 
It is true that (in one sense) there is an internal relation between the intention and its 
fulfilment. That intention is realized in the actual practice of typing periods. Once that 
background (the human practice of typing periods) is in place, however, then the 
intention becomes (on its own, not in relation to anything else) contentful. There is a 
link, then, between intentional mental content and practices that is, essentially and 
constitutively, normative. The harmony between thought and reality is a grammatical 
matter. But linguistic content (to have meaning) is a matter of embedded practice. The 
internal relationship involves an external context, in which the normativity of intentional 
psychological states is embedded. 
In short, the embedding of intentional psychological concepts as practices means, 
therefore, that such concepts just are part of the world. And the normativity of the 
intentional psychological states is a transcendental feature of that world, which is the 
human world of embedded practices. Hence McDowell's talk of a shared command of 
language, in which we 'hear someone else's meaning in his words. '129 The meaning is 
not something different, it is part of the language, and, 
a linguistic community is conceived as bound together ... by a capacity for a 
meeting of minds. ... The essential point is the way in which one person can 
128 McDowell (1991). 
129 ibid. 
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know another's meaning without intcrprctation. '130 
Whilst rejecting the notion of communal dispositions as a way of maintaining 
normativity, McDowell still appeals to 'communal practices' as a way of providing a 
framework in which 'to situate our conception of meaning and understanding'. 131 The 
notion of practice is crucial, but to save the day it must be situated or embedded practice. 
In the final chapter I shall discuss the relevance of this to the person with dementia. It 
should already be apparent, however, that what it is to be a being with intentional 
psychological states is to be situated. Being part of the linguistic community is to share 
in this particular type of being-in-the-world. And I shall suggest that part of what it is to 
be a person is just to be situated in this context. 
The quietist approach to Me world 
One final point is that there might still be the temptation to ask what constitutes 
transcendental normativity. The answer to this question would then seem to be relevant 
to what it is to be the type of being that has intentional psychological states. But this 
temptation represents a failure to recognize the extent to which the account of a 
transcendental normativity is a quietist account. Quietism is suggested by: 'What we 
cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'; 132 as it is, too, by the thought that the 
solution to a philosophical problem is 'something that looks as if it were only a 
preliminary to it 133 As Wittgenstein went on to say, the difficulty is 'to Stop'. 134 
Quietism (or minimalism) is the notion that no philosophical explanation is possible, that 
the only correct response is to accept and describe what is given. So, for instance, 
Thornton suggests: 
'The moral of the rule following considerations is precisely that no substantial 
answer can be given to the question [how can something I grasp in a flash 
130 ibid. 
131 ibid. 
132 TLP § 7. 
133 Z§ 314. 
134 ibid. 
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determine future events? ] and that the phenomenon must simply be presupposed 
and described'. 135 
According to Thornton's account of minimalism, there is nothing that acts as an 
intermediary, say, between my understanding how to continue the series and my actually 
doing so. 136 Sin-fflarly, 
'When one comes to understand the meaning of a word, one acquires an ability to 
use it correctly which cannot be further explained. One simply masters a practice 
or technique. ... Understanding a meaning 
is a piece of 'know-how', a practical 
ability. One way of putting this is to say that meanings and rules are individuated 
by practices and that understanding a meaning or a rule is thus individuated by the 
practice over which one has mastcry. '137 
Quietism, or minimalism, suggests that there can be no substantive explanation of 
normativity. It simply is a feature of the Avorld and of intentional psychological concepts. 
So, for instance, although Luntlcy feels there is still a good deal to be said about the 
metaphysics of thought, he accepts as true: 
'the fact that the norms of meaning exist is something about which no more can 
be said. That there is such a thing as meaning is a claim that properly falls within 
the province of silence. We cannot expect to explain the existence of meaning and 
its norms on the basis of anything more basic. '138 
One reason for accepting this as a positive conclusion is that nothing else remains after 
the destructive effects of the rule-following considerations. In order to understand what 
it is to follow a rule (following Wittgenstein's critique), no appeal can be made to internal 
things (neither to mental processes, nor to dispositions, whether those of individuals or 
those of communities), nor to metaphysical standards. Normativity, therefore, is a given 
in the world. 
135 Thornton (1997a). 
136 Thornton (1998) pp. 88-99. 
137 ibid. p. 90. 
138 Luntley (1991). 
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The question I posed above was how it was possible to move from an account of what I 
do (the practices in which I engage) to an account of what I ought to do (the norms I am 
constrained by)? How do %Nc justify saying that this'Nvay is the correct way to follow the 
rule? It was at this point in the rule-following discussion that Wittgenstcin wrote: 
'If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do. "' 139 
One of the charges made by McDowell is that anti-realism tries to get below bedrock. 140 
The thought to which McDowell objected was that it could be possible for a consensus to 
be reached without norms on whether or not to call a newly encountered ob ect 'yellow'. j 
This consensus would be based upon 'resemblances in behaviour and 
phenomenology'. 141 A reliance on dispositions is sub-bedrock because it does not seek 
normative justifications, it is only concerned with what people actually do. In response 
to this, McDowell mobilizcd a number of quotations from Wittgenstein to support the 
idea that norms still operate at bedrock, for example: 'To use a word without a 
justification does not mean to use it without right'; 142 and, 'Following according to the 
rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game'. 143 The counter-thought, then, is 
simply that there is no getting away from normativity: it goes all the way down to 
bedrock (it is deeply embedded) and talk of a community somehow being beyond this is 
unrealistic: 
'if we respect Wittgenstein's injunction not to dig below the ground, we must say 
that the community 'goes right or wrong' ... according to whether the object 
in 
question is, or is not, yellbiv; and nothing can make its being yellow, or not, 
dependent on our ratification of the judgement that that is how things are. '144 
139 PI § 217. 
140 McDowell (1984). 
141 ibid. 
142 PI § 289. 
143 RFM VI-28. 
144 McDowell op. cit. 
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Having arrived at the importance of the notion of practice as a way of understanding 
normativity, it looked as if practices were only a matter of human agreement or human 
disposition. The problem was that normativity seemed, according to these accounts, to 
be either contingent upon practices or a consequence of them. The embedding of 
practices is a further move to flesh out the positive thought, derived from Wittgenstein, 
that rules are clarified by thinking about external features of the world and not just of 
internal mental states. The way the world is involves normativity as a transcendental 
feature in order for there to be the possibility of meaning and understanding. This is not 
to say, however, that normativity is explained by other (physical, chemical, historical, 
cultural or spiritual etc. ) features of the world; it simply is another fundamental feature of 
our world. Normativity is constitutive of intentional psychological phenomena on 
account of their being embedded as practices in the world. But normativity is also 
irreducible, in that there is no further account to be given, having noted it to be 
transcendental and constitutive. Quietism concerning intentional psychological states 
involves recognition of their transcendental, constitutive and irreducible normativity. The 
upshot of this is that any account of dementia must allow this sort of characterization of 
intentional psychological phenomena. These phenomena show normativity and that has 
to be recognized as transcendental, constitutive and irreducible. Any attempt to provide 
or to seek an account of normativity beyond such terms will be erroneous. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have derived a normative account of intentional psychological 
phenomena from Wittgenstein's rule-following discussion. This suggests that: 
Intentional psychological states are normative; 
Normativity is a matter of being rule-governed; 
Rules and rule-following involve practices and customs; 
Practices and customs are embedded in the world. 
-68- 
I have then proceeded to discuss normativity and accepted a quietist interpretation of the 
rulc-following considerations that stresses the givenncss of normativity within an 
embedding human world. Normativity is seen as constitutive, transcendental and 
irreducible. The normativity of intentional psychological states involves an cxtcmalist 
construal of such states. In the chapters that follow, I shall apply this normative account 
of intentional psychological concepts to different models of dementia. Meanwhile, we 
have already glimpsed the extent to which an account of dementia, which furnishes a 
sufficiently broad view, must have implications for our understanding of the person with 
dementia. The embedded nature of intentional mcntal states gestures in the direction of 
the situated, human-worldly context of persons. 
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Chapter 3. 
The disease model of dementia: 
normativity and the mind-brain. 
Introduction 
My concern is to understand dementia. The disease model, which is the subject of this 
chapter, offers an initially convincing account. Having described the disease model, I 
shall pursue my main argument, which is an analysis of intentional psychological 
phenomena. In Chapter 2,1 argued that intentional psychological states involve a 
constitutive, irreducible and transcendental normativity. This conception of normativity 
suggests that intentional psychological phenomena have to be understood in terms of 
worldly, embedded practices and customs. The task in this chapter is to see how (and 
whether) the disease model accommodates such an analysis of intentional psychological 
states. 
The disease model suggests a physicalist construal of such states. That is, the disease 
model is predicated on the thought that there must be a physical (pathological) basis to a 
disease. As I shall show, the evidence for a physical basis to dementia is very 
impressive. There are, however, different interpretations of what this physicalism 
amounts to. These interpretations suggest different conceptions of psychological 
phenomena which will, in turn, have implications for the understanding of dementia. 
The disease model, therefore, is compatible with various physicalist solutions to the 
mind-brain problem and in this chapter, whilst avoiding a full-blown discussion, I shall 
subject different theories to the critique derived from Wittgenstein. I shall then sketch a 
position in keeping with the Wittgcnsteinian analysis of intentional psychological 
phenomena. The contention towards which I am moving is that the Wittgensteinian 
account of intentional psychological states offers a better understanding of dementia. In 
this chapter I show that our understanding of the disease model is enhanced by the 
broadening, Wittgenstcinian perspective. 
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There are three further sections to this chapter. 
1.1 shall discuss the disease model of dementia. I shall use Alzheimer's disease (AD) as 
my paradigm, since it is so extensively studied. I shall argue that, given the amount of 
knowledge concerning its pathogenesis, diagnosis and treatment, it deserves to be called 
a discase. 
2. -I shall- subject the disease model to a critique based on the analysis of intentional 
psychological phenomena derived from Wittgenstein in the last chapter. This will involve 
a discussion of various positions concerning physicalism and the mind-brain problem. In 
type-type identity theory, as suggested by Armstrong and (more extremely) by the 
Churchlands, AD amounts to just a physical disease. In Davidson's token-token theory, 
it is still just a disease, although there is an (albeit inadequate) account of normativity. 
Finally, I shall suggest an interpretation of Wittgenstein's stance towards the mind and 
the brain which allows that AD is a physical disease, but suggests an understanding of 
this that involves not only causal explanations, but constitutive understanding too. 
Whilst there are grounds for calling each of these positions physicalist, I move in this 
section from an extreme account of physicalism that eliminates the normative, to the view 
that physicalism can only be understood within the context of a normative rcalm. 
3. In conclusion, I shall discuss the standing of the disease model of dementia. The 
practical usefulness of the disease model reflects its context in the world. Within this 
context, however, the disease model accommodates the broad construal of intentional 
psychological states as being constitutively, transcendentally and irreducibly normative. 
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3.1 The disease model of Alzheimer's dementia. 
Preliminary points 
In this section, I shall present a picture of the disease model of dementia. Although any 
type of dementia could readily be construed as a disease, I shall take AD as a paradigm. 
AD is extensively researched and a compelling (if incomplete) story can be presented 
from its genetics through-tp its treatment. I wish to present the strongest possible case in 
favour of this model being both cogent and useful. I There are two further preliminary 
points. 
First, I have deliberately used the notion of a "disease" model, rather than spoken of a 
"medical" model. 2 The notion of a "medical" model is often used in a pejorative sense 
and it is unclear whether or not clinicians, in general, actually use such a model. 3 On the 
other hand, clinicians will often think of conditions as diseases (and use the different 
components of a "disease" model). In short, I believe there is more face validity to the 
notion of a "disease" model than there is to that of a "medical" model. 
Secondly, the disease model fits Fulford's description of the conventional (or science- 
based) view of the conceptual structure of medicine. 4 According to this view, 
dysfunction is the logical root notion. This gives rise to disease concepts and hence to 
our notions of illness. The reverse (ethics-based)5 View is that illness - itself derived 
from 'action failure' - is conceptually prior to disease concepts. The thought is that 
"illness" links more readily to evaluative notions, including to notions concerning the 
I In this and the subsequent two, chapters I shall spend some time describing the models which I am 
considering. First, it seems important that the models under discussion should be presented as clearly C, 
convincing; secondly, the models must be presented in a way which emphasizes their usefulness. 
21 follow Tyrcr and Steinberg (1993); cf. p. 5. 
3 An (unusually) careful characterization of the "medical" model is presented by Veatch (1973). 
4 Fulford (1989) pp. 262-266. 
5 For Fulford's comparison of the science-based and ethics-based views of medicine, see ibid. pp. 266- 
267. 
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person. It may seem, then, that by taking the conventional disease model as my 
paradigm, I have set up a straw-man for my philosophical analysis, since - according to 
Fulford's account - the notion of disease is conceptually m-isplaced in the conventional 
view. 
Whilst, however, the conclusions I reach will be similar to Fulford's in effect, the route I 
have taken is different. Instead of an analysis of concepts such as " illness" and 
"disease", my focus is on psychological concepts. I confine myself to dementia, which - 
to the extent that it is correct to epitomize it as a cognitive problem - was closer (in 
Fulford's view) to the physical illness paradigm than other mental illnesses. 6 On this 
view, dementia is less likely to show the sort of evaluative aspects seen more obviously 
as central to other mental illnesses. My strategy is complimentary to Fulford's. For I 
shall argue, from my analysis of intentional psychological concepts, that dementia must 
be understood within a broad context. This places it, even as a physical disease, in a 
field of evaluative concerns. It is noteworthy that both of our approaches have 
implications for the notion of a person. 7 
Tyrer and Steinberg have suggested that a disease model describes four elements: clearly 
recognizable symptoms and signs of the disease; a scientific account of the putative 
aetiology; an established course and prognosis; and pathological evidence of the disease. 8 
To these can be added a fifth element: an established treatment which modifies the disease 
process in a scientifically understandable way. 9 Using these five characteristics, I shall 
now describe how AD conforms to this model. 
6 ibid. pp. 80-81. Actually, as I have suggested in Chapter 1, regarding dementia as essentially a 
cognitive problem is mistaken. 
7 cf. ibid. p. 252. 
8 Tyrer and Steinberg op. cit. p. 8. 
9 Of course, some diseases are scarcely treatable in this sense. 
Five characteristics of a disease 
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The first characteristic of a disease is that there should be clearly recognizable symptoms 
and signs. This is certainly the case in dementia once it is beyond the mildest stages. 
The symptoms and signs do not always differentiate one form of dementia from another 
and diagnoses remain 'probable' until a post-mortem. Nevertheless, although mistakes 
occur, 10 certain patterns of symptoms and signs, in the absence of other features, can 
lead to a diagnosis with considerable certainty. For instance, using standardized 
criferia, 11 a diagnosis of 'probable' or 'possible' AD was confirmed at autopsy in 87% 
of cases in one study. 12 Even if precise diagnosis is sometimes difficult, 13 it remains the 
case that there are clearly recognizable symptoms and signs of dementia. 
The second characteristic of a disease is that there should be an account of its putative 
aetiology which makes scientific sense. In the case of AD the evidence in favour of a 
genetic contribution to the aetiology is impressive. In an early family study a fourfold 
increase in the likelihood of a first-degree relative of someone with senile dementia 
developing the disease was found. 14 More recent family studies have consistently shown 
the risk for first-degree relatives to be about 50%. 15 Twin studies are starting to produce 
suggestive evidence of a genetic component. 16 
The most exciting developments have come from studies at the molecular level. The 
neuropathology of dementia has as its most characteristic finding senile plaques. These 
are deposits outside the cells in the brain largely made up of amyloid protein. According 
to the 'amyloid cascade hypothesis', it is the incorrect deposition of amyloid which leads 
10 Homer et al. (1988). 
11 McKhann el al. (1984). 
12 Joachim et al. (1988). 
13 Holmes et al. (1999). 
14 Larsson et al. (1963). 
15 McGuffin (1994) pp. 195-196. 
16 ibid. pp. 196-197. 
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to plaques, cell death and hence dementia. 17 
Amyloid results from the degradation of the amyloid precursor protein (APP). A much 
higher than expected incidence of dementia exists amongst Down's Syndrome individuals 
who have an abnormality (trisomy) on chromosome 21.18 In 1987, a link was 
established between AD and several markers on chromosome 21,19 and the gene coding 
for APP was found to occupy roughly the same location on its long arm. 20 
Suýsequently, a number of variants of an early-onset autosomal dominant familial type of 
AD have been described at a molecular level in association with chromosome 21.21 
However, these findings relate to the uncommon familial cases of AD and account for a 
very small proportion of such cases (perhaps less than a quarter). 
Another linkage was found to chromosome 14.22 It is now thought that this 
chromosome (the gene being known as presenilin-1) probably accounts for about 70% of 
the familial (carly-onset) cases. 23 The hypothesis prevails that the route of action is via 
the amyloid cascade. 24 A gene which is thought to have a similar action has also been 
found, in a group of Americans of Volga German descent, on Chromosome I and is 
known as presenifin-2.25 
Such findings among familial cases (accounting for less than 1%) of AD do not, 
however, provide the cause of the vast majority of cases which, although still running in 
families, is more clearly related to age, becoming increasingly frequent over the age of 
17 Hardy (1992). 
18 Oliver and Holland (1986). 
19 St George-Hyslop et al. (1987). 
18 McGuffin op. cit. p. 199. 
21 Lovestone (1997a). 
22 Schellenberg et al. (1992). 
23 St Clair (1994). 
24 Harrison P. (1993). 
25 Levy-Lahad et al. (1995). More recent evidence suggests that the presenilins may be involved in the 
splicing of APP. 
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sixty-five. In recent years a link between a protein which carries cholesterol and 
triglycerides in the blood (apolipoprotein E or APOE) and AD Nvith chromosome 19 has 
been established. 26 It has further been established that the higher the dose of a particular 
type of this protein (coded for by the E4 allele) the greater the chances of developing 
dementia in late life. For instance, in families having several members affected by AD, 
having two alleles on chromosome 19 coding for the protein (being 0/0 homozygotes), 
led to over 90% of the individuals developing the disorder by the age of 80.27 The way 
in which APOE relates to AD is not straightforward. 28 For instance, a recent study using 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) suggested that the E4 allele n-dght modify the risk for 
acquiring dementia, but not influence the pathological processes thereafter. 29 
Nevertheless, APOE might still have a direct role in the amyloid cascade hypothesis. 30 
The important point is that there seems to be suggestive evidence of a genetic basis to 
late-onset, non-dominantly inherited AD. 31 Research into the genetics of AD is complex 
and controversial, 32 but - whilst environmental factors must contribute to the aetiology - 
the strength of the genetic contribution to AD seems enough to satisfy the second 
characteristic of the disease model.. 33 
The third characteristic of the disease model was that it should have an established course 
and prognosis. In dementia, a steady deterioration in cognitive abilities, as shown by 
cognitive function tests, can be predicted. Generally, changes in behaviour in AD show 
great individual variation, but some changes can show a recognizable sequence. 34 
26 Pericak-Vance el al. (1991). 
27 Corder et al. (1993). 
28 Owen el al. (1994). 
29 Barber el al. (1999a). 
30 Lovestone op. cit. p. 132, 
31 ibid. p. 136. 
32 Edwardson and Morris (1998). 
33 A recent review of the genetics of AD is contained in Blennow and Skoog (1999). 
34 Hope et al. (1999). 
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Jobst and colleagues have assessed the value of computerized X-ray tomography (CT) 
scanning and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) in patients with 
AD. Detailed physical and psychometric examinations have been combined with repeated 
scans and histopathological diagnoses. Using controls, serial testing and post-mortems, 
they have suggested a means of testing for AD. 35 Whilst these studies are not beyond 
CritiCiSM, 36 they have yielded exciting results. They suggest, for instance, that the 
combination of CT and SPECT can yield a sensitivity of 90% and specificity of 97%, 
which will enhance diagnostic accuracy. 37 These researchers demonstrated, too, that the 
rate of atrophy in the dementia subjects was ten times that of age-matched controlS. 38 
They have also demonstrated that the neurofibrillary tangle density (where tangles are the 
other pathological hallmark of AD) in the hippocampus (which is the area in the medial 
temporal lobe associated with 'short-term' memory) correlates both with the extent of 
atrophy seen on CT scans and with the degree of memory impairment. Thus the CT scan 
makes a link between the mental manifestations of the condition, as shown by cognitive 
testing, and the brain pathology, as revealed post-mortem. 39 Even if it turns out that 
medial temporal lobe atrophy is a feature of dementia generally, rather than being specific 
to AD, 40 these studies, coupled with assessments of cognitive function, support the 
contention that AD can appropriately be described as a disease, because it is amenable to 
mapping of its course and prognosis. 
The fourth characteristic identified by the disease model was the need for a pathological 
lesion. The pathology of AD was first described by Aldfs Alzheimer. 41 The 
characteristic features of AD are: numerous senile plaques in the cerebral cortex, the 
hippocampus and subcortical. structures; neurofibrillary tangles in similar locations; 
35 Jobst el al. (1992). 
36 Philpot and Bums (1993). 
37 Jobst et al. (1994). 
38 Smith and Jobst (1996). 
39 For an up up to date review of neuroimaginc, and dementia see O'Brien and Barber (2000). 
40 Barber et al. (1999b). 
41 Alzheimer (1907). 
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amyloid deposits in blood vessels; and frequent granulovacuolar degeneration and Hirano 
bodies in the hippocampus. Along with these changes goes a substantial loss of nerve 
cells. Pathological studies have been able to demonstrate differences between the brains 
of patients with dementia and those without, but only in those with severe pathology. 42 
Many 'normal' aged brains also contain features typical of dementia and there is no 
pathological change that is pathognomonic. Hence, 
'The pathology of AD defies precise definition at present. ... The key distinction 
between changes that can be dismissed as normal ageing and those of AD is that 
the changes are all more numerous and, for some of them, more widely 
distributed in AD than in normal ageing. '43 
Despite a degree of variation and lack of definition even at the level of histopathology, it 
remains true that there are pathological lesions in the brain which are associated with AD. 
Hence, it seems credible to designate AD a disease. 44 
The final characteristic of the disease model was the possibility of treatment. In AD it is 
now possible to point to medications that can alleviate symptoms. 45 Such drugs, which 
enhance the activity of a neurotransmitter (acetylcholine) that is otherwise depleted in AD, 
work in a scientifically understandable way. 46 Furthermore, there is the possibility that 
newer drugs will act against the amyloid depositions which are central to the pathogenesis 
of the condition. 47 
Alzheimer's disease, therefore, satisfies the five characteristics of the disease model. The 
model does not preclude the possibility of environmental factors contributing to the 
disease process; in fact, some such factors can easily be incorporated within the disease 
42 Tomlinson el al. (1970). 
43 Esiri (1997). 
44 NTevertheicss, the lack of certainty at the histopathological level (the. only level at which a definite Z> 
diagnosis of AD can be made) is grist to Fulford's (1989) mill, since it shows the importance of 
evaluative judgements even in the scientific realm. 
45 Bums, Russell and Page (1999). 
46 cf. Lovestone (1997b). 
47 Berger (1998). 
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model. Dementia can be analysed 'in biological rather than ethical terms' and it leads to 
abnormalities of function 'typically performed within members of the species. '48 It 
satisfies several intuitively correct disease criteria. 49 Furthermore, regarding dementia 
from the perspective of the disease model has proven to be clinically and scientifically 
useful. 50 
32 Causal and constitutive accounts of intentional psychological phenonwna 
In this section I shall consider the account of psychological concepts suggested by the 
disease model. The construal. of intentional psychological states presented by the disease 
model is physicalist. I shall be asking what this suggests for our understanding of 
dementia. I shall make a distinction between causal and constitutive accounts of 
intentional psychological phenomena. I shall consider a number of ways of fleshing out 
the physicalism of the disease model. The point of this is to place the disease model in 
the correct conceptual context, one that provides an appropriately broad understanding of 
dementia. My concern, as I shall explain, is that the disease model might tend towards a 
more limited view.. Recognizing that the disease model (in itself) only offers a causal 
account of intentional psychological concepts, whilst the Wittgensteinian critique requires 
a constitutive account, allows the broader perspective. This will be seen more clearly by 
considering several alternatives within the mind-brain debate. 
Before embarking on the main argument of this chapter, I shall indicate some of the 
concerns that motivatc it. The disease model of dementia is, after all, so well described 
and so useful clinically that it might not be clear that it raises any real conceptual 
problems. Given its sureness of foot, is it possible that it will slip into philosophical 
48 Boorse (197.5). 
49 See also Lishman (1998) p. 430. 
50 1 should ackowledge that Kitwood (1997) has argued that AD does not meet key criteria for a 
1. classical" disease. Space does not allow me to deal with this point fully. Suffice it to say that 
Kitwood's analysis - which includes at least one factual error (regarding I lomer et al. op. cit. ) - would 
similarly deny asymptomatic prostate cancer, cardiac disease and other medical conditions the status of 
disease, because his criterion for a disease is wrong. 
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quagmires and, indeed, if it sticks to its path of describing the pathological basis of 
disease, is it obvious that there will be any philosophical snares to be avoided? 
It certainly seems to be the case that most of the literature relating to the aetiology, 
pathology, diagnosis and treatment of dementia avoids discussion of philosophical (or 
even ethical) issues. There are, however, several reasons why the philosophical issues 
need to be raised. 
- First, neuropathology proceeds within a context which involves values and 
norms. The upshot, for instance, of a neuropathological diagnosis is not value-free. 
Moreover, there are legitimate philosophical questions about the whole context within 
which science operates. One of my aims is to place the disease model in a broader 
context. 
, Secondly, neuroscientists do make philosophical claims, as in the case of 
Smythies who opined that science and not philosophy would solve the problem of how 
the mind and brain relate. 51 Similarly, Hacker has found it necessary (on Wittgensteinian 
grounds) to castigate prominent neuroscientists for ascribing mental predicates to the 
brain. 52 
0 Thirdly, in the literature concerning the concepts of disease and illness, there is a 
tendency to equate disease with bodily dysfunction. Szasz, for instance, holds that 
disease or illnesses, strictly speaking, can only affect the body (and, hence, mental illness 
is a myth). 53 For Boorse, "disease" is best understood in functional terms. 54 Wakefield 
argues, similarly, that a disorder is a 'hannful dysfunction'. 55 He takes "dysfunction" to 
be a scientific term referring to the failure of a mental mechanism to perform a natural 
function for which it was designed by evolution. Although, according to his view, 
51 Smythies (1992). 
52 E. g. Hacker (1987) and (1993) pp. 69-72. 
53 Szasz (1960). Presumably Szasz would accept that dementia is an illness, but not a mental one. I 
need not engage in the dispute about the concept of mental illness, but I can observe that a different 
conception of what constitutes an illness such as dementia might solve some of the difficulties. For if 
the characterization of an illness must include intentional psychological states, then the analysis I am C, 
commending applies: such illnesses must be viewed as broadly inclusive of causal and normative realms. 
54 Boorse op. cit.. 
55 Wakefield (1992). 
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disorder combines both value and scientific components, it is a point of contention 
whether or not "dysfunction" itself can be expressed in value-free terms. 56 Those who 
lay emphasis on bodily dysfunction, particularly if they think this can be described in 
value-frec terms, inevitably encourage a biological view in keeping with the disease 
model of dementia. I sball suggest, alternatively, that dementia, understood in the light 
of the Wittgensteinian analysis, involves a rational and normative realm as well as the 
realm of biological dysfunction. 57 
* Fourthly, some neuroscientists working in the field of dementia do, in fact, 
draw philosophical conclusions. For example, based on work- using positron emission 
tomography (PET), Rapoport concluded that the human mind could be reduced to the 
human brain: 
cmany aspects of higher cognitive function in humans can be reduced to (mapped 
to and related to algorithms of) the local structure and integrity of brain networks. 
These results are consistent with the neurophilosophical contention (Churchland 
1986; ... ) that critical parameters of mind can be reduced to the structure and 
function of the brain. They also demonstrate that the relations between mind and 
brain are disrupted in the course of AD. '58 
This suggestion legitimizes a philosophical discussion of the disease model in the context 
of thought about dementia. 
- Fifthly, attempts have been made to give psychiatry itself a philosophical basis. 
For example, Kandel asserts: 
'All mental processes, even the most complex psychological processes, derive 
from operations of the brain. The central tenet of this view is that what we 
commonly call mind is a range of functions carried out by the brain. The actions 
of the brain underlie not only relatively simple motor behaviors, such as walking 
and eating, but all of the complex cognitive actions, conscious and unconscious, 
that we associate with specifically human behavior ... As a corollary, behavioral 
disorders that characterize psychiatric illness are disturbances of brain function, 
56 See Sadler and Agich (1995) and Wakefield (1995). 
57 Again, my aim is to steer clear of the debate about "disease" and "illness". 
58 Rapoport (1992). 
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even in those cases where the causes of the disturbances are clearly environmental 
in origin. '59 
Part of the aim of this chapter is to clarify exactly in what sense it is true that the n-ýind and 
brain are to be equated. The ambiguities involved in Kandel's assertion need 
clarification. 60 
- Finally, given the persuasive nature of the evidence supporting the disease 
model, it is natural to start to think of dementia in very physical terms. To some extent 
this is beneficial: it can be useful to carers, clinicians and neuroscientists. But my 
contention, from Chapter 1, is that understanding dementia needs to be from the broadest 
possible view. Although the disease model provides a significant part of the picture, it 
does not provide the whole picture. If carers, clinicians or neuroscientists were to 
mistake the disease model for the whole picture, the effect would be clinically, socially 
and ethically disastrouS. 61 The motivation behind the conceptual argument of this 
chapter, then, is the need to accommodate the physicalism of the disease model within the 
broadest possible understanding of dementia. 
Vie disease model and intentional psychological states 
The disease model construes intentional psychological states in physical terms. It is, in 
this way, a physicalist doctrine concerning the relationship of the mind to the brain. The 
disease model rests on the supposition that there is a physical (pathological) basis to 
disease. The consequence is that, if you believe in the disease model, you must believe 
59 Kandel (1998). 
60 See Radden (1999). 
61 This statement needs some support. Pace extreme materialism, however thoroughly the disease model 
might explain it, being disturbed at night is a social matter and how best to deal with it brings into play 
ethical questions. Ignoring extreme physicalism, there might yet be a tendency towards accepting, too 
uncritically, the physicalism of the disease model. Robertson (1983), for instance, reaches conclusions 
concerning ethical dilemmas in dementia that seem to be predicated on his view of dementia as 'brain 
failure'. This chapter is intended to counteract the tendency to accept a narrow physicalism too 
uncritically. 
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that cognitive impairments are (in some sense) physical defects. 62 Thus, for instance, 
'Degenerative changes in the cholinergic circuits of the hippocampus and in its 
projections from the substantia innominata are believed to be responsible for the 
loss of memory in Alzheimer's disease. '63 
Here, an intentional psychological phenomenon, namely memory, is construed in terms 
of brain circuitry. Furthermore, drug manipulation of such brain pathways can restore 
these psychological abilities and affect functioning generally. 64 Indeed, the scientific 
literature on dementia takes it for granted that the link between brain function and 
psychological functioning is well established: 
'A convincing body of evidence that abnormalities of the basal forcbrain system 
are related to memory loss and other symptoms of dementia, such as 
hallucinations, has been derived from neurochemical, neuropathological, 
phannacological and behavioural sources spanning nearly two decades of 
research. '65 
Not only is the physical basis of psychological abilities taken for granted, as a matter of 
explanation, it is also seen as the way to push forward in therapeutics. 66 Psychological 
phenomena are explained mechanically and there is a physical way to modify them. 
Dementia is based, therefore, on a physical construal of intentional psychological 
concepts, because there is a physical, pathological basis to any disease. This is the 
fundamental stipulation of the disease model. There remain various ways, in which the 
physicalist construal of dementia might be fleshed out, which I shall shortly pursue. It is 
worth noting, however, that the evidence concerning the physical causes of dementia 
precisely concern causes. I shall pursue this discussion using the specific example of 
62 An alternative view, by way of contrast, would be that certain cognitive failures result from malignant 
social processes. This is the sort of view I shall discuss in Chapter 5.1 shall defend a view which 
accepts that there is a physical basis to cognitive impairment, but does not accept that this is the whole 
story. 
63 Butler (1993) p. 38. 
64 R6sler et al. (1999). 
65 Perry (1994) p. 143. Similarly, Damasio and Damasio (1992) p. I 11. 
66 Mellow and Aronson (1995). p. 210. 
face recognition. 
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Prosopagnosia is an inability to recognize familiar faces. It can occur in dementia, 67 as 
well as in other forms of brain damage. An analysis of postmortem and CT scan data 
implies that bilateral lesions of the central visual system, situated specifically in the medial 
occipitotemporal region, are critical for the development of prosopagnosia. 69 More 
recent research has encouraged a return to the older view that prosopagnosia is 
predominantly associated with right hemisphere lesions. 69 Either way, by inference, the 
ability to recognize faces (an intentional psychological phenomenon) is maintained by the 
integrity of functioning in a particular part of the brain. The brain areas involved might 
be even more finely dissected by considering different forms of recognition. 70 
As the case of prosopagnosia shows, the disease model construes intentional 
psychological phenomena in physical terms. I shall go on to argue that there is more to 
face recognition than simply right hemisphere or bilateral medial occipitotemporal 
damage. But this is not to argue that the way in which the disease model accounts for 
prosopagnosia is wrong. The disease model provides a perfectly acceptable (causal) 
account of what must be in place for face recognition to occur. The integrity of the 
medial occipitotemporal lobes is a precondition for face recognition. These brain areas, 
in turn, must connect appropriately to other body parts in order for the person to see the 
face and confirm that it is recognized. So when someone cannot recognize a familiar face 
(in the absence of other peripheral - as opposed to "central" brain - causes) there must be 
damage to these brain areas, either in terms of structure or of functioning; and this can be 
confirmed by the appropriate sort of scan, or at post-mortem. That is, damage to the 
medial occipitotemporal lobes (bilaterally or unilaterally) causes prosopagnosia. 
I have now emphasized the physicalist nature of the disease model and the fact that it 
67 Mendez et at. (1992). 
68 Damasio el al. (1982). 
69 De Renzi et al. (1994). 
70 Warrington and James (1967). 
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presents an essentially causal account. Is it possible, then, for the physicalism of the 
disease model to lead to an account that is not just causal? This suggests the possibility 
of other ways of understanding physicalism and, therefore, other ways of taking the 
disease model. 
atrenze materialism and the place of normativity 
In response to the question I have just set, I shall initially pursue the possibility that 
physicalism can only provide a causal account of intentional psychological phenomena 
and, therefore, only a causal account of dementia. That is, the causal account is the 
constitutive account. This amounts to a type-type identity theory of the mind and brain. 
Face recognition, as a type of mental event, is identical with a certain type of brain event, 
such as the activation of neurons in the medial occipitotemporal lobes. The strict identity 
implied by such a theory means that anything involved in face recognition can be 
accounted for in terms of brain states. Therefore, the account to be given of intentional 
psychological states must be causal. To demonstrate this further I shall consider 
Armstrong's 'Central-state theory'71 and the 'eliminative materialism' of the 
Churchlands. 72 
According to Armstrong's formulation of materialism, mental states are to be identified 
with purely physical states of the central nervous system. As he says: 
'If the mind is thought of as 'that which has mental states', then we can say that 
the mind is simply the central nervous system. '73 
This is a reaction, not only to dualism, but also to behaviourism. It accepts that inner 
mental states exist, 'they are physical states of the brain'; 74 and it gets rid of the problem 
of explaining how the mind and the brain interact, since they are one and the same thing. 
Mental causation exists, because it is, in a real sense, physical causation. Everything that 
71 Armstrong (1968). 
72 See Churchland (1984). 
73 Armstrong op. cit. p. 73. 
74 ibid. p. 75. 
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is mental, therefore, on this view, is contingently identical with states of the central 
nervous system. 75 Armstrong argued that, 
mental states are states of the person defined solely in terms of causal 
relations, of a more or less complex sort, to the objects or situations that bring the 
mental states about and the physical behaviour that constitutes their 
texpression'. '76 
The point to notice is that the account is causal. Mental states (which turn out on 
empirical (contingent) grounds to be brain states) are caused by objects or situations and, 
in turn, cause behaviour. So, the mental state of recognizing Churchill's face is brought 
about by seeing a picture of Churchill, and this mental state leads me to say: 'The finest 
British war-time Prime Minister'. And that mental state, as it happens, which stands in 
these causal relations, is a state of my bruin, its medial occipitotemporal lobes, caused to 
be in this state by the picture and, in turn, causing a vocal response. Moreover, not only 
is the account causal, but it is constitutive too. The theory asserts that what it is to have a 
mental state of this type is simply to have a brain state of this type. There is nothing else 
to a mental state. Leaving Armstrong's identity theory hanging without further comment 
for a moment, I shall now consider the eliminative materialism of the Churchlands in 
order to draw out some similarities. 77 
In a book notionally to do with AD, the Churchlands considered the objection to 
eliminative materialism that, 
'what constitutes a human consciousness is not just the intrinsic character of the 
creature itself, but also the rich matrix of relations it bears to other humans, 
75 See ibid. pp. 90-91, where Armstrong makes it plain that he considers there are two steps to his 
analysis. In the first, which he coins the 'causal analysis', there is a logical analysis of mental concepts. 
The second step identifies mental states with physico-chemical states of the brain, which he describes as 
'a contingent or scientific identification'. There could, logically, be something other than the brain doing 0VC, 
what the brain is doing, but Annstrong accepts the mind-brain identity theory of 'Central-state 
materialism'. 
76 ibid. p. 356. 
77 There are differences too. Armstrong (op. cit. p. 78) referred to the climinativism (although the term 
was not used) suggested by Feyembend as 'desperate indeed'. Nevertheless, how substantial the 
differences raly are could be disputed. 
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practices, and institutions of its embedding culture. A reductionisfic account 
cannot hope to capture more than a small part of what is explanatorily 
important. '78 
Neuroscientistsý, they respond, should embrace the objection: 
dany adequate neuro-computational account of human consciousness must take 
into account the manner in which a brain comes to represent, not just the gross 
features of the physical world, but also the character of the other cognitive 
creatures with which it interacts, and the details of the social, moral, and political 
world in which they all live .... We confront no problem 
in principle here. Only 
a major challenge. '79 
So, according to eliminativists, every aspect of human life will finally be accounted for in 
. neuro-computational terms and, 
furthermore, the folksy modes of description will be 
eliminated in favour of neuroscientific terms. 
Now the point I wish to draw out is not the eliminativism, but the extreme materialism 
upon which the theory is based. As in the case of Armstrong's materialism, the account 
is causal and, moreover, it is presumed that it will also be constitutive. There will be 
nothing left over to say about mental states once the physical description is given. That 
description is both physical and causal, as the following account of face recognition 
makes plain: 
'Suppose, to make it simple, that one neuron is sensitive to size of eyes, another 
to shape of eyes, another to distance between eyes, another to nose length, 
another to mouth width, and so on. There may be several hundred dimensions to 
this facial phase space, and a given face will therefore occupy a specific point in 
the phase space. More likely, the system wants less precision, and two 
presentations of the same face may have only approximately the same point in 
phase space. The response patterns of the input neurons will determine where in 
the phase space the face is, and hence a face is represented when a given response 
79 Churchland and Churchland (1992) p. 26. 
79 ibid. pp. 26-27. 
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pattern obtains. Notice that this view precisely does not say there is a 
"grandmother neuron, " but says rather that there is a response pattern of a whole 
set of neurons that, within limits, covaries with the presentation of 
Grandmother. '80 
According to this view, failure to recognize a face will be solely a matter of there not 
being a certain response pattern in a set of neurons. This causal account, which is 
entirely physicalist, is the common ground between the extreme materialism of both 
Armstrong and the Churchlands. It suggests that the causal account is all that there is to 
say about the intentional mental state of face recognition. I shall now put forward the 
Wittgensteinian critique of this extreme form of physicalism. 
Over against the sort of type-type identity theory represented by Armstrong and the 
Churchlands, the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological concepts suggests 
that there is also a constitutive account, which is broader than (so not identical with) the 
causal explanations suggested by the extreme (type-type) interpretation of the physicalism 
of the disease model. The thrust of my objection to extreme materialism is that it ignores 
or underestimates the normative features of intentional psychological states by which the 
states of affairs that would satisfy them are prescribed. Once attention is paid to these 
normative features, as described in Chapter 2, a much broader canvas, involving the 
embedding of customs and practices within the human world, comes into view. Then it 
is clearer that the causal account, all right in itself, is but a part of what it is to recognize a 
familiar face. The constitutive account is broader, involving, inter alia, a person's history 
and social context. 
I shall recap some of the argument to make this plainer. I cannot (veridically) recognize a 
face I have not seen before and if I recognize the face of Winston Churchill, it must be the 
face of Winston Churchill, or I am mistaken. The point about normativity, which I wish 
to emphasize, is not that recognition requires truth conditions. It is, nevertheless, a point 
80 Churchland (1986) pp. 452453. 
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about meaning, since the concept of recognizing - as a matter of grammar - entails that 
certain things are the case. Thus, it is constitutive of the concept of recognizing that if I 
correctly recognize X as Churchill, then X is Churchill. But the point is not about the 
correspondence between my recognizing X as Churchill and X 's being Churchill. The 
point about normativity is that it inheres transcendentally, as a prerequisite for such 
concepts having the meanings that they do whether or not there are actual 
correspondences in the world between word and object. It is this transcendental 
conception of normativity, already described in Chapter 2, that must be accommodated by 
the disease model. 
According to extreme materialism, recognizing (or failing to recognize) just is a matter of 
certain parts of the brain working or not working. But if all we have here is brain 
activity, if recognizing Grandmother is just a certain neuronal response pattern, how can 
normativity be incorporated? The cells in the medial occipitotemporal regions of my brain 
react causally to certain inputs and have an output, so how they function is certainly 
constrained. This, however, merely - in effect - repeats the disease model account: these 
cells are causally involved in the recognition of familiar faces. The question remains: 
where is the normativity of recognizing Churchill in this account? The disease model, as 
interpreted in the light of extreme materialism, can only present us with accounts of 
neurons firing. 
Of course, we have already had the Churchlands' answer to this problem. This notion of 
normativity, which seems so important to us, will itself - albeit with difficulty (but that is 
part of the challenge) - turn out, according to the Churchlands, to be explicable in 
biomechanical, neurological, terms. The fact that I am normatively constrained, having 
recognized the man's familiar face, to call him "Churchill", which involves (normatively) 
this being the man who said, 'Some chicken; some neck', might all be explained by 
certain neuronal configurations in my brain. If it is a given in the world that recognizing 
X commits me to Y, then it might be suggested that the place in which this is given is in 
the brain. My feeling constrained to call him 'Churchill' inevitably involves my brain 
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being configured in a certain functional state. This, it might be argued, is what 
constitutes normativity. 
In a similar way, Armstrong felt that central-state materialism could provide an adequate 
account of intentionality. For instance, in discussing the intentionality of purposes he 
said: 
, The 'intentional objective' of a purpose is simply that state of affairs towards 
which the mental cause drives the organism. The fact that the 'intentional object' 
may not exist is simply the fact that the mental cause is not alivays sufficient to 
bring the objective to pass. '81 
The mind (which is, as it happens, just the brain) is a cause apt for bringing about 
whatever is aimed at intentionally by the intentional psychological state. If I form the 
intention to strike someone, 
'My mind is in a certain state, a state that I can only describe by introspection in 
terms of the effect it is apt for bringing about: my striking that person. 
... Whatever its nature, it is simply a contingent fact that that sort of thing is apt 
for bringing about the striking of the other person. ... my direct awareness of this 
mcntal cause is simply an awareness of the sort of effect it is apt for bringing 
about. '82 
Just as the Churchlands think that eventually neuroscience will explain everything that is 
constitutive of the mental, including therefore the normativity of intentional psychological 
states, so too, Armstrong believes that the nonnativity of mental states could be described 
solely in terms of the power of the mind to bring about that which it aims at. That power 
is nothing other than the power of the brain. When I recognize Churchill, I make contact 
with a large part of recent British history. This history is involved in my recognition of 
Churchill as Churchill. But that just means, on Armstrong's view, that my brain is apt 
for producing verbally all sorts of other pieces of information about Churchill. Similarly, 
81 Armstrong op. cit. p. 144. 
82 ibid. pp. 134-135. 
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for the Churchlands, it just means that the medial occipitotemporal lobes are connected, 
for instance, to other parts of the brain that are involved in the recall of historical 
infonnation. 
Against this sort of extreme materialism I assert that, even if it were true that normativity 
is a consequence of brain activity, in the sense that my brain is in a particular state as I 
recognize Churchill, the normativity is not constitutive of the brain state, but of the 
recognition. The fact that my brain works in just this way is a matter of causal 
explanation, but not a matter of norms. It might be countered that having norms, 
adhering to them, is just a matter of people being in this and that physical brain state. But 
again, it will then have to be explained where the norms are in such a physical state. That 
is, the description of any physical state, as it were abstracted from its embedding context 
(if such a thing were possible), would merely be a physical description. Normativity 
only comes in when the embedding context returns. But that is precisely because the 
normativity is constitutive of the recognition, not of the brain state, and recognition is 
something that happens in the world, not in the brain. 
A separate, but related argument, from the transcendental nature of normativity, leads to 
the same conclusion. As I suggested in Chapter 2, if there is to be meaning in the world - 
and it is hard to see how this can be argued against without some form of contradiction 
(because the argument against meaning in the world must be conceived as an argument 
with meaning) - it must be constitutively normative, which is a matter of meaning being 
held in place by the world being as it is. Meaning needs to be set in a way that is not 
conditional (this is what it means to say that it is normative) if it is to allow 
communication. Face recognition must be similarly normative, whatever its underlying 
causal mechanism. For what it is to recognize a face, what constitutes face recognition, 
is set in the world in which face recognition plays a role. The brain might explain face 
recognition causally, but the concept of recognition is understood in the human world of 
meaning and normativity. 
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In this sense Patricia Churchland was right to acknowledge that eliminative materialism 
involves a change of meanings. 83 Unfortunately, the sort of reduction involved in 
extreme materialism is also a matter of destroying meaning. The transcendental nature of 
the normativity of intentional psychological phenomena is not undercut by climinativism, 
but rather contradicts the possibility of eliminativism. For the Wittgensteinian critique 
suggests that the world of folk psychology is the embedded human world of normativity 
and meaning. To eliminate these meanings is not conceivable, because it would be to 
eliminate the human world as it is known. If this is a logical possibility, it is not one to 
which it is possible to ascribe sense. It is, therefore, quite literally a nonsensical world. 
In this section I have argued against extreme materialism, by which I mean those sort of 
type-type identity theories that conflate the causal with the constitutive accounts of 
intentional psychological phenomena, suggesting there is nothing more to mental states 
than brain states. If the physicalism of the disease model were understood-in this way, 
there would be no room for normativity in the account that would be given of intentional 
psychological states. The consequence of this, however, is that there would be no room 
for meaning. Whilst climinativism embraces this possibility, it is a possibility that can 
only be regarded as nonsensical in a world of meanings, where face recognition, for 
example, and failure of face recognition, involve significance and concern for those 
involved. There is, therefore, more to face recognition than the causal preconditions that 
explain it. So the physicalism of the disease model must be viewed in a broader context. 
In the next section I consider Davidson, because in his 'anomalous monism' we see just 
such a broadening of the context. By this I mean that the need for physicalism to 
accommodate the non-native realm of psychological predicates is perceived. I shall 
suggest that Davidson's account is problematic, but the broadening move is laudable. I 
have already argued, in Chapter 1, that we need to have a broad view of dementia. This 
is the perspective that accommodates the understanding of the neuroscientist as well as 
the understanding of Mrs. Z. There is undoubtedly a sense in which, depending on a 
83 Churchland PS (1986) p. 274. 
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person's perspective, dementia is understood differently. But an aim of this thesis is to 
show that there is a unifying view. This depends on understanding intentional 
psychological states as embedded in the world, as part of the furniture of the world, so 
that normativity and meaning arc perceived to be as real as rocks and rainbows. From 
this broad perspective - which brings into play history, culture and values, as well as 
biology, psychology and the social aspects of the world - the dysfunctional biology of 
dementia sits alongside the break-down in the normative realm, which constitutes 
dementia too. But then, this broader context turns out to be, not a matter of physicalism 
accommodating normativity, but rather a matter of physicalism being accommodated 
within a broader perspective of the world: one which involves transcendental normativity, 
in which intentional mental states arenot solely a matter of internal mechanisms or 
processes, but in which they enmesh with the external circumstances of the world. 
Davidson's anomalous monisin: physicalism ivith normativity? 
What extreme physicalism fails to provide is an account of intentional psychological 
states that is not just causal. In failing to provide a constitutive account of such states, 
extreme physicalism ignores their nonnativity. In this section I shall consider an 
alternative version of physicalism (provided by Davidson) that seems, at first blush, to 
allow room for a broader account of intentional psychological phenomena. If this 
succeeds, then the disease model can be accommodated within a perspective that 
acknowledges the physical causes of dementia, but allows that a fuller understanding of 
dementia must include recognition of the broader, personal, social and ethical context of 
the disease. 
It is worthwhile reinforcing this broader context by recalling Mr. Z, discussed in Chapter 
1. Mr. Z now fails to recognize his wife. This means that he sometimes becomes 
aggressive, seeming not to understand why she lives with him. His failure to recognize 
her seems involved in his desire to leave home, which would place him at risk. For Mrs. 
Z, not being recognized is difficult to bear after so many years of marriage. It also places 
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her in embarrassing situations when people come to visit, some of whom Mr. Z similarly 
fails to recognize. Gradually they tend not to visit. Moreover, she is now under pressure 
from her family to have Mr. Z placed in a home, on the grounds that he does not 
recognize her anyway and he might pose a danger t6her or himself. For Mrs. Z, 
however, her marriage vows and her love for her husband mean that a residential or 
nursing home is out of the question. Whatever the account we give, based on the disease 
model, of the physical causes of Mr. Z's behaviour, that account must accommodate the 
fuller picture of Mr. Z's dementia. Having rejected the extreme materialist line, I turn 
now to the more moderate materialism of Davidson. 
Davidson accepts that 'all events [including mental events] are physical'. 84 He holds this 
view in an attempt to account for the causal role that mental events have in the physical 
world. 85 He states: 'Psychological events and intentional actions are causally related to 
physical events'. 86 Whilst his monistic stance rejects dualism (and is, therefore, to this 
extent, in step with extreme materialism), he regards mental events as 'anomalous' in that 
they 'resist capture in the nomological net of physical thcory'. 87 
Davidson's 'anomalous monism' is anomalous, 'because it insists that events do not fall 
under strict laws when described in psychological terms. '88 More bluntly, there are no 
precise psychophysical laws. His arguments for this are predicated on his views about 
mental autonomy and holism. 89 Thus, 
'Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science; particular 
mental events can when we know particular identities. But the explanations of 
mental events in which we are typically interested relate them to other mental 
events and conditions. We explain a man's free actions, for example, by appeal 
84 Davidson (1980) p. 214. 
85 ibid. p. 207. 
86 ibid. p. 231. 
87 ibid. p. 207. 
99 ibid. p. 231. 
89 ibid. p. 217. 
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to his desires, habits, knowledge and perceptions. '90 
That is, whilst for other reasons Davidson accepts that mental events are physical events, 
he also recognizes the radical difference which exists between the language of the 
physical sciences and the language of the mental. There are differences between mental 
and physical predicates which stem from their different degrees of law-likeness. Not 
only will physical predicates never give rise in a law-like manner to terms which can 
capture the full extensional meaning of mental predicates, but there is also a radical 
difference between the closed system of a physical science and the generalizations of 
mental predicates. 91 Because of their differing roles, the physical and the mental cannot 
be tightly bound together, as would be required by strict psychophysical laws. This 
allows the freedom which is entailed by the notion of rationality. So, 
'When we attribute a belief, a desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to an 
agent, we necessarily operate within a system of concepts in part determined by 
the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself. Short of changing the 
subject, we cannot escape this feature of the psychological; but this feature has no 
counterpart in the world of physics. '92 
Davidson is most unequivocal about his physicalism. In this he aligns himself with the 
scientific account of brain failure in dementia. He seems unequivocal about the realm of 
the mental too. Here other desires and beliefs come into play, along with habits, 
knowledge, rationality and perceptions. This is less law-like. It allows a fuller account 
of intentional psychological states. On the one hand, it does not deny the physical 
preconditions for such states, but the mental states themselves are seen to enmesh with 
other concerns and beliefs. Davidson is interested, therefore, in what it is to desire or 
intend something. He recognizes that what is constitutive here is more important, at least 
as regards the mental realm, than what is causal. This allows room for normativity. 
What it is for someone to recognize or fail to recognize a friend is not simply accounted 
for in causal terms, but involves their other beliefs, memories, knowledge and general 
90 ibid. p. 225. 
91 ibid. p. 211. 
92 ibid. p. 230. 
understanding. 
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Unfortunately, however, Davidson must both locate mental states within a realm of 
rational and normative connections and maintain (tok-en-token) links to physical and 
causal events in the brain in order for the theory to remain monist. 93 Trying to maintain 
an anti-dualist position, whilst marking out separate realms for physical and mental 
predicates is, however, difficult. For, on the one hand, there is the commitment to the 
link between the mental and the physical (a token link); whilst, on the other hand, there 
can be no psychophysical laws. Nevertheless (and this is the difficulty for Davidson), 
for any description of a mental state there is, according to anomalous monism, a 
particular physical state which must, in some way, specify the normative relations of the 
mental state to other states without which it would not be the mental state that it is. This 
is not possible, however, if there are no psychophysical laws. 
The obvious response is that this has misscd the point of the token identity theory 
proposed by Davidson. But there are grounds for arguing that the token theory just 
cannot get around the need to establish some sort of harmony between the physical and 
the mental once that dichotomy has been allowed to appear. Albeit there are limitless 
ways in which a mental state could be realized physically in the token relationship, the 
brain state which does in fact realize the mental state will have particular physical 
properties. Meanwhile, the mental state will also be particular (recognizing Winston 
Churchill say), which will mean that this mental state will have particular (normative) 
relations to other mental states (remembering the cavalry charge at Omdurman). But, as 
Thornton has observed, 
'this places constraints on its physical properties which will have to be such that 
its causal role fits its rational role such that it is causally related to other tokcn 
states that realise those other mental abilities and states. The normative relations 
93 The other issue, which I shall not pursue, concerns whether reasons are causes. See Bolton and Hill 
(1997) and Thornton (1997b) for a fuller discussion. 
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constitutive of content impose general constraints on the physical lcvel. '94 
These sorts of problems have led Kim to make the suggestion that Davidson should be 
characterized as a dualist: 
in spite of his anomalous monism, dualism in the form of a commitment to 
the mental as an autonomous domain is a nonnegotiable premise of Davidson's 
overall position in "Mental Events". '95 
Davidson has attempted to avoid this dualism by linking the non-relational mental states 
to non-relational physical descriptions. But he has also tried to allow room for human 
rationality (and anomalousness) by making another link between non-relational mental 
states and relational mental descriptions. The problem is that the mental state of 
recognizing Churchill's face is itself relational, not just the description of recognizing 
Churchill. 
So, although Davidson makes a distinction between the homonomic (strict) laws of 
physics and the heteronomic laws governing mental predicates (which are relational and 
subject to human rationality and the context of customs and practices), this is at odds with 
his insistence that mental events are physical events. Something has to succumb: either 
mental events are physical (and susceptible to causal explanations as frcc-standing, non- 
relational items) or mental events are anomalous (and subject to understanding within the 
relational context of human rationality). Hence, anomalous monism cannot form the 
basis of our understanding of the physicalist construal of psychological concepts in the 
disease model of dementia. What Davidson demonstrates is a tcnsion between the causal 
understanding of Mr. Z's prosopagnosia and a constitutive understanding of what the 
failure to be recognized means to Mrs. Z. Davidson fails to deliver physicalism with 
normativity, which leaves the disease model in peril. I shall now show how the 
Wittgcnstcinian analysis of intentional psychological phenomena provides physicalism 
with normativity, that is, both a causal and constitutive account. 
94 Thornton (1998) pp. 200 -201. The chapter 'Content and causality' (pp. 176-204) compares more 
extensively Davidson and Wittgenstein on the mind-brain debate. 
95 Kim (1985) p. 385. 
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lVittgenstein on face recognition 
Face recognition carries normative commitments. In'Chapter 2,1 characterized this 
normativity as being constitutive of intentional psychological states, irreducible and 
transcendental. The transcendental nature of normativity means that it cannot be further 
analysed. It is a precondition; otherwise the concept of recognition would not have the 
meaning it does. To recognize a familiar face jusl is a matter of these normative 
commitments holding sway. As I have suggested, normativity amounts to the practice 
concerned being embedded in the world. Even if quietism is appropriate with respect to 
what further constitutes normativity, we can say more about what constitutes these 
practices qua practices embedded in the world. So, we can say that recognizing someone 
might carry social and ethical commitments. If recognition, normatively constrained, is 
embedded in the world, it is apt to involve those things that go to make up the world. We 
can say, therefore, that face recognition is, from one point of view, a physical matter. It 
is, of course, also a psychological matter. Likewise, from a different perspective, it is a 
social phenomenon. Hence, failure to recognize someone, in the way that Mr. Z no 
longer recognizes his neighbour or his wife, is similarly a physical, psychological and 
social matter. 96 
The constitutive account of face recognition, therefore, incorporates the causal account 
and a whole lot more besides. This follows directly from the Wittgensteinian analysis of 
face recognition as an intentional psychological phenomenon. For that analysis, with its 
emphasis on nonnativity, brings into play the reality of face recognition as an embedded 
practice in the world. This involves the physicalism of the disease model, as ivell as 
psychological and social aspects. These different aspects, moreover, are not different 
96 It might be contended that a fractured leg also involves physical, psychological and social 
implications. These features, it could be said, as part and parcel of what a fracture means, are constitutive 
of a fracture too. But in the case of a fractured mind, which is what I am considering, when we are 
concerned with intentional mental states, these external circumstances come into play (according to the 
Wittgensteinian analysis) constitutively in the sense that they are involved in our very understanding 
(transcendentally) of what it is, say, to remember. Having a non-fractured leg does not similarly entail 
normative commitments. 
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realities, but different aspects of the same reality, which is the reality of face recognition 
as a practice in the human world. So, if I am asked to say what constitutes face 
recognition, I must mention what it means to Mrs. Z, as ivell as what occurs 
neuropsychologically in Mr. Z, as ivell as the physical basis of recognition in the brain 
(which will be a causal account), as ivell as the ethical and legal implications, and so on. 
The causal account is one aspect of the broader reality; and the broader reality (the 
constitutive account) tells us more about what dementia is. 
In saying this, I have merely applied the analysis of intentional psychological phenomena 
to the disease model of dementia. What this analysis suggests is that Wittgenstcin would 
both have accepted folksy ways of talking of mental states, whilst at the same time 
similarly accepting the physicalist description of the world. The emphasis on the 
embeddedness of intentional psychological phenomena in the ivorld means that the 
dichotomy suggested by the mind-brain debate, at least as regards these phenomena, 
should seem chimerical. 97 Hence Schulte's suggestion that, for Wittgenstein, 'many of 
the questions that have arisen in the context of discussions of the mind-brain problem arc 
just confused or, at best, unanswerable'. 99 So, inasmuch as we find statements relevant 
to the mind-brain problem in Wittgenstein, they cut this way and that. 99 Indeed, 
commentators have accused Wittgenstein both of being a dualistlOO and a physicalist. 101 
But before I glibly allow that Wittgenstein can be taken as accepting a certain 
interpretation of physicalism, in keeping with the disease model, I need to account for a 
number of his statements which appear profoundly inimical to physicalism: 
97 Some suggest a problem concerning non-intentional mental states, e. g. simple qualia. But see ref 
in Ch 2 (p. 31). Since I am not attempting to solve the mind-brain problem, I shall not pursue the 
point. As far as intentional psychological states are concerned, however, the Wittgensteinian analysis 
offers a solution to the mind-brain problem. 
98 Schulte (1993) p. 166. 
99 E. g PI §§ 36,339,422,454; Z §§ 20,211,611; LAV ii pp. 63 and 84. 
100 Hacking (1982). 
101 Hopkins (1975). 
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'One of the most dangerous of ideas for a philosopher is ... that we think with 
our hcads or in our heads'; 102 
'No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the 
brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible 
to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. ... So an organism might 
come into being even out of something quite amorphous, as it were causelessly, 
and there is no reason why this should not really hold for our thoughts, and hence 
for our talking and writing'; 103 
'It is thus perfectly possible that certain psychological phenomena cannot be 
investigated physiologically, because physiologically nothing corresponds to 
them. ... 
Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no 
physiological regularity corresponds? '. 104 
One apologia here would be to highlight the important insight concerning the difference 
between talk of thinking and talk of neurophysiological processes. Another defence 
would be to stress the need to take careful note of Wittgenstein's exact words. It is, for 
instance, a dangerous ideafor philosophers to think that we think with our heads. 
Perhaps the point here is that philosophical confusion might follow from this idea even 
though it is an empirically useful notion. Or it could be suggested that the correlation of 
brain-processes and mind-processes is not a natural supposition, but a highly 
sophisticated one; and our thoughts do seem to appear causelessly. So too, it is 
(logically) perfectly possible for there to be no physiological underpinning to 
psychological states. Elsewhere he talks of brain mechanisms, which he thus clearly 
allows as a possibility, as being 'not our concern'. 105 
102 Z§ 605. 
103 Z§ 608. 
104 ZH 609-610. 
105 Z§ 304. For similar points, see Thornton (1998) pp. 203-2(g. 
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An alternative defence of these passages is to argue that they could be developed into the 
position adopted by Davidson. After all, Davidson's stricture that there arc no 
psychophysical laws was anticipated by Wittgenstein's remark: 'Why should there not be 
a psychological lawlikeness to which no physiological lawlikeness corresponds? '. 106 If 
Wittgenstein is to be assimilated to Davidson, however, he would face similar problems: 
the lack of lawlikeness in the psychological realm would have to be grafted somehow 
onto the strict lawlikencss in the physiological sphere. But I think that the Zettel passages 
do not need to be interpreted with Davidson in mind. It is fairer to Wittgcnstein to make 
an interpretation in the light of his other writings. Interestingly, this can still be done 
using the example of face recognition. 
In Zetlel § 610 Wittgenstein wrote: 
'I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I 
remember his name. And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering 
in my nervous system? Why must something or other, whatever it may be, be 
stored up there in anyfonn? Why must a trace have been left behindT 
Having asked why there needs to be a correspondence between psychological and 
physiological reality, Wittgenstein added, 'If this upsets our concepts of causality then it 
is high time they were upset. '107 
Now, it would be natural to interpret this passage in the light of the remarks that surround 
it. For instance, Wittgenstein suggests that no process in the brain correlates with 
thinking. To illustrate this he considers the example of a seed and plant. He says: 
citothing in the seed corresponds to the plant which comes from it', 108 and he adds that 
the properties and structure of the plant cannot be inferred from those of the seed, but '- 
this can only be done from the history of the seed. '109 With these comments in mind, it 
might be suggested that, just as Wittgenstein did not know that the structure of DNA in 
106 RPP i§ 905. 
107 Z§ 610. 
108 Z§ 608. 
109 ibid. 
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the seed determines the structure of the plant, so he did not know that the workings of the 
media] occipitotemporal lobes control face recognition. 
What should make this interpretation suspicious is the fact that it fastens onto a solely 
causal account of the phenomena being considered. Part of my argument has been that 
Wittgenstein's analysis of intentional psychological concepts draws us to the constitutive, 
not the causal. Elsewhere there are enough comments by Wittgenstein to suggest that he 
was not primarily concerned with the scientific explanation of the problems he was 
considering. 110 For instance, he wrote in connection with the study of psychology: 
'The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of 
solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one 
another by. 'I II 
My suggestion, therefore, is that Wittgenstein was talking conceptually when he 
considered the seed and the lack of correspondence between recognizing someone and 
what might be going on in the brain. 
Wittgenstein mentions face recognition elsewhere. As I noted, 112 in the midst of the 
rule-following considerations, he discusses how the experience of reading is as if the 
letters and sounds form an alloy or unity. He goes on: 
'In the same way e. g. the faces of famous men and the sound of their names are 
fused together. This name strikes me as the only right one for this face. '113 
He then criticizes this account as an account of what constitutes the process of reading. 
For reading cannot be defined in tenns of some essential aspect or process. As I 
suggested in Chapter 2, what constitutes reading has to be understood in terms of reading 
as an embedded, worldly custom and practice. The normativity, which involves this 
word meaning this and that face being Churchill's, cannot be further analyzed in terms of 
110 Cf. BB p. 18 (quoted later); and CV: 'I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really 
grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions do that. At bottom I am indifferent to the solution of 
scientific problems; but not the other sort. ' (p. 79). 
III PIp. 232. 
112 In Chapter 2, p. 34. 
113 PI § 171. 
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what constitutes it. But this irreducible normativity is constitutive of the phenomenon of 
reading and is transcendental, since without it there would be no such thing as reading. 
The same holds for face recognition. 
This takes me back to the passage in Zetteý. Does my recognizing someone have to have 
a cause in my nervous system? Wittgenstein's concern in these paragraphs is with the 
intentional psychological phenomena of recognizing, remembering and thinking. If we 
take it that his concern was typically with the constitutive nature of such phenomena, not 
with their causal preconditions, then his comments no longer seem naYve or maverick. 
What it is to think, or recognize, or remember, is not straightforwardly explicable in 
causal terms if we are considering the phenomena themselves. My recognition of 
someone and recall of his name does seem, in terms of these phenomena, to come from 
'something quite amorphous'. 114 The face and the name are fused in a sense, but what it 
is to recognize a familiar face is part of a practice, with a history. If my inind is to be 
compared to the seed, prior to the recognition there is nothing in it that can afterwards be 
correlated with the recognition, except that my mental history will include the elements 
that make the recognition possible, namely that I have seen pictures of Churchill before. 
There is nothing here that should deny the brain activity that is a precondition for this 
recognition. But that was not Wittgenstein's concern. His concern was with the 
conceptual and constitutive understanding of intentional psychological states. 
McDonough has trenchantly argued, too, for a non-apologetic interpretation of these 
paragraphs. 115 His argument is predicated on a holistic characterization of meaning in 
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, such that Wittgenstein denies the 'semantic 
correspondence thesis' which suggests that 'elements in the meaning correspond with 
elements in the brain'. 116 McDonough also stresses that Wittgenstein's notion of use is 
'the notion of context embedded linguistic behaviour'. 117 He continues: 
114 Z§ 608. 
115 McDonough (1989). 
116 ibid. 
117 ibid. 
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'This embeddedness is not constituted by causal connections between utterances 
and contexts, but by criterial or conventional connections betwen them. The 
description of the use of an utterance is, therefore, nothing like the description of 
a physical state. It is more like the description of a criterial connection between 
words and significant contexts. Even if use, in this sense, cannot be traced to the 
brain it does not follow that utterances physically characterized cannot be traced to 
the brain. Wittgenstein's view is not incompatible with moderate 
physical ism. 'I Is 
This interpretation allows that the brain, itself a structure, can picture structural 
phenomena such as spoken or written words, but cannot picture meaning which requires 
its embedding context. Furthermore, 
'Instead of causally tracing the outer behaviour of the person to a semantical. 
engine inside him, one must in a different sense (conceptually), trace the criteria 
for the description of the neural centre to the semantical system outside them. The 
person is not semantically centred in their brain, but in their institutional and 
cultural context. '119 
McDonough is concerned with the theory of meaning, which is not directly my concern. 
But his suggestion that Wittgenstcin has brought about a Copernican revolution, whereby 
'the person's centre of thought and meaning (a) is not inside the person, and (b) is not 
their individual possession', is in keeping with the normative analysis of psychological 
concepts which I have described. So, for instance, McDonough speaks of 'rules, 
procedures, norms' which are constitutive of the context in which use is embedded. He 
eschews a causal connection between the utterances and context, but plumps for a 
4criterial or conventional' connection. This is still too weak for the transcendental 
normativity required of intentional psychological concepts, since it suggests that meaning 
is fixed by criteria or convention, rather than norms being a constitutive precondition of 
meaning. Nevertheless, McDonough's account allows a rapprochement between the sort 
118 ibid. 
119 ibid. 
- 104- 
of moderate physicalist, who might otherwise have been put off by Wittgenstcin's talk of 
there being no correlation between the brain and thinking, and those who wish to 
maintain a notion of linguistic holism and avoid the sort of reductions which would 
threaten such holism. 
From this discussion, it seems possible to defend the following view, which is in 
keeping with the Wittgensteinian analysis of psychological concepts. Prosopagnosia is 
the result of brain pathology. Recognizing, or not recognizing, a familiar face, however, 
involves nonnativity, because such recognition, or its absence, carries other 
commitments. These commitments can be characterized as constitutive of the act, or 
failure, of recognition. The normative commitments are a prerequisite for such concepts 
having the meanings that they do (and are thus transcendental). The normative 
commitments also mean that the concept of failure of face recognition cannot just be a 
matter of brain pathology (normativity is irreducible), even though brain pathology 
provides a causal explanation for the failure. Being able to recognize a familiar face is 
subject to certain rules - this is part of what the normativity consists in - and it forms part 
of a practice. Not only can we (in normal cases) instantly say whether or not someone 
has recognized a familiar face correctly, but such recognition forms part of what we 
ordinarily do everyday and places us in a certain way within a particular context. This 
embeddedness in the context of the human world is what ensures the normativity 
associated with face recognition. 
At the same time, however, the embcddedness also allows the physicalist construal of 
face recognition that is required by the disease model. There is something for face 
recognition to be in the brain, as is shown by the lesions that lead to prosopagnosia. But 
for face recognition actually to be face recognition, that is, for it not just to be a ncuronal 
circuit of no consequence, reference has to be made to the broader context in which 'face 
recognition' plays the part that it does. The broader context, of rules and regularities of 
practice and custom, is the one in which normativity inheres. In this context, which is 
defined by the realities and concerns of human beings (i. e. it is cultural, historical, 
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political, social, geographical, ethical, etc., etc. ), normativity is embedded as a 
constitutive, transcendental and irreducible reality. Face recognition, similarly, is located 
- and normatively constrained - within this context. But so too are the neuronal 
mechanisms that support face recognition; and so too'are the lesions involving the medial 
occipitotemporal regions of the brain that cause propsopagnosia. Those mechanisms and 
lesions mean nothing outside this human context. The reductionist impulse, which 
moves towards micro-structure, must be reversed to look towards the macro-structure 
where the insights of science have meaning. For meaning is a function of embedded 
context. 
Summary 
Extreme physicalism does not allow room for normativity. It even does away with 
mentalistic talk and (rather nonsensically) meaning too. The attempt by Davidson to 
allow that psychological and physiological descriptions are radically different is helpful 
from the point of view of normativity. But, having allowed the dichotomy between mind 
and brain to appear, characterizing the relationship between the two is radically 
problematic. The Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological states roots them 
from the start in the physical world. So that inner and outer, mental and physical, brain 
and mind are enmeshed and mutually-involving. As Wittgenstein wrote: 'What goes on 
within also has meaning only in the stream of life'. 120 There is, thus, no dichotomy, 
since the locus of intentional psychological phenomena is the human world, which is 
constituted by physical and psychological and social and ethical and spiritual aspects and 
so on. This allows, therefore, both physicalism and normativity. The physicalism of the 
disease model does not preclude a broad understanding of what it is for Mr. Z to fail to 
recgnize his wife, even if it explains the underlying causal preconditions for 
prosopagnosia. But failure of face recognition - and the disease model as a whole - are 
placed in the broad context of a constitutive account of intentional psychological states. 
120 I-AV ii p. 30. 
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3.3 Conclusion: the standing of the disease model 
I started by noting the clinical and scientific usefulness of the disease model. 
Nevertheless, at first blush, its construal. of psychological concepts in physical terms 
seems to lead to a paradox. On the one hand this construal seems to be reductive, in that 
psychological phenomena are only really explained by digging deeper into their physical 
basis. On the other hand, the reductive impulse is opposed by the Wittgensteinian 
analysis which places psychological concepts within the broader context of normatively- 
constrained human practices. This analysis, therefore, looks as if it should reject the 
disease model. But this means we should be rejecting something that is clinically and 
scientifically useful. 
The scientific tendency to move from macro-structure to micro-structure, or away from 
everyday language to explanations in terms of sub-structural mechanisms, is strong. 
This reductive impulse, however, seems to move medical science away from the 
concerns of ordinary people afflicted with disease. Although people enjoy the benefits of 
scientific advances and support scientific research into diseases, it is a commonplace that 
medicine has become too technological and less person-centred. 121 
Wittgenstcin wrote: 
'Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. ... I 
want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything into anything, or 
to explain anything. Philosophy really is "purely descriptive". '122 
It is important to note that this is not a point about science, but about philosophy. 
Wittgenstein accepts that science is reductive, but insists that philosophy, which involves 
the analysis of concepts by looking at their uses, pulls us in another direction. A further 
point is that the use of the scientific model in the wrong field is deleterious. A 
121 cf. Kitwocd (1997). 
122 BB p. 18. 
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philosophical critique of the disease model, therefore, should leave the model itself as it is 
- the science of it is not our concern - but it should be no surprise if such a critique placed 
the model, and our understanding, in a broader context. 
One response, from the dementia scientist, to this point about philosophy could be to say 
that this is all very well, but the concern of the scientist is solely with causal mechanisms 
and processes. Thus, none of my philosophical points needs to be taken as relevant to 
the perfectly proper business of scientific research on dementia. Indeed, I have myself 
already highlighted what is good about the disease model, namely its ability to give a 
useful causal account. The danger is, however, that the disease model facilitates a 
surreptitious move towards the erroneous thought that it alone might tell us what 
dementia actually is, as if the disease model might tell us what conslitutes dementia. This 
ignores the extent to which AD, say, is a breakdown, not just of cholinergic pathways, 
but also within the rational realm where normativity holds sway. The purpose of my 
philosophical discussion, therefore, is to locate our understanding of dementia in this 
broader field. 
The analysis of intentional psychological concepts in the disease model of dementia 
provides us with a way of bridging the gap between scientific explanation and person- 
centred understanding. Scientific explanation generally, and the disease model in 
particular, must be located in the broader context of the normatively-constrained human 
world. In this context people act according to historically and culturally embedded 
practices and customs. Indeed, McDonough suggests that at some level the explanatory 
power of scientific models will run out and the task will become purely descriptive, just 
as in philosophy; at which point, 
'The real philosophical problem is to understand the meaning of statements about 
atoms by looking in the other direction, "upwards", to the role of those statements 
in the embedding culture'. 123 
McDonough states: 'the very meaning of mechanical models must be cashed in tenns of 
123 McDonough (1991). 0 
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Iheir use in a culture'124 He also suggests that it is Wittgenstein's view, 
'that scientific statements and models are meaningful ... 
insofar as they do some 
cultural work. But this kind of work does not enable science to "penetrate 
phenomena" (reduce them) to the mechanisms which are "really there". '125 
Our understanding of the disease model itself involves normativcly-constrained 
understandings, embedded in the world of practices and customs. The physical features 
and non-nativity of the world are part of the same world and are inevitably enmeshed. 
The scientific explanation of prosopagnosia in dementia is understood in the context of 
meanings and concerns, in which face recognition plays a culturally, historically and 
emotionally embedded role. Psychological concepts pick out aspects of the human world 
which are simultaneously both physical and mental: there is no dichotoMy. 126 Similarly, 
prosopagnosia is a matter both of brain pathology and psychological reality. The concept 
is itself understood as 'a phenomenon of human life'. 127 There is no real conflict 
between scientific explanation and human understanding, once both are seen as giving 
descriptions embedded in the context of the human world. This is a physical world, but 
it is at the same time one in which physical descriptions and models gain their meaning 
from their embeddedness in the broader 'stream of life'. 128 Thus, the disease model 
squares with the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological states. 
The paradox of the disease model is solved in this way. There is nothing wrong with the 
scientific inclination to look for mechanistic and micro-structural explanations in a 
mechanical and physically structured world. This scientific inclination brings about 
clinically useful advances. The understanding of the scientific explanations (their 
meaning), however, must involve (and the 'must' is transcendental in the sense that it is a 
prerequisite of meaning) reference to the broader context of the human world in which 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid. 
126 cf. Z §§ 486-487. 
127 PI § 583. 
128 LAV ii p. 30. 
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understanding and meaning are normatively constrained. If this were not the case the 
scientific explanations, as McDonough suggests, would be meaningless. What the causal 
explanation of dementia is about, therefore, is only understood in the broader human 
context, If dementia is a failure in the realm of ncur6physiological functioning, it is a 
failure in the realm of norms too. In the normative context of the human world, looking 
simply at the micro-structure will inevitably miss something of the mental: precisely the 
normativity of intentional mental states, which arc constituted not by underlying causal 
structures, but by relationsl between agents and things and events in the public world. 
The disease model can only be articulated within the context of a range of inherently 
normative understandings and concerns. It is this human world in which the disease 
model is embedded and in which it can be used appropriately. This is the world of 
understanding and human meaning, where not to recognize a face signifies brain 
malfunction, but also a personal calamity. 
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Chapter 4. Cognitive neuropsychology models: 
mental representations and sub-personal accounts. 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall consider the models used by cognitive neuropsychologists and 
bring to bear the Wittgensteinian analysis (developed in Chapter 2) of intentional 
psychological states. Cognitive neuropsychology suggests a certain account of 
intentional psychological phenomena and, in keeping with the main plot of the thesis, I 
shall consider whether this type of model provides a broad enough understanding of 
dementia. 
The chapter is divided into six further main sections: 
1.1 shall describe cognitive neuropsychology models, paying particular attention 
to the account given of semantic memory. I shall emphasize cognitive 
neuropsychology's representationalism, by which I mean: 'the thesis that our possession 
of content consists in our possession of entities/states of some specified kind called 
"representations", where these are characterizable independently of that which they 
represent'. 1 This definiton will become clearer; but, in brief, cognitive neuropsychology 
can be taken to construe psychological states in terms of representations which are 
independent inner entities. 
2.1 shall then consider some of the work of Fodor, for two reasons: first, his 
philosophy is a species of functionalism, and functionalism has been described as the 
most suitable paradigm for cognitive neuropsychology; secondly, he presents a clear 
I Luntley (1999) p. 7. There is another sense in which intentional mental states must be 
representational, in that they must (by definition) be about something. They represent the world in some 
way. Dennett sometimes speaks of representations in this 'intentional' sense, but I suggest that he also 
demonstrates a commitment to representationalism. I am using the notion of representationalism 
specifically to characterize those theories that describe inner entities or states, which carry content, 
independent of the feature(s) of the world represented. 
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example of representationalist thought. But, I shall argue, Fodor's Representational 
Theory of Mind does not square with the transcendental account of normativity required 
by the Wittgcnstcinian analysis. So the cognitive neuropsychology construal of 
intentional psychological phenomena requires some Other basis. 
3. If the problem for Fodor is that normativity is not accounted for solely by 
reference to the internal representations that constitute his Language of Thought, one 
tactic is to try to bring the normativity of meaning and mental content into the sphere in 
which the computational transformations of representations take place. Dennett's account 
of the mind attempts to ascribe meaning and intentionality to the representations being 
processed at the sub-personal level in order to explain personal-levcl meaning and 
intentionality. His account fails for two reasons: first, because sub-personal 
intentionality is merely metaphorical; secondly, because normativity cannot be reduced 
and explained in non-normative terms. Even so, Dennett's discussion of the personal 
and sub-personal levels turns out to supply a useful way to understand the models of 
cognitive neuropsychology. 
4. Bolton and Hill offer a further attempt to transplant meaning from the personal 
to the sub-personal realm with their 'encoding of meaning' thesis. For mental 
ýates to be 
causal, they argue, there must be encoding of meaning. This does not involve syntax, 
but it does involve there being semantics in the inner representations of the brain. The 
mechanism by which this occurs is not clear, but it remains the case (1) la Dennett) that it 
can only be metaphorical and, therefore, real meaning is not encoded. 
5. Gillett offers useful clarification concerning personal and sub-personal 
representations. He accepts talk of structural representations (not metaphorical ones) in 
the brain. These are the brain's way of conveying "thin" information. But they must not 
be confused with the contcntful representations of the mind. In keeping with the 
Wittgensteinian analysis, mcntal representations - if by this we mean the meaningful 
content of the mind - must be related to embedded practices in the world and are 
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understood, accordingly, only at the personal level. 
6. Before concluding, I reassess the standing of cognitive neuropsychology 
models. I argue that they continue to have a role, inasmuch as their talk of inner 
representations and processes can be regarded as metaphorical and heuristic. But a 
metaphorical representation is not, as suggested by representationalism, a real entity. The 
wiring diagrams of cognitive neuropsychology give us a sub-personal description of 
functional abilities whatever the underlying, causal, neurophysiological preconditions 
might be for such abilities. But there arc certainly no vehicles of content travelling on 
inner pathways. Cognitive ncuropsychology, therefore, to the extent that it is based upon 
representationalism, is erroneous; but, to the extent that it delineates mental functions, it 
remains useful both scientifically and clinically. Stripped of its representationalism, 
cognitive neuropsychology can still contribute to a broad understanding of dementia. 
4.1 Cognitive neuropsychology: memory and representation 
Introduclion to cognitive neuropsychology 
Cognitive neuropsychology 'is an approach which attempts to understand cognitive 
functions such as recognising, speaking or remembering through an analysis of the 
different ways those functions can be impaired following brain injury. '2 It attempts to 
explain normal and abnormal cognitive function 'in terms of damage to one or more of 
the components of a theory or model of normal cognitive functioning'. 3 Separate 
modules arc held to be responsible for different cognitive operations and the 
'hypothesised organisation of these modules may ... 
be expressed in terms of an 
"information processing" diagram. '4 For my purposes, the most important assumption 
in cognitive neuropsychology is that of 'isomorphism': 'the cognitive structure of the 
2 Ellis and Young (1988) p. 23. 
2 ibid. 
3 ibid. 
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mind is reflected in, and arises out of, the physiological organisation of the brain. '5 
In order to illustrate the sort of model used by cognitive neuropsychologists, Figure 1 
shows a cognitive processing flow diagram which demonstrates how, from dictation, a 
word might be orally spelt or written. 6 When a word is heard, it is first analyzed either in 
terms of the separate sounds that constitute the word (route I in the diagram), or as a 
whole entity (routes 2 and 3). Following route 1, the heard sounds may be converted 
directly into phonemes or speech sounds which can then be spoken. 7 If the heard word 
is to be written down, then the phonemes will need to be converted to graphemes (e. g. 
individual letters). 
The alternative route from the level of auditory analysis involves the whole word being 
recognizcd within the auditory input lexicon. The generally accepted route from thence 
(route 2) is that words are further processed in terms of their semantic properties. The 
meaning of the word directly determines its spelling, so semantic processing leads from 
the heard word in the auditory input lexicon to the written spelling in the graphemic (or 
orthographic) output lexicon. 
There is some intuitive justification for postulating two routes. I cannot hope to spell 
"there" and "their" correctly by an analysis of their sounds alone, but only by knowing 
their meanings in a given context. I must use, therefore, the semantic route (2). On the 
other hand, having never previously heard the non-word "garp", I can only hope to spell 
it by an analysis of its sounds, which I must convert to letters (graphemes) if I wish to 
write it down (route 1). 
4 ibid. p. 24. 
6 Such cognitive tasks have now been investigated in Alzheimer's patients, who may (e. g. ) show a mild 
lexical dysgraphia early in the disease, with impairments of more peripheral aspects of writing becoming 
apparent as the disease progresses. See Hu hcs et al. (1997). Zý 9 
7 There are further processes, which are iff clevant to my discussion, between the phoneme level and the 
actual production of speech. 
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Figure 1. 
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The validity of the distinction between two routes is based on the results of investigating 
patients with various forms of brain damage. For instance, some patients have particular 
difficulty in spelling words where there is an irregular correspondence between how they 
sound and how they look. 8 Nevertheless, such patients may attempt phonologically 
plausible spellings, indicating they are using the sounds, for instance by spelling "cough" 
as COFF. This error is taken to show that these patients are having to use route 1. 
Alternatively, there are cases where patients cannot write unfamiliar non-words to 
dictation, whilst familiar words are managed well. 9 This suggests they use the lexical 
route (2). 
In addition to the two main routes just described, it has also been postulated that there are 
other routes from the auditory input lexicon to the speech or graphemic output lexicons 
(e. g. route 3). The suggestion is that some patients use a lexical route, but one which 
does not involve semantic processing. 10 Patterson's patient (GE), 11 for instance, was 
almost totally unable to speak following a stroke, but could still spell words he did not 
understand correctly. However, GE could not spell non-words and he rarely made 
phonologically plausible spelling errors, so his spelling must have been lexical but 
nonsemantic. 
Patterson's closely argued account of the impairments found in GE - and how these 
impairments point to a particular model of cognitive processing - is impressive. It also 
suggests that what is at issue is a representational process. For example: 
'It seems that for GE ... proceeding 
from recognition of a spoken word to its 
orthography was not primarily based upon a semanfic representation. ... 
GE's 
spelling of large numbers of words, many of them very complicated, must 
certainly have derived from representations in the orthographic output lexicon. 
... My preferred interpretation is of course that these representations 
in the 
8 cf. Beauvois and Derouesn6 (1981) and Hatfield and Patterson (1983). 
9 cf. Bub and Kertesz (1982). 
10 Lesser (1989), Patterson (1986). There are differences between the accounts of Lesser and Patterson. 
11 Patterson op. cit. 
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phonological output lexicon were, right from the beginning, sufficiently available 
to provide a mediating role between his virtually intact auditory input lexicon and 
his virtually intact orthographic output lexicon' (emphases largely added). 12 
Thus, representations are (at least) spoken of as if they arc entities which exist and 
mediate an internal process. The representations, according to the assumption of 
isomorphism, are reflected in and arise from the physiological organization of the brain. 
Whether neurophysiological or neuroPsychological, however, what is postulated is a 
representation along with a process. This commitment to internal representations is 
similarly in evidence in cognitive neuropsychology's account of memory. 
Memory 
Memory can be divided into declarative memory (which allows me to recite a famous 
soliloquy by Hamlet) and procedural memory ( which allows me to drive my car). 13 In 
the recall of declarative information we require 'the activation of an internal 
representation' (for instance, if we are asked to name an object); whereas, 'the retrieval of 
procedural information requires a motor oUtpUt. '14 Within declarative memory, a 
distinction is made between short-term (working) memory (which allows the storage of 
information for a few seconds only) and long-term memory. Tulving made the further 
distinction within the long-term system, based on empirical data, between episodic and 
semantic memory. 15 Episodic memory stores events from a person's life. Semantic 
memory 'stores general knowledge about the world, concepts, and language; ' it is 
'impersonal and ... independent of any time and place'. 16 Furthermore, many cognitive 
disorders can be construed as memory disorders: 
'The anomic aphasic patient ... appears to have lost conscious access to the 
12 ibid. 
13 See Hodges (1994) for a clear description. 
14 Damasio and Damasio (1992). 
15 Tulving (1972). 
16 McKenna (1991). 
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representations in memory of the spoken forms of many Nvords. ... The patient 
with "surface" dysgraphia has sin-fflarly lost conscious access to the 
representations in menzory of the spellings of many words' (my emphasis). 17 
It appears that semantic information is stored in a hierarchical and modality-specific 
manner. 18 So, for example, loss of the superordinate concept "animal" might entail loss 
of the subordinate concept "dog" (alternatively, presented with a picture of a dog a patient 
might say "animal", showing that higher order concepts are preserved at the expense of 
lower order concepts). This apparent order within the semantic memory system is held to 
support the notion of processing within a representational system. 
In AD it is apparent that both episodic and semantic memory are affcctcd. 19 It is 
particularly important in those cognitive functions which involve language. 20 Nebes 
suggests that the links between semantic concepts remain intact in dementia. 21 Hence, 
'it appears unlikely that Alzheimer patients have actually lost specific attributes 
such as physical features and functions from their representations of semantic 
conccpts. '22 
Whereas, Hodges et A felt there was 'compelling evidence of semantic memory loss in 
[Alzheimer's diseasel. '23 In their terminology, this amounted to a 'breakdown of 
representational knowledge. '24 From a later study of face recognition and naming, they 
concluded: 'loss of semantic memory is a fundamental defect in [ADJ. '25 Similarly, loss 
of semantic representations was held to be relevant to impaired reading in a study of 
17 Ellis and Young op. cit. p. 303. 
18 Warrington (1975). 
19 Huff, Corkin and Growdon (1986). 
20 Bayles (1982). 
21 Ncbcs et al. (1984). 
22 Nebes and Brady (1988). 
23 Hodges el al. (1992). 
24 ibid. 
25 Hodges el al. (1993). 
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AD. 26 Consensus now seems to favour the notion that the representations are actually 
lost (rather than it being a mere failure of access to them): 
'Underlying the language impairment in [AD] is a breakdown in the knowledge 
base, or what is termed "semantic memory". This refers to the representation of 
knowledge, including concepts and the knowledge of words and their meaning' 
(my emphasis). 27 
Clearly, whether it is failure of access or degradation of the store, there is no dispute over 
the representational character of semantic memory. 
So far, I have presented an account of the sort of information-proccssing models that are 
used by cognitive ncuropsychologists. Such models involve the positing of internal 
representations. I have also discussed the evidence for impairments in semantic memory, 
involving the loss of representations, in AD. It is clear from the literature that 
representations are central to the cognitive neuropsychologist's information-processing 
model. 28 I still need to secure the point that this model construes intentional 
psychological states as representational. 
7be representational construal of intentional psychological states 
My suggestion is that intentional psychological phenomena are construed by cognitive 
neuropsychology in terms of representations. Is the model representationalist in the 
sense in which I defined it in my Introduction? Does cognitive neuropsychology 
suggest, for instance, that to have memories is to possess entities or states, called 
representations, which can be characterized independently of that of which the memories 
are memories? I shall pursue this by considering, as an illustration, the start of Edward 
Thomas's poem "Adlestrop": 
26 Patterson el al. (1994). 
27 Morris (1997) p. 55. 
28 Hereafter, for simplicity, I shall refer to a single model. 
- 119- 
'Yes. I remember Adlcstrop - 
The name, because one afternoon 
Of heat the cxpress-train drew up there 
Unwontedly. It was late June. '29 
Now the point is: how would a cognitive neuropsychologist construe the remembering 
that Thomas experiences? It would have to be construed in terms of an inner 
representation of "Adlestrop". This name, according to the model I am considering, must 
be represented in a store of names. To remember "Adlestrop", -Thomas presumably must 
have gained access to a lexical store, part of the semantic memory, in which his 
knowledge of place names was represented. As he remembered, he must have retrieved 
from the store the representation of "Adlestrop". Remembering, therefore, according to 
this model, is a matter of accessing or retrieving representations, which do indeed sound 
like entities independent of the things they represent. Cognitive neuropsychology, 
therefore, is based on a form of representationalism. One characteristic of 
representationalism, apparent in cognitive neuropsychology, is that, 'The content of 
mental states can be explained by the possession of inner mental representations'. 30 
Thornton has suggested three aspects to the claim that mental representations are inner 
states: 
They are ontologically independent of the external world. 
They are the internal causal origins of action. 
Their existence is a matter of hypothesiS. '31 
Each of these aspects is manifest in cognitive neuropsychology. 
First, according to the cognitive neuropsychology principle of isomorphism, mind states 
are brain states. This suggests some sort of physicalist understanding. In Chapter 3,1 
19 Thomas (1981) pp. 182-183. 
30 Thornton (1998) p. 17. Thornton gives four such characteristic elements of representationalism. The 
other three elements could be ascribed to cognitive neuropsychology, but are not articulated in such 
models. 
31 ibid. p. 20. 
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supported physicalism inasmuch as it provides causal explanations of intentional mental 
states, which are, however, embedded in the normatively-constrained world. The mind 
is not, therefore, as suggested by the first aspect of representationalism, ontologically 
independent of the external world, but a part of it. According to cognitive 
neuropsychology, contrariwise, my mental representation of "Adlestrop", in itself, is an 
internal feature (whether of the mind or brain) quite distinct from the external world. 
Secondly, 'mental representations play a causal functional role in the production of 
behaviour'. 32 In cognitive neuropsychology, my mental representation of "Adlestrop" is 
the necessary pre-condition for my being able to write or spell "Adlestrop". 
Nevertheless, thirdly, the existence of the mental representation can only be inferred. It 
explains my behaviour. For instance, if I were only able to give a phonologically 
plausible spelling of "Adlestrop" (as, say, "Adelstrop'), and my spelling of "yacht" was 
cc yot", it would be hypothesized that I was using the phonological route for spelling, not 
the lexical route. It might be said that I was not able to gain access to the lexicon, or that 
the representations in the lexicon were degraded. These conjectures would have their 
basis in the inferred, underlying or hidden, causal explanation - which depends on the 
notion of inner processing of mental representations - of my spelling difficulties. 
In each of these regards, therefore, this characterization of representationalism, which 
suggests that the content of mental states can be explained by the possession of inner 
mental representations, is one that fits with the cognitive ncuropsychology model. My 
remembering "Adlestrop", and the consequences of that memory, are explained by my 
possessing the mental representation of "AdIcstrop". It seems reasonable to argue, 
therefore, that cognitive neuropsychology is representationalist. But how will the 
representationalist construal of psychological concepts in cognitive neuropsychology 
stand up to the challenge of the Wittgensteinian analysis? And does normativity figure in 
this construal as a constitutive, transcendental and irreducible feature? 
32 ibid. p. 21. 
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4.2 The Fodorian paradigm 
Functionalisin and the Representational 77ieory of Mind 
One obvious direction in which to turn, in search of a philosophical paradigm, is to the 
Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) suggested by Fodor. Having described Fodor's 
RTM, however, I sball go on to dismiss it on the grounds that it does not give a suitable 
account of normativity. Fodor provides a type of functionalist approach to the mind that 
seems at first blush to provide an extremely good philosophical paradigm for cognitive 
neuropsychology. His representationalism, however, falls foul of the requirement that 
intentional psychological states are normative. 
Fodor's RTM is a species of functionalism: 
'My own view is that RTM, construed as a species of Functionalist psychology, 
offers the best realist account of [propositional attitudes] that is currently 
available. '33 
Functionalism is generally held to be the philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. 34 
Fodor called functionalism the 'ontological doctrine' of cognitive science: 
9 For, if Functionalism is true, then there is plausibly a level of explanation 
between common-sense belief/desire psychology ... and neurological 
explanation 
This is the level at which cognitive scientists operate. According to functionalism, as 
described by Fodor, 
cpsychological-state tokens were to be assigned to psychological-state types 
solely by reference to their causal relations to proximal stimuli ('inputs'), to 
33 Fodor (1985). There are differences between Fodor's functionalism and other breeds. Mental states 
with content are connected causally according to functionalism. Fodor treats such states as linguistic-type 
of entities that can be combined to form a language in a systematic way: his 'Language of Thought'. 
This language is a system of representations which explains our bchaviour. Functionalism itself does 
not require such a language, only that one mental state should cause another. 
34 cf. Lockwood (1989) p. 31. 
35 Fodor op. cit. 
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proximal responses ('outputs'), and to one another'. 36 
As a paradigm, this fits well with cognitive ncuropsychology, in which inputs (such as 
seeing the name "Adlestrop') causally relate to outputs (such as remembering 
"Adlestrop") and causally relate to other psychological states (such as recalling it was late 
June). In addition, functionalism - whilst allowing that the 'natural domain for 
psychological theory might be physically heterogencous'37 - is also compatible with 
physicalism in a way that squares with cognitive neuropsychology's principle of 
isomorphiSM. 38 
Having presented some reasons for thinking that Fodor's functionalism is likely to 
provide an appropriate philosophical paradigm for cognitive neuropsychology, I shall 
outline how he presents his representationalism. Fodor says: 
'Mental states, insofar as psychology can account for them, must be the 
consequences of mental processes. Mental processes ... are processes 
in which 
internal representations are transformed. '39 
This is the spirit of cognitive neuropsychology, in which transformations of 
representations in the auditory input lexicon are processed to the orthographic output 
lexicon. Fodor characterizes the RTM as follows: 
'At the heart of the RTM is the postulation of a language of thought: an infinite set 
of 'mental representations' which function both as the immediate objects of 
propositional attitudes and as the domains of mental processes. '40 
Fodor's Language of Thought (LOT) clearly relies on the notion of mental 
representations. It is worth seeing how Fodor fleshes out his account of the RTM. 
36 ibid. 
37 Fodor (op. cit. ). This makes clear that Davidson's philosophy, as discussed in the last chapter, can 
also be regarded as functionalist. 
38 It is worth just considering that there are alternatives to the Fodorian paradigm; for instance: Stich's 
(1983) eliminativist functionalism, or logical behaviourism, or instrumentalism. But none of these 
offers the realist approach to propositional attitudes that is common to cognitive neuropsychology and 
Fodor's functionalism. 
39 Fodor (1976) p. 200. 
40 Fodor (1987) p. 16. 
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First, there is a claim about the nature of propositional attitudes: 
'For any organism 0, and any attitude A toward the proposition P, there is a 
('computational'/'functional') relation R and a mental representation MP such that 
MP means that P, and 0 has A iff 0 bears R to MP. ... To 
believe that such and 
such is to have a mental symbol that means that such and such tokened in your 
head in a certain way; it's to have such a token 'in your belief box ...... 41 
The second claim concerns the nature of mental processes, which are regarded as 'causal 
sequences of tokenings of mental representations'. 42 Both claims bring out the 
importance of mental representations to RTM. 
Elsewhere Fodor has put forward two arguments in favour of RTM. The first starts by 
noting there are an infinite number of thoughts and asks how a theory of mind accounts 
for this 'productivity'? The answer is, by appealing to what constitutes a propositional 
attitude, namely a symbol. 'What kind of symbol do you have to token'to tokenýan 
attitude? A mental representation, of course. Hence RTM. '43 This argument makes use 
of the first claim made above. Thus RTM accounts for the fact that we can go on making 
up new sentences and having new thoughts. All that is required is the ability to compose 
new thoughts from the vehicles of content, namely the representations, which, once 
possessed, can be combined in an infinite number of ways. The 'productitvity' of 
thought poses no problem for Fodor's account and, moreover, fits nicely with the 
cognitive neuropsychology model: the stored representations of words can be accessed 
and then used in a huge variety of ways. 
Similarly, the second argument relates to the second claim. It requires that 'mental 
processes are causal sequences of mental states'. 44 Fodor argues: 'You connect the 
causal properties of a symbol with its semantic properties via its syntax. 45 The syntax 
41 ibid. pp. 16-17. 
42 ibid. p. 17. 
43 Fodor (1985). 
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
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of a symbol is, roughly, its shape. The shape determines its causal role. It then becomes 
possible to conceive machines (computers or brains) which operate to change symbols by 
changing their shapes. Such transformations will only occur if the symbols bear certain 
semantic relations to one another. Fodor continues: ' 
'But, patently, there are going to have to be mental representations if this proposal 
is going to work. In computer design, causal role is brought into phase with 
content by exploiting parallelisms between the syntax of a symbol and its 
semantics. But that idea won't do the theory of mind any good unless there are 
mental symbols; mental particulars possessed of semantic and syntactic 
properties. There must be mental symbols because ... only symbols have syntax, 
and our best available theory of mental processes ... needs the picture of the mind 
as a syntax-driven machine. '46 
Fodor makes it clear that thoughts, or mental content, must be explicitly represented for 
RTM to be true. 
My aim here, in giving an account of the claims and arguments used by Fodor to support 
RTM, has been purely to demonstrate its closeness to cognitive neuropsychology (rather 
than to give a full account of his philosophy). In both, mental representations and 
internal processing are crucial. Fodor makes use of LOT, since thought is (on his view) 
a matter of symbol use. I shall now argue that the Fodorian paradigm does not withstand 
the critique offered by the Wittgensteinian analysis of psychological phenomena. The 
deficiency in the Fodorian paradigm lies, as a consequence of its commitment to RTM, in 
its failure to give a plausible account of normativity. 
Fodor's paradigin and normalivily 
The Fodorian model implies that intentional mental states amount to the functioning of 
internal, mechanistic, physical systems. It also suggests that the involvement of the 
whole person is not crucially defining. I shall now consider these two features of the 
46 ibid. 
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paradigm separately, but they are linked, as is the argument against them. The 
overarching argument is that the Fodorian model takes no account of the way in which 
the normativity of intentional mental states is a matter of such states being embedded in 
the world. This argument informs the separate lines, Which I shall now pursue: 
- Intentional mental states cannot just be a matter of the internal processing of 
representations, because the normativity of such states involves their external embedding 
in the world; it is constitutive of such states that they are normative, but (as I have 
argued) this involves worldly embedding; 
The normativity of intentional mental states implies that such states should be 
given an externalist construal, so that meaning and understanding constitutively involve 
the world; in which case, an understanding of the whole person is crucial, because it is 
the whole person who acts and engages with the world. 
(a) Internal mechanisms and nonnalivily 
Fodor makes it quite plain that what he envisages can be thought of in mechanistic terms: 
'what happens when a person understands a sentence must be a translation 
process basically analogous to what happens when a machine "understands" 
(viz., compiles) a sentence in its programming language'. 47 
Thus, when I understand the name of something, I access its mental representation in my 
semantic memory store. This representation can be processed or transformed to produce 
an output in various modalities: I could spell the name, write it or point to its picture. 
Similarly, Fodor's talk of computation 'presupposes a medium in which to compute'. 48 
The language of thought is instantiated in the physical structure of the brain. It is part of 
the make-up of the machine itself and is determined by its cngincering. 49 As a matter of 
biological necessity, its computations are not random. 50 This is in keeping with 
cognitive neuropsychology's concept of isomorphism. For cognitive 
47 ibid. p. 67. 
48 ibid. p. 33. 
49 ibid. p. 66. 
50 ibid. p. 71. 
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neuropsychologists, as for Fodor, information-processing is something that occurs 
physically. Similarly, mental representations must be reflected in, and arise from, brain 
physiology. 
But if this is how we are going to construe intentional mental states, whence will come 
the notion of normativity? Understanding and remembering, according to Fodor, are 
merely functional states of the mechanistic brain. This is not, however, consistent with 
the Wittgensteinian account. Elsewhere, discussing memory, Wittgenstein suggests that 
memory is not a matter of personal fiat. If I think I have captured the notion of memory 
by pointing to internal representations, I have missed the point that I shall have, 
gno criterion of correctness. ... whatever is going to seem right to me is right. 
And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'. '51 
The concern here is not with the epistemological point, that I might not know whether or 
not my memory is correct, but is with the constitutive point, that memory is bound up 
with external states of affairs. This is because of the normativity involved in 
remembering. When I remember something I make a normative connection with the 
world; what it is to remember involves this externalist orientation as a constitutive feature. 
So, internal mechanisms separated from external states of the world provide no criterion 
of correctness, because normativity is not a feature of internal mechanistic states. Such 
purely internal physical states are not normative since, according to the Wittgensteinian 
analysis, normativity is a feature of the embedding of intentional psychological states in 
the world. The Wittgensteinian position sets out a conceptually unavoidable, externalist 
account. It is unavoidable because the constitutive account makes the normativity of 
intentional mental states a feature of the world. Thereby intentional mental states cannot 
be considered in abstraction. Our whole understanding of such mental states is structured 
by our normatively-shaped understanding of the world. 
51 PI § 258. This is part of the private language argument, which is not specifically my concern. I have 
used it merely to extract the talk of a criterion of correctness. 
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There is nothing in the Fodorian account to suggest that the psychological states 
instantiated in the physical goings-on of the computational brain must be embedded 
within the broader context of human life and thought. 52 Indeed, the implication is that 
psychological phenomena are explained, on this view, merely in terms of mechanical 
engineering. The non-randomness of computations is a matter of biological necessity. 
Whereas, according to the Wittgensteinian analysis, the irreducible nature of normativity 
is a conceptual, rather than an empirical, point. Of course, there is a causal explanation 
for things being the way the), are in the world. The Wittgensteinian analysis, however, 
establishes the plausibility of a broader conceptual enquiry within which empirical 
enquiries have meaning. 
Elsewhere Wittgenstein considered someone writing down 'jottings' to remember what 
has been said. The jottings are not connected by rules to the text: 
'... if anything in it is altered, if part of it is destroyed, he sticks in his 'reading' 
or recites the text uncertainly or carelessly or cannot find the Nvords at all ... The 
text would not be stored tip in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our 
nervous system? '53 
The jottings specify the text and, so too, the configuration of molecules in the nervous 
system might specify the memory. Disturbing the molecules might disturb the memory, 
just as disturbing the jottings disturbs the text. But talk of the memory being in the 
molecules, or the text in the jottings, is merely metaphorical. Fodor talks of the 
computations, which are (for instance) what it is to remember, as being in a physical 
medium. There is an important sense, however, in which this cannot be where the 
memory resides, even if the molecules do provide the causal preconditions for memory. 
The normative constraints, which surround our use of the concept of memory, cannot be 
reduced to the causal constraints that operate in the functional states of the brain. For 
internal states in the RTM are precisely inner, whereas nonnativity is a feature of the 
external world in which intentional mental states are embedded. 
52 Cf. PI § 325: 'What people accept as a justification - is shewn by how they think and live. ' 
53 Z§ 612. 
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It is clear that there is systernaticity of thought that allows comparison (on the one hand) 
with a language and (on the other) with a computational machine. According to Evans's 
'Generality Constraint', the structuring of thought is a matter of thoughts being 'a 
complex of the exercise of several distinct conceptual abilities. '54 Grasping the meaning 
of an assertion or thought, 'ra' for instance, conceptually involves the generalizable 
ability to use the name 'a', as well as the generalizable ability to use the predicate 'P. 
This general structuring of thought is taken by Fodor to be an empirical matter, which can 
accordingly be represented in empirical models of cognitive processes. But the point is 
unavoidably and really a conceptual one too, about the normativity of meaning. Grasping 
a meaning commits one to its future use being thus and so. The Wittgensteinian analysis 
counters the idea that the systernaticity (or structuring) is solely a matter of computation 
and representation. Neither thought nor language can be conceived as merely 
computational or representational, for they both involve conceptual abilities, as Evans 
suggests. Normativity resides, therefore, beyond internal computations and 
rcprcscntations, in the world of such abilities. In this sense, normativity cannot be 
reduced. Such a reduction, which is what Fodor offers, can only amount to a refusal to 
undertake the conceptual analysis which would reveal the transcendental nature of the 
normativity of meaning. 
So, for instance, Wittgcnstein asks how we should counter someone who argues that for 
him understanding was an inner process? 55 Wittgenstein responds by asking how we 
should counter him if he said that playing chess was an inner process. 
'We should say that when we want to know if he can play chess we aren't 
interested in anything that goes on inside him. -- And if he replies that this is in 
fact just what we are interested in, that is, we arc interested in whether he can play 
chess -- then we shall have to draw his attention to the criteria which would 
demonstrate his capacity, and on the other hand to the criteria for the 'inner 
54 Evans (1982) p. 101. 
55 PI p. 181. 
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states'. Even if someone had a particular capacity only when, and only as long 
as, he had a particular feeling, the feeling would not be the capacity. '56 
Normativity is not reducible merely to physical processes (even if they are involved), it is 
a matter of structured accomplishments within the world. To reiterate, this is not a matter 
of empirical investigation, but the result of conceptual analysis concerning what it is to 
understand or remember something. Hence, 
- Intentional mental states cannot just be a matter of the mechanistic, internal 
processing of representations, because the normativity of such states involves their 
external embedding in the world; it is constitutive of such states that they are normative, 
but this involves worldly embedding. 
(b) Organs and organisms 
The second feature of Fodor's model, which I wish to scrutinize, is the suggestion that 
the involvement of the whole person is not crucially defining for intentional mental states. 
For Fodor, thinking is something that organisms do; whereas that which he describes 
could go on in the nervous system of organisms. However, to Fodor the distinction 
between organisms and organs 'does not seem to be frightfully important'. 57 He 
continues: 
'... the states of the organism postulated in theories of cognition would not count 
as states of the organism for purposes of, say, a theory of legal or moral 
responsibility. But so what? What matters is that they should count as states of 
the organism for some useful purpose. In particular, what matters is that they 
should count as states of the organism for purposes of constructing psychological 
theories that are true. '58 
So, it seems, the description of psychological states given by Fodor's account can be 
called 'states of the organism', even though this is vastly different from the sort of thing 
56 ibid. 
57 Fodor (1976) p. 53. 
58 ibid. 
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that counts as a state of the organism when we arc considering law or morals. When the 
cognitive neuropsychologist explains what it is to remember "Adlestrop" in terms of an 
information processing diagram, this is what it is for the organism, the human being, to 
remember, or - as far as Fodor is concerned - it might as well be. 
According to the Wittgensteinian analysis, however, this is simply wrong. In criticizing 
Fodor, Taylor observed: '... human and animal agents are beings for whom the question 
arises of what significance things have for them. '59 For Taylor, the crucial difference 
between humans and machines is that for the former 'things inalter for them', which is 
what he terms the 'significance feature'. 60 Both for us and for animals (but not for 
machines) 'things have,, significance for us non-relatively'. 61 Taylor goes on to argue that 
Fodor has made false analogies: 
'When Fodor talks of the relation of psychology to physics, he is not talking 
about our account of ourselves as agents. His 'psychology' is an account of what 
we do in computational terms, and the reductive issue for him arises between an 
account at this level and one at the physical or neurological level. He is quite 
oblivious of the difference between an account in computational terms and one 
which characterizes us as agents with the significance featurc. '62 
According to Fodor, whether or not something has significance must itself be a matter of 
certain computational states holding sway. For Taylor, however, the significance of 
things is a feature of the world grasped by us as agents. That things in the world have a 
significance for us establishes a link between the world and us. This is analagous to 
intentional mental states: for such states to have content an externalist account is required; 
that is, one which establishes a link between the inner mental world and the outer world 
of events and things. Fodor ignores this point. Instead, he suggests there are simply 
internal mental representations, which have meaning (semantics) purely on the basis of 
59 Taylor (1985) p. 196. 
60 op. cit. p. 197. 
61 op. cit. p. 201. 
62 op. cit. p. 209. 
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their syntactic 'shape', and which stand in causal relationships to other mental 
representations. In which case, these internal mental representations need make no 
reference at all to the external world. The problem with this view is that significance and 
meaning are attributes of the world of persons (who are agents and do not, therefore, take 
a passive view), whereas Fodor only points to a sub-personal realm of functioning. 
Fodor's view eliminates the relevance of the external world of meaning and significance 
in favour of internal functionings. 
Wittgcnstein's view is that wholes and not parts provide a reference for psychological 
concepts: 
'An event leaves a trace in the memory: one sometimes imagines this as if it 
consisted in the event's having left a trace, an impression, a consequence, in the 
nervous system. As if one could say: even the nerves have a memory. But then 
when someone remembered an event, he would have to infer it from this 
impression, this trace. Whatever the event does leave behind in the organism, it 
isn't the memory. The organism compared with a dictaphone spool; the 
impression, the trace, is the alteration in the spool that the voice leaves behind. 
Can one say that the dictaphone (or the spool) is remembering what was spoken 
all over again, when it reproduces what it took? '63 
Regarding this quotation, Schulte commented: 
'Wittgenstein merely says that the traces in the organism -- our 'records' or 
(representations' -- may be all kinds of things but are certainly not inemories; the 
concept 'memory' must not be applied to them. ... we need more than mere traces 
in a memory store if we are to decide whether or not something is to count as a 
memory. '64 
What is needed is contextual embedding, which provides normativity to intentional 
psychological states. Unfortunately for representationalism (and Fodor), the result of 
such conceptual understanding, Nvith its emphasis on normativity, undermines the notion 
63 RPP I§ 220. 
64 Schulte op. cit. pp. 115-116. 
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that there can be vehicles of thought (representations) capable of being characterized 
independently of that which the thoughts concern. Linkage has to be made to the external 
world in which the thoughts are meaningfully embedded, which entails that mental states 
cannot be regarded as fully captured by internal, mental representations. Hence: 
* The normativity of intentional mental states implies that such states should be 
given an externalist construal, so that meaning and understanding constitutively involve 
the world; in which case, an understanding of the whole person is crucial, because it is 
the whole person who acts and engages with the world. 
Summary 
What is in evidence throughout this discussion is the extent to which the Wittgcnstcinian 
approach, in stressing the preconditions for concepts having the meanings that they do, 
emphasizes abilities and human actions, which are constitutive of the intentional mental 
states to which the concepts refer. Abilities and actions are demonstrated in the world 
and cannot, therefore, solcy be a matter of 'internal' representations and mechanistic 
processes. The Fodorians will perhaps respond that, whatever the outcome in the world, 
what is important for remembering is what happens internally, mechanically, in terms of 
representations and processes instantiated in the brain. The arguments above conspire to 
show that, whatever the causal preconditions, remembering and meaning conceptually 
involve normatively-constrained abilities, which are properly understood only in the 
context of their worldly embedding. Hence, these intentional psychological states cannot 
be characterized purely in terms of possessing inner states or entities, which are 
independent of that which they concern. The Fodorian model takes no account of the 
way in which the normativity of intentional mental states is a matter of such states being 
embedded in the world. Thus, a representationalist account fails. 
43 Sub-pm-jwW meaning: Dennett's realism or metaphorkA representations? 
Having established that cognitive neuropsychology models are representational, but that 
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RTM as propounded by Fodor (which initially seemed to offer a promising paradigm) 
offers an account of psychological phenomena that is deficient with respect to 
normativity, I shall now consider (in this section and the next) the possibility that the 
non-nativity of meaning and intentional mental content could be brought into the sphere of 
inner representations. If this could be achieved, then representationalism might be 
salvaged. It would, at least, be an advance on the Fodorian position, which ignored the 
need for transcendental normativity. In the works of Dennett an attempt is made to 
import meaning and intentionality to the sub-personal level. The attempt fails because of 
a commitment (more or less acknowledged) to representationalism in the form of realism 
about mental states. What I shall suggest is that representations are merely metaphorical. 
Hence, representations do not satisfy the requirements of representationalism. 
Nevertheless, having rejected the Fodorian paradigm, I shall go on to suggest that 
Dennett's personal and sub-personal levels form a useful model for cognitive 
neuropsychology. 
Dennett insists that we should not conflate talk of persons with talk of bodies: the 
personal and sub-personal levels must not be confused. He goes on to say that this 
lesson, derived from Wittgenstein and Ryle, 
'... has often been misconstrued, however, as the lesson that the personal level of 
explanation is the only level of explanation when the subject matter is human 
minds and actions. In an important but narrow sense this is true, for as we see in 
the case of pain, to abandon the personal level is to stop talking about pain. In 
another important sense it is false, and it is this that is often missed. 65 
For Dennett, both levels of explanation have their place. He wishes to talk of pains as 
being something to do with whole persons, but he does not wish pains to be divorced 
from talk of ncrves. For the pain in my head is something to do with things occurring in 
the stuff of my brain. 
Dennett's attitude to representationalism is not completely clear, although he clearly 
65 Dennett (1969) p. 95. 
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accepts that there is a sense in which it is pennissible to talk of representations in the 
brain: 
'Somehow ... the way a brain represents hunger must differ, physically, from 
how it represents thirst ..... There must also ... 'be a 
difference bctxx, ccn the way a 
particular adult brain represents Paris and Atlantis, for thinking of one is not 
thinking of the other. How can a particular state or event in the brain represent 
one feature of the world rather than another? '66 
Dennett's answer has involved his theory of "multiple drafts", of how the brain's 
numerous units are simultaneously processing the plethora of information given to it by 
the senses, and incorporating information already stored (some of it innately in the 
brain's structure as it has evolved), without a central controller (or "ghost in the 
machine"), but in a way which allows the emergence of a "narrative". This narrative is 
what emerges at the personal level, but it is nothing more or less than the operations of 
the numerous units, or homunculi (a Pandemonium of Homunculi'67), that exist in the 
brain which acts, in effect, as an enormous "parallel distributed processor". But it is in 
these units or homunculi that our mental states find their instantiation: this is where the 
thoughts and memories are represented. 
The notion of homunculi seems to be crucial to Dennett's account, although these need 
not be taken as literal manikins in the brain, but rather as processing and sub-processing 
units. These units necessarily operate at the sub-personal level. It is they that effect the 
join (for Dennett) between the sub- personal and personal levels of explanation. The 
processing which the homunculi are required to perform, however, needs something to 
be processed and it is here that the representations make their appearance. The 
representation of "Adlestrop", for instance, needs to be processed by the sub-personal 
units or homunculi. 
There is a degree of ambiguity to Dennett's representationalism. He discusses, for 
66 Dennett (1991) p. 192. 
67 ibid. p. 455. 
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instance, the data structures of Artificial Intelligence (Al) models in a sympathetic way. 
They can be regarded as models akin to those of cognitive neuropsychology. He 
discusses them in terms of homunculi interacting at different levels: 'each homunculus 
has representations that it uses to execute its functions'. 68 He suggests then that there are 
two philosophical responses: 
'One could grant that they are indeed self-understanding representations or one 
could cite the various disanalogies between them and prototypical or real 
representations (human statements, paintings, maps) and conclude that data 
structures are not really internal representations at all'. 69 
Dennett suggests, however, that this would undermine the wcll-established principle that 
'psychology needs internal representations'. 70 He goes on to indicate that he feels the Al 
models are on the right track. So the positing of internal representations would seem to 
be a natural concomitant. 
If Dennett is chary about internal representations, it is because he wishes to be realist as 
regards mcntal states, but nevertheless feels that belief-states 'appear as absiracta when 
one attempts to interpret all those real phenomena by adopting the intentional stance'. 71 
Dennett later talks of 'sub-personal cognitive psychology'. Whilst being critical of 
Fodor, 72 he is nevertheless overtly representationalist: 
'it will be "cognitive" in that it will describe processes of inforniation- 
transformation among content-laden items - mental representations - but their style 
68 Dennett (1978) p. 124. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. p. 125. 
71 Dennett (1987) p. 72. On the same page he sums up his 'selective instrumentalism' thus: 'My ism is 
whatever ism serious realists adopt with regard to centers of gravity and the like, since I think beliefs ... 
are like that - in being absiracta rather than part of the "furniture of the physical world" and in being 
attributed in statements that are tnie only if we exempt them from a certain familiar standard of literality. ' 
A fuller discussion of Dennett's intentional stance is beyond my scope. 
72 1 should note that Dennett is critical of Fodor. E. g.: Wone of this is to say that neural representations 
... are 
impossible. 
... 
But Fodor, by making explicit coding criterial for representations or contentfulness, 
has 
... confused a conceptual answer with a causal answer. ... 
Fodor 
... makes a 
direct leap from content 
to structure and seems moreover to make structure in the end criterial for content. ' (Dennett (1978) p. 
106. ) 
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will not be "computational"; the items will not look or behave like sentences 
manipulated in a language of thought'. 73 
Dennett tries to show how a machine-like structure can behave as an intentional system 
and can thereby carry meaning. According to Dennett, having acknowledged that there 
arc personal level intentionally characterized abilities and activities, a decompositional 
analysis must take place to reveal the sub-systems which themselves can be regarded as 
intentional systems. It is the interaction between these sub-systems or homunculi that 
explains the intentionally characterized abilities and activities at the personal level. But 
this is not to be taken as a reduction of the mental to the physical, because the sub- 
systems themselves (as well as the systems as wholes) are to be regarded as intentional. 
The decompositional analysis must persist, otherwise the question as to how we account 
for the intentionality of the homunculi is not answered. So we move to sub-homunculi 
and this will continue until an explanation of the interactions of the lowest levels of 
homunculi requires only 'problem or task descriptions that are obviously mechanistic'. 74 
At this point no further representations or homunculi need to be posited because the work 
has been reduced to a functional task and no further explanations of intentionality are 
required. 
This account, however, of Dennett's theory leads to problems concerning the nature of 
representations. The dilemma has been described by Ward, whilst considering Dennett, 
thus: 
'Either representationalism is committed to instrumentalism concerning 
representations and their attendant homunculi (in which case there are no genuine 
representations), or representationalism is question-begging because it never 
73 Dennett (1987) p. 235. 
74 Dennett (1978) pp. 80. 
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succeeds in "discharging" intentionally characterized homunculi. '75 
That is, either there are no homunculi (and no representations) or Dennett has fallen for 
the 'homunculus fallacy', by which Kenny means the practice of taking predicates, 
'whose normal application is to complete human beings or complete animals' and 
applying them 'to parts of animals, such as brains, or to electrical SySteMS. '76 
The whole notion of intentionality is tied to the personal level. Dennett allows that 
intentional ascriptions can be made of homunculi at the sub-personal level, but this just 
begs the question. For, if at this sub-personal level intentionality is the same as it is at the 
personal level, it is hard to see how that intentionality can be dissipated; or, if it is not the 
same sort of thing (and it is hard to see how it can be, given that it is a notion that marks 
out the distinction between personal level language and talk of mechanistic processes), 
then it will not meaningfully characterize - at the sub-personal level - that which is 
captured by the full-blown term at the personal level. In brief, intentionality at the sub- 
personal level seems to be merely metaphorical intentionality; that is, not intentionality at 
all. 
The problem Dennett highlights is that of bringing intentionality, including meaning (and, 
therefore, normativity), into the realm of the sub-personal. For, mental representations 
are either metaphorical or, if they really represent something, they do so by engaging at 
the personal level. It is only at this level that things either do or do not have meaning. 
Hence, if mental representations are said to exist at the sub-personal level, they cannot be 
the bearers of semantic content. And this is, of course, inimical to the representational 
theory of mind. 
The problem with the sub-personal level is that it does not allow the world-involvingness 
75 Ward (1993) p. 292. In the passages I cited earlier, Dennett appears to recognize these alternatives (cf. 
(1978) pp. 124-125, note 71 above), but the key appears to be his degree of realism concerning these 
mental representations. He is realist concerning mental states - they do occur - but he %vishes to be 
instrumentalist in his attitude to such states. The question (for a full discussion of Dennett's philosophy) 
is whether this equipoise can be maintained. 
76 Kenny (1984) p. 125. 
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of content and, therefore, it can accommodate neither intentionality not normativity. 
According to McDowell: 
'The 'sub-personal' account of a sensory system, which treats it as an 
information-processing device that transmits its informational results to something 
else inside an animal, cannot adequately characterize what its sensory systems are 
for the animal (as opposed to what they are, metaphorically speaking, for the 
internal parts that receive the results of the information-processing): namely, 
modes of sensitivity or openness to features of the environment - not processors 
of information, but collectors of it. '77 
Explanations at the sub-personal level do not equate to what is going on for the creature 
as a whole. For humans, this is because the sub-personal does not engage with the 
world in the way required for there to be meaning. 
McDowell illustrates his point with the distinction (discussed by Dennett too)78 between 
what the frog's eye tells the frog's brain and what the frog's eye tells the frog. Whilst it 
is perfectly true that there are distinctions to be made within the distinction between the 
personal and sub-personal levels of explanation, if we accept talk of the frog's eye telling 
either the frog's brain or the frog anything, we have already accepted a particular picture 
of mental processes. It might be more illuminating to recognize that the frog's eye does 
not "tell" anything, except by a metaphorical use of language, but a use which may tend 
us towards a representational account of psychological phenomena. 
So, as Dennett acknowledges, 79 talk of personal level attributes at the sub-personal level 
has to be metaphorical. Dennett attempts to make representations normative by stretching 
the normativity at the personal level down to the sub-personal level. There are two 
arguments against him. 
- First, normativity at the personal level - and this was part of the substantive 
77 McDowell (1994) p. 197. 
78 Dennett (1978) p. 163. 
79 ibid. p. 123. 
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conclusion of Chapter 2- is a matter of practices being embedded in the human world. 
The sub-personal level, which is the level at which (according to cognitive 
neuropsychology) "Adlestrop" is represented and processed, is (by definition) not 
embedded in the (typically human) world of meaning'and normativity. It can only have, 
therefore, metaphorical personal level attributes. So importing Dennett's analysis of sub- 
personal representations to cognitive neuropsychology models would not save them, 
inasmuch as it remains representationalist, because it does not deliver non-nativity. 
- Secondly, normativity cannot be discharged. Dennett's suggestion that a move 
can be made from norms to a causal account is a reduction. The Wittgensteinian analysis 
argues that we cannot causally say what it is to have a thought. Dennett suggests that the 
intentional can be reduced to the non-intentional, that normativity can be explained in 
non-normative terms. But the analysis of normativity as transcendental, constitutive and 
irreducible, denies this possibility. 
Ward went on to suggest that intentionally characterized abilities and activities are 
embedded in the context of human life. 80 Homunculi, however, are not part of this 
normative realm, even if they form a metaphorical part of the description of the causal 
pre-conditions for such a realm. So we cannot use Dennett to accommodate normativity 
and meaning within the sub-personal realm of representations that forms the basis to 
cognitive neuropsychology models. For, at root, the divide between the personal and the 
sub-personal levels is precisely a divide between meaningfulness and its absence. If we 
are talking about meaning and intentionality we must ipso facto be talking about persons 
and not just about brains or cognitive processes. For thereto be meaning, which requires 
normativity, as I argued in Chapter 2, we require practices or uses to be embedded in the 
world of whole persons. This is a constitutive argument, since this is what it is to have 
intentional mental states, irrespective of the causal regularities underlying such mental 
states. 
80 Ward op. cit. p. 295. But Ward resorts to Witt-enstein to save representational psychology. This 00 just seems odd given Wittgenstein's hesitancy concerning mental processes. Ward also seems to accept 
that the intentionality of homunculi is derivative. 
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4.4 The encoding of meaning? 
I turn now to a different attempt to argue, on the basis of a cognitive paradigm, that 
meaning (and normativity) reach the level of mechanistic processing, this time by being 
encoded in the brain. Bolton and Hill accept 'the broadly Wittgenstcinian view that 
meaning is grounded in social practices, embedded in culture'. 81 But they also wish to 
hold to their 'encoding thesis', namely: 'neural states encode, and process, 
infon-nation'. 82 Their concept of "information", 
'has to be a semantic one, linked to meaning, intentionality, representation, etc. 
... the information processed by the brain has to be about something (it has to 
represent something), namely, actual or possible states of the environment, 
results of action, etc. When brain function is described in these terms, in terms of 
intentionality, it is in effect being regarded as functioning like the mind. '83 
Bolton and Hill are keen to keep away from the idea that 'there are signs (signs with 
syntactic structure) in the brain doing the representing'. 84 In the place of language-like, 
syntactic, structures they wished to substitute 'the view that meaning essentially pertains 
to rule-guided activity, or again, [to] intentional agent/environment interactions'. 85 They 
think it is appropriate that their theory is vague about how the brain encodes meaning, but 
their notion of meaning as being essentially involved with activity links their theory, they 
suggest, to the Wittgensteinian view. Hence, 
'Rule-following activity ... 
is what warrants the attribution of meaning to the 
agent, or to the brain, which as a matter of fact is the material system most of all 
involved in the regulation of action. 86 
81 Bolton and Hill (1996) p. 113. 
82 ibid. p. 76. 
83 ibid. 
84 ibid. p. 114. 
85 ibid. 
86 ibid. 
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But, the), are also clear, 'it is not the brain in isolation which carries meaning, but the 
brain in its role as regulating action'. 87 Otherwise, concerning the intrinsic, physical 
aspects of the brain, the), would agree with Hacker that it actually does very little. 88 
Bolton and Hill offer a very direct answer to the question concerning how mental content 
has meaning. It has meaning because the brain has meaning. Elsewhere, Bolton makes 
it clear that the encoding thesis is meant as a way of showing how the causal properties of 
mental content are to be explained without relying on syntax (as Fodor does). 89 For 
Fodor, it is syntax which provides the connection between the causal properties of a 
symbol and its meaning. But if, therefore, meaning is not itself regarded as being a part 
of the information which is passed around the brain, according to Bolton, 'there is no 
explanation of intentional (environment-direcled) action'. 90 Put simply, it just is the case 
that the encoding thesis, 
'is what is required for the purpose of understanding the role of neural processes 
in the regualtion of intentional activity. But the implication is that the language of 
neural encoding should not blind us into thinking that in some way everything 
semantic is in the brain. On the contrary, if meaning (representation, cognition) is 
anywhere, it is in the whole interaction between the living being and its natural 
and social milicu. '91 
The Bolton and Hill line is similar to that of Dennett, although they are more chary of the 
mechanics, in that they too wish to ascribe intentionality within the sub-personal realm. 
Bolton and Hill, however, do not wish to do this because of advances in Artificial 
Intelligence, but because they hold it just must be the case that meaning is encoded in the 
brain. Otherwise (by their lights), it is difficult to explain how mental states with 
meaningful content can be causal. That is, meaning and normativity need to be imported 
87 ibid. p. 115. 
88 cf. Hacker (1987) p. 492. 
89 Bolton (1997). 
90 ibid. 
91 ibid. 
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to the neuronal level. Part of their aim is to obliterate the gap between the personal and 
sub-personal levels. Representations, then, must just be personal because they have 
personal level effects. If they are personal, they are rooted in the practices of the 
embedding world by being such. Yet, (contra Boltonand Hill) how there can be 
meaning in the brain, which is quite distinct from the assertion that meaning is in the 
whole interaction of the human being with a social milieu, remains mysterious. Given 
that it is the person who interacts, rather. than the brain, the meaning and representations 
in the brain seem still to be metaphorical. 
The admirable effect of this is that it allows an account of a condition, such as AD, to be 
given which moves seamlessly from disruption of neural processes, to disruption of 
psychological processes, to disruption of action. Moreover, it allows an account of 
'functional, meaningful, compensatory strategies' in response to such disruptions. 
However, it also begs some questions, because - having just stated it must be so (in order 
for there to be mental events which have causal properties through their meaningfulness) 
- the talk of encoding meaning implies some mechanism as well as some sort of code. If 
Bolton and Hill clearly reject the code (it is not a matter of syntax), they do not so clearly 
reject the notion of mechanism, which is required by their continuing commitment to a 
representational theory of mind. 92 But with that commitment comes an adherence, 
whether they like it or not, 93 to the problems of the dichotomy between pcrsonal and 
sub-personal levels. In short, in trying to force a Wittgensteinian account (which regards 
meaning as a matter of practice within a human context) onto a cognitive science account 
(with its commitment to representationalism and thereby to the personal/sub-personal 
dichotomy), Bolton and Hill have tried to have their cake and cat it. The endeavour fails 
because the personal/sub-personal divide is precisely a divide between meaningfulness 
and its absence. If we are talking about meaning and intentionality, we must ipsofacto 
be talking about persons and not just about brains; so talk of brains encoding meaning 
must be metaphorical. 
92 Thornton (1997b). 
93 Bolton and Hill (1997). 
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4.5 Representations in the normative world 
Is it possible, then, to allow talk of representations and also to accommodate meaning and 
normativity? I turn now, before summarizing the argument of the chapter and re- 
examining the status of cognitive neuropsychology, to an account (with which I largely 
agree) of representations and of how mental content can have meaning. Whilst Fodor 
attempts, as it were, to eliminate personal level normativity (- it is all explained by causal 
processes at the sub-personal level -), whilst Dennett attempts to sequester normativity, 
from the personal to the sub-personal (by analogy and reduction), and whilst Bolton and 
Hill attempt to insert meaning directly into the representational workings of the brain, 
Gillett allows that at both personal and sub-personal levels there might be some sense to 
talk of representations. However, whereas sub-personal representations can be thought 
of in structural terms, personal level mental representations, which require meaning- 
normativity, must be embedded in the world. 
Gillett is not averse to talk of mental representations. He regards representations as 
intentional and thinks it 'both natural and plausible to say that our concepts get organized 
into mental representations of things in the world'. 94 However, Gillett notes different 
uses of the term "representation" and he accuses Fodor of conflating different uses of the 
notion. He continues: 
'The essence of 'representation' as it is used in epistemology involves rule- 
governed human activity which obeys identifiable but informal norms to do with 
the use of signs, and it is in this complex and structured milieu that we can 
understand what it means. By contrast, the cognitive scientist's use of 
representation' is tied to processing networks and states of excitation in 
information systems and these necessarily concern only one organism and what it 
is disposed to do in certain conditions. There are no formalizable symbol 
complexes involved and no norms to be obeyed dictating how the individual 
94 Gillett (1992) p. 101. 
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should react to a canonical sign. '95 
Pertinent here is the distinction between "thin" and "thick" information. Thin information 
involves 'analysis of causal transactions between spatio-temporally specifiable states and 
events and has no place for normative features linked to judgements; 96 whereas, 'thick 
information is conceptual and is therefore essentially tied to reasons, inferences, 
understanding, perceiving, knowledge, belief, and meaning'. 97 Thin information, for 
Gillett, relates to the cognitive scientist's use of the term "representation". The 
information processing, which is part of the cognitive neuropsychologist's paradigm, 
involves thin (technical) information and the representations based on it are 
correspondingly "thin". By contrast, on Gillett's view, 
9 representation, both to oneself and to others, depends on what is public and on 
the shared norms which persons follow to regulate and articulate activity'. 98 
To be clear, Gillett accepts the cognitive neuropsychologist's use of the term 
"representation". But he does not allow that this use has anything to do with the way in 
which our actual (non-metaphorical) mental representations (- and he is happy to call 
them such -) affect our human behaviour and thoughts. For Gillett, thought content is 
'tied to the grasping of concepts and thereby to a natural language'. 99 A useful summary 
of his position is the following: 
'If we seek to explain the character and role of a given thought and what it is for a 
thinker to act on that thought, then we must look to the patterns of information 
sensitivity that the thinker uses in acting as she does. These are elucidated by a 
study of the rule-governed practices in which she participates and are pervaded by 
the essential features of those practices. Asking neurophysiological questions 
about the brain as an information processor is a matter for empirical science and 
95 Gillett (1989). 
96 Gillett (1992) pp. 110-111. 
97 ibid. p. I 11. See also Kenny (1984) pp. 128-129. 
98 Gillett (1992) p. 118. 
99 ibid. p. 119. 
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just gets the cart before the horse. The essential nature of infonnation as it figures 
in the explanation of human action remains a matter for philosophy of mind. '100 
The importance of this point needs to be emphasized, for it counters those cognitivists 
(including Fodorians) who might argue that their concern was to give an account of how 
the brain actually works, irrespective of what might be true or false at the personal level. 
Their account discusses how the brain processes "information"; but Gillett points out that 
the very concept of "information" - if, say, we are talking about what it is to remember 
"Adlestrop" - must have thick, embedded, connections, otherwise we simply are not 
talking about what it is to remember. 
Sticking to the account of human actions as concerning the agent's thoughts, rather than 
in terms of causes, Gillett comments that thinking about actions as guided by thoughts 
appeals 'to a far richer conception of persons and their relations than that found in ... an 
impoverished [causal] model'. 101 He states: 
'Human agents are able to reason because their brains function in causally regular 
ways, but the nature of their reasoning, and thus the structure and content of 
mental explanation, only merge when we consider them as rational and social 
beings. Mental explanation tells us which concepts are being used to shape an 
action. Concepts involve rule-governed links between a subject's behaviour and 
the world and thus dcten-nine the way that an action is sensitive to that world. '102 
He emphasizes the normative characteristics of concept-use and the way in which the 
distinction between the inner and the outer is not clear-cut. Gillett feels that the 
conceptual analysis of "mental representations" involves public criteria and significance 
100 ibid. p. 75. 
101 ibid. p. 76. 
102 ibid. p. 75. 
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within the normatively constrained field of human discourse. 103 His inclination, whilst 
accepting the importance of physiological accounts, is nevertheless to tic all talk of an 
intentional nature tightly to the realm of persons. Physiological accounts may use 
language metaphorically, but will be in error if they start literally to apply personal level 
ascriptions to the sub-personal level. 
So, for Gillett, there are the internal representations of representationalist theories such as 
cognitive neuropsychology, which are metaphorical. And there are the mental 
representations, which constitute the content of our mental lives; but the reality of these 
representations stems from their cmbeddedness in the world of rule-governed practice 
and agents. 
Summary 
As in the case of the disease model, cognitive neuropsychology offers a clinically useful 
and scientifically fruitful way of explaining dementia. In this case, the construal of 
intentional psychological concepts is representational. In the most obvious philosophical 
paradigm, however, the Wittgensteinian analysis shows Fodor's functionalist account of 
RTM to be deficient from the point of view of normativity. The challenge, then, is to 
give an account of cognitive neuropsychology models that do justice to normativity. This 
can be couched in terms of the question: how does representational mental content have 
meaning in the world of persons? For Dennett, it is a question of meaning being 
stretched down to the lowest sub-personal level of homunculi where it is decomposed to 
functional mechanisms. But at this level nothing is constrained normatively, even if it is 
causally determined, because of the gap between the personal and sub-personal levels. 
For Bolton and Hill, there just must be meaning in the representational workings of the 
103 1 am not clear whether Gillett would agree with the line taken by Luntley (1991) on the 
transcendental grounds of meaning. On the one hand, he seems to accept that there is a transcendental 
structure to thought as expressed by concept use, in which case the norms surrounding the use of 
intentional psychological concepts could be conceived as grounded a priori (cf. Gillett, 1992, pp. 32-33). 
On the other hand, Gillett writes: 'The present discussion of concepts, rules, and judgements argues that 
it must be public criteria, the actions and reactions of identifiable individuals, that ground our judgements 
in general and thus mental ascriptions in particular' (1992, p. 41). 
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brain in order for mental states to be causal. Yet how this is achieved is somewhat 
mysterious, but still seems to require mental mechanisms, which can only be regarded, 
however, as metaphorical. According to Gillett, representational mental content has 
meaning precisely because it is embedded and understood only in the context of rule- 
governed practices. Mental representations involve public criteria and havc a significance 
within the patterned and normatively-constrained field of human discourse. 
Such an account of mental representations, however, is not an account of a 
representationalist theory. If mental representations are to be regarded as public 
phenomena, in the sense that they are subject to shared normative constraints, which 
guide the patterned use of the concepts that describe them, they cannot then be thought of 
as entities or states that are characterizable independently of that which they represent. 
My representation of "Adlestrop", albeit there is a distinct story to be told in terms of 
brain processes, is shaped by a patterned, nexus of understandings within the world. 
Remembering "Adlestrop" is, after all, to evoke a pastoral world of innocence before the 
First World War. This is what gives the poem its particular quality. But this quality is a 
public feature resting on shared understandings, so that what counts as remembering 
"Adlestrop" is normatively given, irrespective of the underlying causal processes. There 
is no internal vehicle of content here, the representation is shared and public in order for 
the poem to work. So, if cognitive neuropsychology wishes to speak of representations, 
these must be metaphorical. Representationalism, which suggests real, independent 
vehicles for mental content, cannot accommodate normativity and must, therefore, on the 
Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological states, be discarded as a theory 
purporting to describe such states. 
4.6 Whither cognitive neuropsychoIogy? 
So, representations, if understood in terms of thin information, as signals passed around 
the brain, may be regarded in structural terms; and if understood in terms of thick 
information, must be regarded as rooted in the rule-governed practices which embed in 
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and pattern the human world. The representations of cognitive neuropsychology must be 
understood in the light of this analysis. Hence the question: whither cognitive 
neuropsychology? 
Well, first, the descriptive content of cognitive neuropsychology remains just as 
clinically and scientifically useful as ever. That someone can recognize faces but not 
remember names, that a person can say his or her address but not write it, these are 
important clinical findings. Such descriptions continue to suggest hypotheses concerning 
underlying mechanisms. These hypotheses may be verified or falsified by observing 
other cognitive deficits in other individuals. They may also be tested by anatomical, 
electrophysiological, neuro-radiological and other means. We should not, however, be 
mesmerized by the usefulness of these observations and descriptions into 
misunderstanding the representations described by cognitive neuropsychology. These 
representations have, at one level, a structural reality, since there is an anatomical and 
physiological basis to mental phenomena. But once we start to talk of representations in 
the language of intentionality and normativity, they must engage with the human world of 
practices and customs. To talk of representations qua neurochemical signals as if they are 
themselves meaningful is to talk metaphorically. 
Secondly, whilst talk of representations in cognitive neuropsychology might err 
philosophically, it might also go wrong empirically. It is at least possible, for instance, 
that connectionism might supervene, as providing a more realistic model of brain 
function. 104 Of course, there might be no inherent incompatibility between cognitive 
neuropsychology and connectionism. 105 But Shallice, at least, feels that neural networks 
might pose a threat to cognitive neuropsychology. 106 Whilst he thinks that it is worth 
continuing to use the classical theories of cognitive neuropsychology, he recognizes the 
possibility that this could be misleading. More uncompromisingly, however, Fodor and 
104 Park and Young (1994). 
105 Margolin (1992) pp. 13-14. 
106 Shallice (1988) p. 266. See the full discussion pp. 245-266. 
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PylyshynIO7 note the representational nature of connectionism, in keeping with classical 
descriptions of cognitive science, but point out that connectionism is not committed to a 
'symbol-level of representation', which they feel is 'deeply wrong' because it gives 
neither 'syntactic nor semantic structure' to mental representations and, hence, allows 
that, 'any collection of (causally connected) representational states is a possible mind. '108 
They allow, however, that connectionism might provide an account of the neural 
structure in which the classical cognitive architecture is realized. 
It might just be that the 'box and arrow' diagrams of cognitive neuropsychologists are 
wrong. As Shallice suggests, having the wrong conceptual model could lead researchers 
down empirical blind alleys. Furthermore, as Fodor and Pylyshyn demonstrate in their 
talk of minds, at least some advocates of classical cognitive neuropsychology do relate 
empirical findings to philosophical concepts. So it cannot be argued that the critique I 
have been proposing is inerely conceptual, since some theoreticians are keen to use 
empirical observations to support conceptual positions. If the concepts are wrong, then 
either the empirical data might need to be observed in a different light, or the empirical 
research might be misled by the confused concepts. Commitment to box and arrow 
diagrams, as used by cognitive neuropsychologists, might obscure the true complexity of 
cognitive function. 109 
From these comments follows my third point, which is that the descriptions and 
observations of cognitive neuropsychology will shed light on the underlying neurology. 
Drury once wrote: 'neurophysiology is the asymptote of experimental psychology'. 110 
Similarly, it seems likely that neuropathology (as well as neurophysiology) is the 
asymptote of cognitive neuropsychology. As cognitive neuropsychology moves towards 
its asymptote, things will become more complex. One danger is that the information 
107 Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). 
108 ibid. p. 49. 
109 1 am aware that many cognitive neuropsychologists would be happy to square their findings with 
both concctionist models as well as the more traditional information flow diagrams. 
I 10 Drury (1973) p. 55. 
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processing paradigm, along with a commitment to inner representations, might tend to 
underestimate this complexity. It might be better, that is, to abandon all talk of inner 
representations and look instead at the complexity of the whole intra-ccrcbral environment 
with millions of nerves interacting differentially within specific sub-environments 
determined by location and delicate neurochemical balances. This sort of complexity is 
harder to grasp, but more realistic. 
Fourthly, whilst I was critical of Dennett's attempts to accommodate intentional, 
normative commitments within the sub-personal realm, it might be that talk of personal 
and sub-personal levels is useful here. The wiring diagrams of cognitive 
neuropsychology were, after all, developed in response to functional problems as a way 
of understanding them. Having accepted (contra Dennett) that sub-personal content is 
metaphorical and that intentionality cannot be discharged into causal reactions, it is 
nevertheless true that the wiring diagrams do seem to provide a sub-personal account. 
For they provide an account of functional abilities at a sub-personal level. What it is for 
me to be able to write can be decomposed into sub-personal, functional skills, any or all 
of which might go wrong. What it was for Edivard Thomas to write the poem 
"Adlestrop" has to be understood at the personal level; but it required a number of sub- 
personal, functional abilities to be intact. This functional description does not require 
contcntful, mental representations to be passed along cognitive pathways, but "thin" 
information, neurochernistry and neuronal structures are undoubtedly involved. It need 
not be the case, however, that there is only one physical, neurological way of realizing 
such functional abilities. How these functional abilities are realized in terms of 
mechanisms is an empirical question worthy of study. It is not, however, a study of the 
intentionality and normativity of mental states. Figure I in this chapter, therefore, whilst 
gesturing at causal preconditions, is a covert and approximate description of functional 
abilities. 
Meanwhile, if metaphorical language is to be used - and this is my final point - it should 
be used cautiously. As Kenny suggests: 
-151- 
'The moral is not that the human-being predicates cannot have their use extended 
at all, but that they must be extended cautiously and self-consciously, and that if 
they are extended one may not argue from the application of such a predicate to a 
whole human being to the application of the transferred predicate to anything 
other than the whole human being. 'I II 
Kenny's concern is that the inappropriate use of human-being (or what I have called 
personal level) predicates might lead to a false metaphysics. Thinking that cognitive 
neuropsychology, or cognitive science generally, has explained the mind would be an 
example of this. For, the explanatory power of such sciences remains within the realm of 
the sub-personal level and cannot explain personal level ascriptions. In real terrns, 
allowing metaphorical uses of language to take too deep a root is cashed out in the 
approach of the clinician to the patient. The patient, as an information processor, has no 
real engagement with the world, but simply reacts in pre-determined ways. The patient- 
as-a-pcrson is an agent in the world with values for whom things have a significance. 
Conclusion 
Cognitive neuropsychology indulges in a metaphorical use of language that might lead to 
metaphysical or empirical errors. Its representationalism, understood in terms of internal 
vehicles of content, is erroneous. Nevertheless, it has heuristic value and, used 
cautiously, can deepen our explanatory account of dementia. Meanwhile, talk of mental 
representations or inner processes must be tied conceptually to the (outer) world of 
persons, in which events have significance and meaning. Cognitive neuropsychology 
directs us towards function and underlying neuropathology. But, our understanding of 
intentional mental phenomena (as I argued in chapter 2) and of the brain (as I argued in 
chapter 3) must be embedded in a larger understanding of persons as beings of a 
particular sort in the world. It is to the social world of persons interacting that I now 
turn. 
III Kenny (1984) pp. 133-134. 
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Chapter S. 
Social construction and dementia: 
discourse and normativity 
Introduction 
Having considered how psychological phenomena are dealt with in physical and 
psychological models, I now turn to a social model of dementia. In the previous two 
chapters, I have emphasized a broad perspective of psychological phenomena - and 
thereby of dementia. The social perspective offers, at first sight, a broad view, but it too 
is in danger of being circumscribed. 
In this chapter, there are three main sections before the conclusion: 
1.1 shall describe social constructionism and discursive psychology. Such 
theories have been used in connection with dementia and I shall examine these links, 
particularly in the works of Harr6 and Kitwood. Social constructionists often make 
appeal to Wittgenstein's philosophy for theoretical support. 
2.1 shall ask, as the first move in the Wittgensteinian analysis, how social 
constructionism construes intentional psychological states. The answer is that it suggests 
that psychological phenomena are social constructs. In part, this is right. The emphasis 
is on the public following of rules in practices and customs, just as required in the 
Wittgensteinian analysis of Chapter 2. In order to explain why the answer is only partly 
right, I need to clarify an ambiguity, concerning whether social constructionism offers a 
causal or constitutive account of intentional mental states. Unfortunately, as I shall 
demonstrate, this ambiguity is pervasive in the writings of social constructionists. 
1 shall offer two clarifications. First, if social constructionism is no more than 
a causal account of intentional mental states, it is not broad enough. Secondly, more 
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seriously, if social constructionism. offers a constitutive account of such mental states it is 
flawed philosophically, since it will not be able to offer the transcendental conception of 
normativity required by the Wittgensteinian analysis of chapter 2. Both clarifications 
imply that social constructionism, is deficient as a way of conceptualizing dementia, 
because of its circumscribed construal. of intentional psychological phenomena. Whereas 
social constructionism roots normativity in discourse and social practices, which are 
thereby seen as essentially public, the Wittgensteinian analysis emphasizes the embedding 
of these practices in the world, so that normativity is a matter of such practices being 
potentially public, but not essentially social. 
In my conclusion, I shall start to look again at the notion of the person. In this respect, 
social constructionism at least broadens the perspective and impels us towards the views 
of the final chapter. 
5.1 Social constructionism, discursive psychology and dementia 
Social constructionism emanates from a variety of sources. Elements of social 
constructionist thought are prefigured in the works of Mead, who argued that the self 
arises through the process of social experience and activity,, and Vygotsk-y, who held 
that speech develops 'from the social to the individual'. 2 My concern is with 
psychological phenomena, about which Harrd has stated: 'The central thesis of social 
constructionism is the claim that most psychological phenomena are created in and have 
their primal being in social encounters'. 3 
Indeed, Harrd has split contemporary psychology between, on the one hand, those 
following Freud, Piaget and Dennett, who have embraced, 
'the thoroughgoing individualism of the cognitivists who conceive of human 
I Mead (1934). 
2 Vygotsky (1934) p. 20. 
3 Harr6 (1993) p. 95. 
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action as the product of individual mental processes'; 4 
and, on the other hand, those in the camp of Wittgenstein, Vygotsky and Mead, sharing, 
'the collectivism of the social constructivists, who conceive of human action as 
the joint intentional actions of minded creatures whose minds are structured and 
stocked from a social and interpersonal reality'. 5 
Harrd has associated himself with the general spirit of social constructioniSM: 6 'I share 
with many the idea that people and what they do are artifacts, products of social 
processes. '7 Harr6 identified this as the thesis shared by all versions of social 
constructionism: 'all psychological phenomena and the beings in which they are realized 
are produced discursively. '8 
Social constructionism and discursive psychology 
In the first part of this section, I aim to give an account of the assumptions of social 
constructionism (or discursive psychology9), specifically as they relate to the mind. This 
will involve some mention of the connections made between social constructionism and 
Wittgenstein's philosophy. In the next section, I shall highlight the ambiguity concerning 
whether social constructionism offers a causal or constitutive account of intentional 
states. For now, however, I shall turn a blind eye to such ambiguities, although they lie 
latent in much social constructionist thought. 
According to Gergen, one of the assumptions of social constructionism is that, 'The 
terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of historically 
4 Harr6 (1983) p. 8. 
5 ibid. 
61 follow Gergen's suggestion (1985) in using the term 'constructionism' rather than 'constructivism'. 
7 Harr6 (1993) pp. 2-3. 
8 Harr6 (1992). 
9 Harr6 prefers, to describe his theory as "discursive psychology", and he is chary of some of the 
implications of social constructionism. For the sake of simplicity, I shall intend "discursive 
psychology" to be covered by the umbrella of "social constructionism". 
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situated interchanges among people'. 10 Gergcn explicitly recognizes related themes in 
the work of Wittgcnstein: 
'Wittgenstein brought into poignant clarity the extent to which the use of mental 
predicates is convention bound. ... many classic problems both in psychology and 
philosophy appear to be products of linguistic entanglement'. 11 
The aim, therefore, should be clarity which, again recalling Wittgenstcin, often relies on 
anthropological research to demonstrate the social origins of man), of our assumptions. 
The social constructionist movement begins in earnest 'when one challenges the concept 
of knowledge as mental representation' and replaces it with the view that 'knowledge is 
not something people possess somewhere in their heads, but rather, something people do 
togethee, 12 mostly by means of language. The ontological basis of mind or self, 
according to social constructionism, is not in the head but is 'within the sphere of social 
discourse'. 13 Again, this analysis is supported by a Wittgensteinian spin: 
gone ceases to view mental predicates as possessing a syntactic relationship with a 
world of mental events; rather, ... such terms are cashed out 
in terms of the social 
practices in which they function'. 14 
Similarly, the influence of Wittgenstcin is pervasive in Coulter's Vie Social Construclion 
of Mind. For instance, in his treatment of memory, Coulter made the point that 
9 remembering is a defeasible achievement and not purely a mental process. ... To have 
remembered is to be correct about the past event, 15 Coulter accepts that, whilst 
remembering, a person might have an image of the past present to consciousness, 'but in 
itself such an experience cannot be the sole criterion for remembering'. 16 Hence, 
9 our interest need not be in 'underlying' rules or structures putatively 'in the 
10 Gergen (1985). 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid. 
15 Coulter op. cit. p. 59. 
16 ibid. 
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mind', but in public displays of psychological phenomena and subjectivity- 
determinations as socially-organized accomplishments'. 17 
He goes on to form the social constructionist conclusion: 
'It would be a retrograde step to attribute the properties of such social phenomena 
to individuals' minds; the reorientation proposed here involves attributing the 
properties of mental-predicate ascriptions and avowals to the culture, not to 
minds. '18 
So, in connection with thought and thinking (- and again this has a Wittgensteinian ring 
to it -), Coulter states: 
'We can be misled, lied to or deceived about a person's thoughts and actions, but 
being misled, lied to or deceived in these ways cannot be an invariant feature of 
our social world in these respects, for in order to possess the concept of 'thought' 
... 
in the first place, we must have publicly available standards of appropriate use 
and reference for them, which presupposes some agreement on actual cases. '19 
To anticipate, a key point, as far as my argument will be concerned, is whether or not the 
normativity of mental states such as thought requires 'publicly available standards of 
appropriate use'. There are at least three alternatives: 
* first, the practices, which are constitutive of intentional psychological states, 
must be essentially private; that is, these practices could be inner routines that allow me 
to say that I have remembered or thought of something; 
,, secondly, the practices must be essentially public; thus, understanding how to 
play chess is precisely to make these public moves in public space (and in the absence of 
these moves, there is absence of understanding); 
- thirdly, the practices must be potentially public; so what I mean by thinking can 
- in principle - be communicated and understood by others, even if it is not in fact 
17 Coulter op. cit. p. 61. Although it is not my concern, it could be argued that, on these grounds, false 0 
memories might have to be called memories. Whereas, in the same way that false knowledge just is not 
knowledge, false memories are not memories, even when publicly displayed. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. pp. 90-91. 
- 157- 
communicated; and my understanding of chess involves the potential for just these public 
moves, but whether these moves are, in fact, publicly instantiated is another question. 
The first position, as I have made apparent in earlier chapters, is argued against 
extensively by Wittgenstcin. Cognitive neuropsychology, for instance, can be 
characterized in this way. It is problematic because it is not clear how such private 
practices can account for the public manifestations necessary for normativity. In this 
chapter, I shall largely ignore this position. The second position is the one which is most 
clearly social constructionist. It suggests that normativity is a matter of public practices. 
What makes this a matter of understanding X is just the fact that it conforms to the social 
practice of understanding X. The third position is the one that I shall advocate as being 
closest to the Wittgensteinian analysis of Chapter 2. There must at least be potential 
public practices underpinning language and thought. Whether, in fact, there is someone 
else to understand X with you is a further question. But the normativity which attaches 
to the state of understanding X, is such that it must potentially be a shareable state. I 
shall make clear later in the chapter why I accept the third position over against the 
second. 
Harr6 accepts the basic premisses of social constructionism. This is not to say that he has 
no qualms. He has made it clear that there are two implications that he would rcjcct. 
First, 'The fact that people are created by other people and that their actions are in essence 
joint actions does not mean that the actions people perform are socially caused. '20 Even 
though constructed, a person is still capable of autonomous action. Secondly, Harr6 
rejects suggestions that social constructionism implies 'a radically anti-foundationalist 
theory of human nature, as if there is 'no common human nature'. Against this he 
asserts: 'We could no more genuinely adopt another way of life than we could take up 
another biology. To do so would require us not to be the people we are. '21 
Nevertheless, Harrd believes that psychological phenomena are jointly created by people, 
20 Harr6 (1993) p. 3. 
21 ibid. 
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most importantly through discursive proccsscs. 
According to Harr6's brand of social constructionism it is in discourse, ordinary 
conversations, that the construction of selves and of psychological phenomena occurs. 
'I take the array of persons as a primary human reality. I take the conversations 
in which those persons are engaged as completing the primary structure, bringing 
into being social and psychological reality. Conversation is to be thought of as 
creating a social world just as causality generates a physical onc. '22 
Harr6's inclination to stress the intersubjcctivc nature of persons constitutes a direct 
assault on the old paradigm of psychology: 
'We must really stop thinking of psychology as the science of what happens in 
and around individual people. We must turn to the most tantalizing and difficult 
aspect of human action, namely conversing, to find the empirical basis of our 
studies. '23 
Others have focused on conversation too, in order to show its influence on a person. It is 
notable, in this regard, that language therapy and linguistics can use philosophers such as 
Austin and Wittgenstein in a pertinent fashion. Hopper used both philosophers to 
suggest that, 
'Spoken conversation ... is primordial activity that underlies other interaction. 
... Speaking-in-conversation is central to the human cxpcrience'. 24 
Elsewhere, having restated the underlying social constructionist theme, that, 
'An individual emerges through the processes of social interaction, not as a 
relatively fixed end product but as one who is constituted and reconstituted 
through the various discursive practices in which they participate', 25 
Davies and Harrd proceed to argue that, 'the constitutive force of each discursive practice 
22 ibid. pp. 64-65. 
23 Harrd (1989a). 
24 Hopper (1988). 
25 Davies and Harr6 (1990). 
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lies in its provision of sub ect positions. '26 Now, the notion of positioning within a j 
discourse, which acknowledges the importance of understanding the relationship between 
participants in a conversation, is itself relevant to any consideration of discourse between 
a dementia sufferer and his or her doctor. The relationship may affect the illocutionary 
force of a particular utterance. The point about positioning is summarized by Harr6 and 
Gillett thus: 
'Positioning highlights the importance of "making something of a situation" as 
one participates in it and according to one's perceptions of it. This idea in turn 
underpins the concept of subjectivity, which expresses the way things appear to 
be or are signified by the speech and action of a person seen in rclation to a 
discursive context. This is the closest our present approach comes to an account 
of the Cartesian "inner". '27 
In the first part of this section, I have given an outlinc of social constructionism. Some 
of the things that social constructionists have said about the mind have been touched 
upon. The main idea, albeit there is a range of views, is that mental phenomena are 
made, or constructed, from continuing human practices. Our understanding of a mental 
state, therefore, will be contingent upon social interactions and, in particular, on human 
conversation and discourse. In this regard, I have introduced discursive psychology, 
Harr6's development of social constructionism. Wittgenstein has been used by social 
constructionists and I have advcrtized some areas which may be contentious. In the 
second part of this section, I shall consider the ways in which social constructionist 
models have been used in relation to dementia. 
Social constructionism and dementia 
It should already be apparent that social constuctionist theories have relevance to 
dementia. Any theory of mind will have implications for a condition in which the mind is 
26 ibid. 
27 Harr6 and Gillett (1994) p. 35. 
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apparently "lost". Further, social constructionism's emphasis on discourse is relevant 
because dementia can involve the loss of language. Moreover, whilst any illness or 
disease occurs within a social context, dementia inevitably has social consequences which 
often pose the main problems for carers: disturbed behaviour, for instance. So there arc 
numerous ways in which social constructionist theories can be used relevantly in 
connection with dementia. Here, I shall present some of the literature that makes such 
connections. First, I have selected writings from the field of medical ethics; secondly, I 
shall look more closely at writings by Kitwood; and, thirdly, I shall refcr to papers co- 
authored by Harr6 which again make the link between social constructionist accounts and 
dementia. The noteworthy stategic point is that many of these authors have had direct 
experience of professional contact with people with dementia, Hence, as in previous 
chapters, this model of dementia too has been found theoretically fruitful and practically 
useful. 
Lyman provides a good example of how awareness of social constructionism has led to a 
different perspective on dementia: 
9 reliance upon the biomedical model to explain the experience of dementing illness 
overlooks the social construction of dementia and the impact of treatment contexts 
and caregiving relationships on disease progression' (emphasis added), 28 
Partly Lyman bases her case simply on the recognition of the social setting of dementia 
('care occurs in social settings and relationships that are seldom examined in regard to 
their contribution to dementia'29 ); but she also builds an assault against the 
'medicalization of senility', in which the attempt to differentiate clearly between dementia 
and normal ageing is seen as 'a social construction to create order from the disorderly 
aspects of living with dementia'. 30 Her suggestion is that disturbed behaviour in 
dementia often results from disturbed care-giving relationships, which tend to be 
overlooked if the behaviour is attributed to disease. It would be possible, I think, to 
28 Lyman (1989). 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
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dispute some of her more contentious assertions. 31 However, her advocacy of the 
sociogenic perspective deserves respect: 
'The sociogenic perspective recognizes that all human experience involves 
intentional social action and interaction, in soc ially structured environments, in the 
context of taken-for-granted socially constructed knowledge about aging, 
development, and discase. '32 
Discussing ethical issues in dementia, therefore, can quick-y lead to social constructionist 
claims and (as in the next two examples) readily brings up the social context of dementia. 
Moody, in discussing advance directives and the ethical principles surrounding them, 
stresses not only the social structure but the communication which takes place within 
such structure: 
'Both autonomy and beneficence revolve around claims of individuals. In place 
of that focus on individuals, we should put the attention on the social structure in 
which communication takes place'. 33 
From the perspective of social work-, Poldcn proposes that we should consider the 
'language of consent' as less abstract than Kant's 'respect for persons'. But her 
suggestion that the 'language of consent' 'points to fundamentally important aspects of 
the relationship people have to one another ... 
'34 could sit amicably alongside a social 
constructionist account. Both Moody and Polden, therefore, using a "sociogenic" 
perspective, find themselves stressing communication and language, in keeping with the 
tenets of Harr6's discursive psychology. 
Norberg's overview of ethical issues in dementia makes use of 'narrative relation 
31 Those who rail against 'medical models' need to be clear exactly who it is they are attacking. Old Age 
Psychiatritsts, for instance, would take it as a sine qua non that the social environment of a patient was 
crucial. Lyman's assertion that most disturbed behaviour results from problems in the care-giving 
relationship also needs support. It might often be true. But, equally, it often seems to be a direct 
consequence of the disease and little to do with the relationship with the carer. The truth is more likely 
to be that disturbed behaviour results from an interaction of the disease with the environment. 
32 ibid. 
33 Moody (1992) p. 65. 
34 Polden (1989). 
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ethics'. 35 Narratology is recognized by Harr6 to be close to social constructionism, 
because it allows us to consider the stories that we construct of our lives. And, according 
to Norberg, 
(we create and tell our stories within stories that others have already told. When 
we narrate we order actions into the past, the present and the future. ... People are 
simultaneously invoved in many stories, that of their families, their countries, 
their professions, mankind and so on. There is also a personal story. The person 
tells and is told. '36 
Such a view is clearly constructionist: the person is constructed by the various story lines 
in which he or she takes part and these stories are essentially public, so the construction 
is social. It has, according to Norberg, ethical implications: 
'Being able to experience episodes of our lives as whole and meaningful stories is 
an important aspect of our narrative competence. The demented person gradually 
loses this competence. The caregiver then has an important task helping her or 
him experience wholeness and meaning. '37 
It is clear, then, that social constructionist thought can play a role in some of the ethical 
issues that arise in connection with dementia. 
Having discussed the sort of views which readily become apparent in the medical ethics 
literature relating to dementia, I shall now consider in more detail some of the writings of 
Kitwood. He argues that the approach which he espouses suggests that 'the problem' of 
dementia does not exclusively lie within the dementia sufferer: ' 'The problem' should be 
located, rather, in the interpersonal ri-fflieu. '38 At a time when inner security is vanishing, 
because of loss of memory and the decline of other cognitive faculties, 'personhood can 
only be guaranteed, replenished and sustained through what others provide. '39 This 
35 Norberg (1994). 1 should add that narratology does not equate to social constructionism. It need not 
involve others, so need not be social, and it need not be a matter of constructing, but rather just of 
ordering our lives. Nevertheless, Norbcrg talks in a way that is at one with social constructionism. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 Kitwood (1993a). 
39 ibid. 
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sentiment reflects social constructionist thought, since it relies on the notion that 
personhood is constructed by others, whereas many would wish to stress the inner 
qualities (such as self-consciousness) or physical attributes (such as having an intact 
functioning human brain) necessary to confer personhood. 40 Indeed, Kitwood gives a 
straightforward social constructionist avowal when he writes: 'virtually all the losses and 
difficulties of later life are socially constructed'. 41 Kitwood defines pcrsonhood as, 
'a standing or status that is bestowed upon one human being, by others, in the 
context of relationship and social being'. 42 
Personhood is, thus, according to Kitwood, constructed by others in a social context: 
'The core of our position is that personhood is essentially social; it refers to 
human beings in relation to others. '43 
According to Kitwood, 'the dementing illness is intricately woven into the pattern of life 
history and social rclationshiPs'. 44 Dementia requires 'inter-subjective insight' and 
'intcr-subjective understanding' on the part of carcrs and health professionals. 45 On the 
basis of such social constructionist thoughts, Kitwood suggests that we need research 
into the social psychology of dementia, in which we come close to the 'actual experience 
of those who are old and confused. 46 This suggestion also ha's an impact on the process 
of research with dementia sufferers. 47 Researchers themselves are seen as 'socially 
cnmcshcd'. 48 A broader view of dementia appears to encourage feelings of self-worth 
and self-agcney amongst dementia sufferers within the context of hopeful caring. 49 
Kitwood suggests that attending to the "malignant social environment" of care can lead to 
40 1 shall return to the notion of 'personhood' in Chapter 6. Some of the issues are briefly summarized 
in Gillon (1986), pp. 50-53. 
41 Mtwood (1989). 
42 Vitwood (1997). 
43 Kjtvvood and Bredin (1992). 
44 Vitwood (1990). 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid. 
47 Kitwood (1995). 
48 ibid. 
49 Kitwood (1993b). 
a process of "rementing". 50 
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Kitwood's work-, premised on social constructionist theory, has had a significant impact 
on theorizing concerning dementia, as well as on the actual practical business of 
providing 'person-centred care'. 51 Even if at a conceptual level Kitwood's theories can 
be criticized, the practical usefulness and humaneness of the perspective he has helped to 
create are undoubted. 
Finally, in this section, I wish to return to the work of Harr6, to show its applicability to 
dementia. The point here is simply to show how the theoretical work has practical 
usefulness and relevance, without criticizing its theoretical basis. There are critical 
comments to be made, which will appear in subsequent sections. I shall start with earlier 
work by Sabat, who has later co-authored papers with Harr& Sabat has recorded 
conversations with AD patients for analysiS. 52 As a preface to this work, Sabat 
discusses Biffiler, who, 
'saw the elements of language as being social tools, the use of which was 
determined by the intentions of the user, with purposeful communication as the 
goal'. 53 
Interestingly, but as an aside, the theories of the BUhlers are strongly evident in Vygotsky 
(who provides some of the roots to social constructionism); moreover, Wittgenstein met 
the BOhIers and it has been conjectured that he might himself have been influenced by 
them. 54 
Sabat convincingly musters evidence to show that 'the social context of the conversation 
and the purposes of the interlocutors' are all-important. 55 He proceeds to demonstrate 
50 Kitwood (1997) pp. 62-62. 
51 ibid. The whole book is a testimony to Kitwood's theoretical and practical impact. 
52 Sabat (1991). 
53 ibid. 
54 Toulmin (1969). 
55 Sabat op. cit. 
- 165- 
that, in two conversations with AD patients, 
'there was an exchange of ideas, information about the present and past, humor, 
sadness, concerns and advice; there were openness and compassion, there were 
changes of attitude. In short there was an experience, shared between two 
interlocutors, of some of the most fundamental human characteristics. '56 
Although the conversations were disjointed, language was used as a social too], in 
keeping with Biffiler's theories, with the words having a purpose. This suggests that 
these were genuine conversations between persons. In social constructionist terms, 
extrapolating from Sabat, the personhood of the participants was constructed in part by 
the conversation. The conversation can certainly be seen to have contributed to their 
standing as persons in relation to one another. 
In later studies, premised on the constructionist notion that 'pcrsonhood is created 
primarily in the process of engaging in certain types of spoken discourse', 57 Sabatjoined 
with Harrd to argue for the preservation of self in dementia. They make a distinction 
between self 1, which is the self of personal identity, 'experienced as the continuity of 
one's point of view in the world of objects in space and time' which is 'usually coupled 
with one's sense of personal agency'; and SCIVCS2, 'the selves that are publicly presented 
in the episodes of interpersonal interaction in the everyday world, the coherent clusters of 
traits we sometimes call 'personae'. '58 Alzheimcr's, on this view, 'does not result in the 
loss of self I and only contributes indirectly to possible losses in sclvcS2'. 59 This is 
because self I requires that the person can index his or her discourse by the use of first 
person pronouns, an ability which endures into even severe demcntia. 60 And SCIVCS2 
will remain intact because any particular self2 is not related to progression of the disease, 
but to 'the behaviour of those who are regularly involved in the social life of the 
56 ibid. 
57 Sabat and Harr6 (1992). 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid. 
60 ibid. 
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sufferer'. 61 Sabat and Harrd's conclusion here is much the same, therefore, as that of 
Kitwood. They state: 
'if there is a loss of the capacity to present an appropriate sclf2, in many cases the 
fundamental cause is to be found not in the neurofibrillary tangles and senile 
plaques in the brains of the sufferers, but in the character of the social interactions 
and their interpretation that follow in the wake of the SyMptoMS. '62 
Elsewhere, again using real conversations with AD subjects, Sabat and Harr6 suggest 
that such patients remain 'semiotic subjects', by which they mean, 
9 people who can act intentionally in the light of their interpretations of the 
situations in which they find themselves, and who are capable of evaluating their 
actions and those of others according to public standards of propriety and 
rationality. '63 
They suggest that the illocutionary force (often present in conversations with people with 
AD) of the elements of a discourse are 'not diminished or obliterated by grammatical or 
phonetic errors, or by paraphasias. 64 Just to emphasize again the utility of this work, its 
upshot is highly relevant to carers who find themselves with a duty to search 'for the 
meaning in the behavior of the afflicted when it is not readily apparcnt'. 65 
To conclude this section, then, I have described social constructionist theories - including 
the tendency for them to be given a Wittgensteinian basis - and shown how they have 
been used in relation to dementia. Such theories have been useful in providing a way of 
discussing ethical issues relating to dementia-, useful in presenting carers with broader 
models to understand the people for whom they care; useful as a way of suggesting both 
that the self is not lost in dementia and that dementia sufferers continue to be persons who 
can (inter-)act with meaning. I shall now move on to the Wittgensteinian analysis of the 
61 ibid. 
62 ibid. It should be clear, in this discussion, selfl is not a socially constructed self, whereas self2 is. 
63 Sabat and Harr6 (1994). 
64 ibid. 
65 ibid. 
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social constructionist's handling of intentional psychological phenomena. 
5.2 Intentional psychological states as social constructions 
In pursuing the Wittgcnstcinian analysis of social constructionism I shall, once again, 
start by asking how social constructionism construes intentional psychological states. 
The answer is clear. intentional psychological phenomena are social constructs. To a 
degree this accords with the Wittgenstcinian analysis, since it places an emphasis on the 
public following of rules in practices and customs. Social constructionism is opposed to 
the view (outlined abovC66) that the practices constitutive of psychological states must be 
essentially private. Instead, social constructionism opts for the position that regards the 
practices that underpin language and thought as essentially public. As I have already 
indicated, the Wittgensteinian analysis suggests that such practices must be potentially 
public. If they have to be essentially public the account of intentional psychological 
states, as I shall show, is circumscribed. 
That said, it is still worth considering the degree to which the suggestion that intentional 
psychological phenomena are social constructs accords with the Wittgensteinian analysis. 
Consider, for instance, Harrd's assertion that, 
'Insofar as psychological functioning is accomplished through the medium of 
speech-acts it must be both public and collectivc'67 
He also maintains that 'the discursive thesis entails a sociality thesis'. 68 The emphasis is 
on the extent to which understanding psychological phenomena requires public display 
and agreement. For Harrd, to be a psychologically functioning person is to be able to 
take part in public discourse. This immediately acts as a corrective to those models 
suggesting that psychological phenomena are only understood in terms of the internal 
workings of the brain. Social constructionism, on this view, helps to broaden our 
notions of what it is to be a psychological person of this sort. To take another example, 
66 See pp. 156-157 above. 
67 Harr6 (1989a). 
68 Harr6 (1992). 
Coulter states: 
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cour interest need not be in 'underlying' rules or structures ... but in public 
displays of psychological phenomena and subj ecti vity-determi nations as socially- 
organized accomplishments'. 69 
He later opincd: '... the ascription and avowal of mental-conduct categories turn upon 
essentially public grounds ... 
'. 70 What is apparent is the rule-govemed. nature of 
psychological phenomena; but the rules arc not internal, they are external, contained in 
practical, social accomplishments. Again there is a feeling of a corrective here, for 
instance to the conventional medical view, which tends to look for internal explanations 
for problems in psychological functioning, rather than look to the social environment. 71 
The corrective can legitimately claim some support from the Wittgensteinian analysis, 
according to which intentional psychological states involve the public following of 
practices and customs. But there is no mention here of normativity. Just how social 
constructs can account for normativity will need to be made clear in what follows. As in 
the previous models of dementia, it is in its treatment of normativity that social 
constructionism will be found wanting by the Wittgensteinian analysis. 
The important issue is whether or not the account given of normativity, in relation to 
intentional psychological states, squares with the Wittgensteinian analysis. What is 
crucial is exactly what it means to construe such mental states in tcnns of social 
constructs. There are two alternatives: 6 
social institutions and pracices cause intentional mental states to be the states 
they are; 
e intentional mental states are constituted by social practices and institutions. 
The ambiguity concerning these alternatives is deeply rooted in social constructionist 
literature. In the rest of this section I shall demonstrate this point. 
69 Coulter op. cit. p. 61. 
70 ibid. p. 153. 
71 Actually I doubt that doctors always look to 'internal' causes. It has been commonplace to locate 
causes in the the 'outcr' environment, for instance in the family or in relationships. The view to which I 
am paying lip-service is a parody of real medical practice. 
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I have already quoted Kitivood as saying: 'The core of our position is that personhood is 
essentially social: it refers to human beings in relation to others'. 72 Eit%vood could be 
suggesting that personhood (which typically involves the possibility of ascribing 
intentional mental states) is caitsed by social relations; in this sense it is socially 
constructed. But the "essentially" also implies that this is what personhood is in essence, 
namely a matter of social relations, which would be a constitutive claim. 
Harrd echoed Kitwood in writing: 'persons are discursively produced'. 73 which sounds 
like a causal explanation of persons. Elsewhere he writes: 'Memories are created 
discursively ... remembering is paradigmatically a socihl activity'. 74 Although the notion 
of memories being created by social activity sounds like a causal account of memories, 
the copula in 'remembering is ... a social activity' could 
be taken as an indication as to the 
nature of remembering. Moreover, I previously quoted Davies and Harr6 (but now with 
emphases added): 
'An individual emerges through the processes of social interaction, ... as one who 
is constituted and reconstituted through the various discursive practices in which 
they participate. '75 
If the emergence is a caimal, social process, the second half of the sentence implies the 
person is consfiluted by the social interaction. In which case, 'persons are discursively 
produced' might be given a constitutive interpretation too. 
Similarly, Gergen's talk of the ontological basis of mind being 'within the sphere of 
social discourse', 76 together with Coulter's suggestion that 'the properties of mental- 
predicate ascriptions and avowals' should be attributed 'to the culture, not to minds', 
equally show a tendency towards a conslitulive account of mental states. But the causal 
72 Kitwood and Bredin op. cit. 
73 Harr6 (1992). See also quotation cited in reference 8. 
74 Harr6 (1994). 
75 Davies and Harr6 (1990). 
76 Gergen op. cit. 
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tendency in social constructionism - for instance, Kitwood saying that 'virtually all the 
losses and difficulties of later life are socially constructed'77 - remains. 
So too, concerning memory, Harr6 suggests: 
'An entry in a diary is not a memory, nor is a molecular configuration in the 
brain. A memory is a representation. A representation is only a memory if it is 
an accurate or true representation of some past event.... 78 
He goes on to say that a representation becomes a true representation through a 'public 
negotiation of authenticity'. 79 This keeps in n-ýind, 
'the important observation that remembering is a task for people, and that the 
memory 'machines' in their heads are of no more and no less significance than the 
tape recorders and diaries they also use'. 80 
Harr6 had in his sights the cognitivist's account of memory, which I discussed in the last 
chapter, but the point is thus, not only social, but constitutive: a memory is consfilitted as 
such by a public negotiation. Yet, the causal line is strong in: 'psychological phenomena 
arc created in ... social encounters. '81 
So, even if the emphasis on public practices has a Wittgcnsteinian ring to it, the 
ambiguity concerning whether social constructionism offers a causal or constitutive 
account of intentional psychological states is pervasive, which has implications for the 
account it gives of normativity. So far, in this chapter, I have: 
offered an account of social constructionism; 
shown that social constructionism construes psychological phenomena as social 
constructs; 
o highlighted an ambiguity concerning whether social constructionism offers a 
causal or constitutive account of intentional psychological states. 
77 Kitwood (1989). 
78 Harr6 (1994). 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid. 
81 Harr6 (1993) p. 95. 
- 171- 
5.3 The social construction of normativity 
I shall now offer two clarifications: 
" first, if social constructionism offers a causal account, it is not broad enough; 
" secondly, as a constitutive account, social constructionism is deficient in its 
treatment of normativity. 
I shall then outline the upshot of these clarifications, in line with the Wittgensteinian 
analysis, by considering the treatment of mind in social constructionist writings. 
Clarificafion 1: broadening the causal account 
First, is it right to say that our intentional psychological states are caused by social 
customs or institutions? It is difficult to doubt the importance of the social in our 
thoughts and other intentional mental states. I shall take the example of calculation, 
bearing in mind this is a cognitive skill that can disappear in dementia. Now, ignoring 
the implicit questions concerning normativity (which I have already discussed and will 
shortly discuss again), the sum '175+81' calls for the answer '256'. It is a fact that there 
are numerous causal explanations, which are social, of what it is to perform such 
calculations. For instance, it must reflect learning. If my teacher were a maverick, I 
might have been taught such that I always mean 7 where others mean 5 and vice versa. 
My answer to the sum would then correctly be '238'. That my teachers did not teach me 
in this way is itself a matter of social causality: they were taught the 'normal' way too. 
This much seems mundane, but it makes the point that there is an ordinary sense in which 
our calculations being as they are can be explained, causally, in social terms. There is 
little doubt, therefore, that public agreement plays some part in calculations having the 
results that they do. Consider, for instance, that before 1971 in England, 'El+fl= 480 
pence' was true; whereas nowadays 'El+fl = 200 pence' is true. Thus, social 
institutions and customs can correctly be said to cause calculations to be as they are (but I 
have not said that these customs and institutions constitute what calculations are). 
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The same holds for all intentional psychological states. My ability to remember things, 
for instance, partly depends upon my ability to share and recall things in conversation. I 
can work out, as it were, memories with others. There is a social element to 
remembering (or, at least, the social element is potentially present), but in old age the 
opportunity to recollect things with others decreases. Some memories dwindle, it might 
be surmised, owing to a failure in the social environment. Reminiscence therapy, indeed, 
aims to counter such a deficiency. 82 I might otherwise not be able to create my memories 
because of a lack of the appropriate social activity. 
In a variety of ways, therefore, a causal account of intentional psychological phenomena 
seems unobjectionable. There are social causes contributing to our understanding and 
interpretation of intentional mental states. These states are typically manifest in social 
contexts, in which the context can shape the manifestation of the state. At root, these 
states are made shareable by our shared language. It would be easy here to slip into talk 
of normativity, but I am only making the more mundane point that language is a social 
phenomenon and our ability to share certain concepts depends on it in a causal way. In 
the absence of spoken language, I might have to use a sign language to tell you that my 
intention is to hunt today, but that is enough to suggest that without language of some 
sort there could be no communication concerning intentional mental states. So there are 
numerous social causes at work in connection with such states. 
The clarification I wish to offer, however, involves pointing out that we do not just share 
a language and certain other social institutions and customs. Intentional psychological 
states are not caused solely by social factors. We also, for instance, share a bodily 
existence; and, in particular, a human bodily existence. Typically this involves having 
certain ways of performing; other ways are just not possible. Thus, we have certain 
ways of communicating intimacy. If there are variations between different societies, 
these remain understandable between societies. But I cannot frighten off a territorial 
82 Butler (1963). 
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intruder by puffing up the size of my body. Our bodies provide both our possibilities 
and our limitations. Our bodily existence seems also to shape some of our psychological 
responses. Too much or too little food or sleep affects our mental states. Drugs have the 
effects that they do on our moods because of our physical configuration. Our physical 
construction plays some part in our emotional responses. 
The first clarification, therefore, is simply to point out that, if social constructionism aims 
to supply a causal account of intentional psychological phenomena, there are other causes 
at work- too. Mathematics is a social institution (involving meaning and language) which 
causes me to give the answer'256' in response to the sum '175+81'. But there is a 
sense in which this is also caused by our physical structure. Mathematics is, specifically, 
a human construction. Even if this is just a contingent matter, it remains true that the 
physical structure of humans is a relevant cause of mathematics. This first clarification 
can be broadened: not only are there physical and psychological causes as well as social 
causes of intentional mental states, but we can also delineate historical, geographical, 
economic, religious and aesthetic causal accounts. Social constructionists might wish to 
claim that these accounts are all manifestations of the social, but that is to simplify. 
Clarity will come from seeing the complexity. Part of the reason that different peoples 
calculate in different ways, or have different concepts (albeit concepts that can be 
compared between cultures), is not just social (or not just a matter of discourse) but a 
matter of mountains and seas, traditions separated over time, or made diverse by the 
differing availability of certain resources. 
The first clarification, like social constructionism itself, has an anthropological basis, in 
that it suggests diversity within the human species testifics to the variety of causal factors 
that shape our thoughts and our ways of understanding ourselves. But in which case, 
social constructionism is )vrong inasmuch as it suggests that intentional psychological 
concepts (and the states they stand for) are caused by social factors alone. It is just as 
sensible to speak of physical or geographical causes. There is nothing wrong with 
presenting a social, causal account of intentional mental states, but this is only one 
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amongst man), possible causal accounts. If this is what social constructionism amounts 
to, it is a circumscribed account. The second clarification, meanwhile, gets to the heart of 
the philosophical argument, because it considers the stronger constitutive claim and this 
brings in normativity. 
Clarification 2(i): the constitulive account - afonn of linguistic idealism? 
Secondly, then, is it right to say that our intentional psychological states are constituted 
by the social? This would be the claim that calculation, as a feature of mathematics, is 
actually a social institution or custom. If you ask what it is to calculate (or to understand 
or remember) the answer is that it is to take part in a social practice and nothing else. I 
have already given examples of social constructionists tending in this direction, or at least 
being ambiguous between the constitutive and the causal accounts. This section draws 
upon a dispute in social constructionism between whether it is to be interpreted as idealist 
or realist. Social constructionism seems more obviously to be a form of idealism and I 
shall pursue the suggestion that it is a form of linguistic idealism (which is linked to the 
suggestion, which I shall not pursue, that linguistic idealism is to be found in 
Wittgcnstein too). I shall argue that if this were the case, then the account of nonnativity 
is deficient when exposed to the Wittgensteinian analysis of Chapter 2. Because, if 
nonnativity is a socially constructed fact (conceived in a mind-dependent way) it is not 
already there inherent in the concept. The Wittgensteinian account suggests that, whether 
or not the practice is actually public, transcendental normativity implies that it is 
potentially so. The normativity is a transcendental conceptual feature of intentional 
psychological states and the actual, public instantiation of the practices that constitute 
non-nativity is a secondary issue. 
In the next section, I shall turn to the possibility that social constructionism is a realist 
doctrine. This is much harder to defend. Nevertheless, the impulse towards realism is a 
natural reaction to the deficiencies of social constructionism. The second clarification I 
shall make, therefore, is to say that social practices and institutions cannot be constitutive 
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of mental states, because of the consequences for normativity. And this means that social 
constructionism is an incoherent doctrine. 
The idealistic characterization of intentional mental states, suggested by social 
constructionism, implies that such states amount to no more than the social exchanges, 
the language or discourse, that constitute such states. For instance, Sabat and Harr6 
(ironically, because it is Harrd who criticizes idealism in social constructionism) state: 
'From the discursive point of view, psychological phenomena are not inner or 
hidden properties or processes of mind which discourse merely expresses. The 
discursive expression is ... the psychological phenomenon 
itsclL'83 
This is both a constitutive claim (there is nothing more to the psychological phenomenon 
than the discursive expression) and an idealistic one (since the reality of discursive 
expression - which is constitutive of psychological phenomena - is mind-dependent). 
This seems, therefore, pace Harr6, to be a form of linguistic idealism. 
According to Anscombe, the test for whether or not we have linguistic idealism is the 
question: 'Does this existence, or this truth, depend upon human linguistic practice? '84 
Clearly, there is a strong tendency for social constructionism to push us in this direction. 
Bloor regards Wittgenstein as a proponent of linguistic idealism and, moreover, he 
interprets this in social terms. 85 According to Bloor, 'Ostensive learning by paradigms is 
enculturation or socialization into the local practices of reference' and 'The ultimate 
authority for what our paradigms shall be is our own shared practice'. 86 Bloor makes a 
direct link between social interaction and the concerns of the linguistic idealist; they both 
83 Sabat and Harr6 (1994). 
84 Anscombe (1976). 
85 Bloor (1996). Incidentally, I think Bloor's interpretation of Anscombe (1976) and Wittgenstein is 
wrong. For, although Anscombe talks of finding 'a sort of "linguistic idealism" ' in Wittgenstein's 
treatment of rules, she finally concludes that he was able to avoid it, since he accepts that: '77tat one 
knows something is not guaranteed by the language-gwne. ' Thus he attained 'realism without 
empiricism'. Further, as Bloor and Anscombe acknowledge, Wittgenstein said 'Essence is expressed by 
grammar' [PI § 371]. But he never said'Essence is created by grammar', which would be linguistic 
idealism. 
86 Bloor op. cit. pp. 369-370. 
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involve self-reference and sclf-creativity. He concludes: 'The truths and realities created 
by "linguistic practices" are clearly social institutions ....... 87 So here is one commentator 
who interprets Wittgenstein as a linguistic idealist in order to conuncnd (Nvhat amounts to) 
a social constructionist account. In particular, for Bloor, normativity is a matter of shared 
standards emerging from social interaction. 88 
In a discussion of Wittgenstein on mathematics and rules, Bloor comments: 
'... the inexorable character of mathematics is explained in terms of training in 
counting and calculating. The importance of the institution explains why we learn 
to count as we do ... It 
is ive who are inexorable. ... The feeling that there 
is some 
truth to which a calculation corresponds is not rejected by Wittgenstein, though he 
relocates that truth in utility and the enduring character of social practice... '. 89 
On these grounds Bloor argues against realism. He also goes on to reach a conclusion 
which is entirely in keeping with a social constructionist way of thinking: 
'Mathematics and logic are collections of norms. The ontological status of logic 
and mathematics is the same as that of an institution. They are social in nature. '90 
More recently, Bloor has used Wittgcnstein to support the constitutive and idealistic line: 
'Wittgenstein sometimes expressed himself by saying that consensus is a 
precondition of rule-following activities, e. g. of arithmetical calculation: 'This 
consensus belongs to the essence of calculation, so much is certain. Le.: this 
consensus is part of the phenomenon of our calculating' (RFM 111: 67). '91 
But in this account, the notion of normativity becomes a matter of social norms and 
conventions. Normativity is constructed and a matter of consensus: 
'Normative standards come from the consensus generated by a number of 
interacting rule followers, and it is maintained by collectively monitoring, 
87 ibid. p. 375. 
88 ibid. pp. 371-374. 
89 Bloor (1973). 
90 ibid. 
91 Bloor (1997) p. 16. 
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controlling and sanctioning their individual tendencies. '92 
Such a form of normativity, however, runs counter to the requirement that it should be 
transcendental. Normativity is not, according to the Wittgensteinian analysis, a matter of 
social convention - although the concepts are used in language in social settings - but 
rather a precondition for the concepts having the meanings they do. The transcendental 
nature of normativity was emphasized by Luntley (as I discussed in Chapter 2) in his 
discussion of having the experience of hearing someone say 'add 2': 
'the norms that shape our future experience must already be there as constitutive 
of the experience, for they shape that experience. '93 
Thus, an attempt to reconstruct normativity from norm-free data will inevitably fail. 
There is a consensus concerning calculation, as Wittgenstein says, but the important 
point, which Wittgenstcin makes again and again, 94 is that normativity just is a 
constitutive feature of calculation. 
It is a mistake, as I argued in Chapter 2, to try to go further and say what then constitutes 
normativity. In social constructionism, however, if discursive expression is the 
psychological phenomenon, then the normativity that is constitutive of the psychological 
phenomenon must be no more than the discursive expression. But that goes against the 
suggestion that normativity is irreducible and transcendent. It makes the nonnativity, as 
Bloor would have it, a socially constructed fact. It ignores the point that if normativity 
were not already there as part of what it is to calculate (as a constitutive feature of 
calculation), calculation would not be calculation. Normativity is simply a part of the 
form of life in which calculation makes sense. 95 
The difference between social constructionism and the Wittgensteinian account is the 
difference to which I have already referred. The practices that underpin the normativity 
92 ibid. p. 17. 
93 Luntley (1991) p. 176. 
94 E. g. Z§ 299 ff., PI pp. 225-227. 
95 Hence, having spoken of calculation, Wittgenstein wrote: 'What has to be accepted, the given, is - so 
one could say -fonns of life. ' (PI p. 226. ) 
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of intentional psychological states are either essentially or potentially public. Social 
constructionism makes them essentially so: normativity is solely a consequence of the 
public nature of practice. The Wittgensteinian analysis, contrariwise, holds that 
normativity is a transcendental feature: it inheres in the intentional psychological states as 
a constitutive feature and must do so for these to be the states that they arc. The practices 
underlying normativity are potentially public, but even if it should turn out that such a 
practice were not actually instantiated, it would remain conceptually true that the potential 
for shareability must have been present. The transcendental nature of normativity, if 
taken seriously, ensures that the emphasis is on the potenfial for the underlying practices 
to be public. 
The tendency towards linguistic idealism in social constructionism, which follows on 
from the attempt to make social practices constitutive of intentional mental states, leads to 
an account of normativity that makes it the consequence of social consensus. This is 
opposed by the account of normativity suggested in Chapter 2 which characterizes the 
normativity of intentional mental states as transcendental, constitutive and irreducible. 96 
Clarification 2(ii): the constitutive accotuit -a realist reading? 
An alternative tack for social constructionism is to suggest that discourse is not creating 
reality, but reflecting it in some sense. In Harrd we find an attempt to defend social 
constructionism as a doctrine of realism. He argues against the anti-realism of Gergen, 97 
whom he accuses of taking on only 'part of Wittgenstein's account of discursive 
practices, namely the thesis of the autonomy of grammar. 98 According to Harr6, 
Gergen 'misses the other part, namely the 'riverbed' over which all action flows, the 
human form of life'. 99 
96 1 should emphasize that the problem lies in the account given of normativity. The dispute concerning 
whether social constructionism is idealist or realist is of secondary importance to my thesis. 
97 Gergen (1991). 
98 Han-6 (1992). 
99 ibid. A useful account of the riverbed analog is given in Stem (1995) pp. 186-192. Of relevance is Cly Wittgenstein's comment in Z§ 173: 'Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning'. 
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The later conception to which Harrd refers is seen in On Cerlainty, in which Wittgenstcin 
writes of. 'the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and 
false. '100 He then writes: 
'... the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement 
of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a 
sharp division of the one from the other. ... And the 
bank of that river consists 
partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly 
of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washcd away, or 
deposited. '101 
The imager), here suggests that some things are fixed, but not utterly. Stem, however, 
warns that talk of a fixed background could also be misleading, since it suggests 
something very determinate, whereas Wittgenstein's later notion of a background, 
'is not something apart from or prior to our lives; instead it is the pattern of those 
lives themselves, the "praxis of language" in all its detail and Complexity'. 102 
It is to this fixed background, in which we inevitably participate, that HarT6 refers in his 
advocacy of a realist interpretation of social constructionism. He states: 
'The ontological basis of all psychology must be found in joint actions and the 
persons who perform them. These are the elementary beings or prime substances 
of the universe on which the ontology of a genuinely scientific psychology must 
be based. '103 
Talk of ontology here is suggestive of a constitutive account and elsewhere, Harr6 
asserts: 
'... there is no mind-substance. As far as individual human beings are concerned 
there are only contingently organized conversational and other symbolic 
100 OC § 94. 
101 OC § 97 and § 99. 
102 Stem, op. cit. p. 191, with quotation from OC § 501. 
103 Harr6 (1992). 
practices'. 104 
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In other words, the mental is constituted by the social. But it is also intended to be a 
realist doctrine, for what is real for social constructionism, 
,... must be whatever is intransigent to individual human desires coupled with 
whatever is necessary for there to be a human world at all. The intransigent 
background to all human action is the human conversation, the elements of which 
are the acts produced by the joint actions of speakers. '105 
An initial point is that, whilst Hari-6 is critical of Gergen's failure to emphasize the 
riverbed, his own foundation is human conversation or discourse, which (without further 
support) would seem to be far too biddable to the changing currents of mere opinion. 
When we turn to Harr6's necessary conditions for the possibility of discursive practice, 
we still find that discourse is always primary. 106 Thus, according to Harrd, the existence 
of persons provides a necessary condition for discursive practices, but 'persons are 
discursively produccd', 107 so discourse is primary. If his talk of persons and discourse 
is sometimes ambiguous as to which is primary, his statement (which I have quoted 
above) about the shared thesis of social constructionism was unambiguous: 'all 
psychological phenomena and the beings in ivhich they are realized are produced 
discursively. '108 In Harr6, therefore, all the strcss is on discourse, language and 
conversation. 
If Harr6 wishes, however, to tic his brand of social constructionism to something as 
concrete as the only gradually changing riverbed, he needs to find something more robust 
104 Han-6 (1989b). 
105 Harr6 (1992). 
106 ibid. It is Nvorth noting that Harr6 makes use of the Kantian notion of a transcendental sense of the 
self (see Harr6 (1983) pp. 213-215), but does not have a transcendental account of meaning normativity. 
Instead the emphasis is on discourse. 
107 ibid. Here Nve again see the ambiguity concerning whether the account given by social 
constructionism is to be constitutive or causal. 
108 ibid. 
- 181 - 
than just mere discourse and conversation. 109 The problem with this account is that it is 
not very realistic. There is very little room here for mind-independence. If the mind is 
construed in terms of discourse, it is nevertheless the primary reality. Harrd and Gillett 
moved towards something more solid when they describe their view of the mind 'as 
dynamic and essentially embedded in historical, political, cultural, social, and 
interpersonal contexts'. 110 They continue: 
'It is not definable in isolation. And to be a psychological being at all, one must 
be in possession of some minimal repertoire of the cluster of skills necessary to 
the management of the discourses into which one may from time to time 
enter. 'I II 
But whilst, on the one hand, being culturally and socially embedded - which all 
discourses and conversations must inevitably be - adds solidity to the understanding of 
the mind in social constructionism, on the other hand, there is nothing in the embedding 
context that amounts to the full description of psychological phenomena required by the 
Wittgensteinian analysis. 
The problem again is that the normativity of intentional psychological phenomena can 
only be accounted for on this view by mention of conversations and discourse. Harrd's 
theory tries to offer an account of normativity, just as it offers an account of intentional 
psychological phenomena, in terms of conversation. According to the Wittgensteinian 
analysis, however, whilst the normativity of intentional mental states will be shown in the 
'praxis of language', 112 normativity is not constructed, as it were, as language goes 
along. Normativity is rather a prerequisite for language: it is a constitutive feature of 
meaning and without meaning there could be no language. There must, similarly, be 
meaning-normativity as a prerequisite to discourse if discourse is to make sense. But 
normativity cannot be decided at the time, even if it is only in discourse that it shows 
109 Wren (1987), who is sympathetic to Harr6, still points to the need for some 'deep sense of what is 
truly important', something that will place constraints on the availability and viability of 
'interpretations, moral orders, identity projects, etc. '. 
110 Harr6 and Gillett op. cit. p. 25. 
111 ibid. pp. 25-26. 
112 OC § 501. 
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itself, otherwise what has meaning and what does not must await revelation in actual 
discourse. Whereas, on the Wittgensteinian view, the meaning is already there - 
normatively constrained - as a transcendental feature of the concept, in order for it to be 
the concept that it is. 
In addition, there is a subsidiary argument lurking in the emphasis on the skills necessary 
for discourses, which are regarded as, in turn, necessary for a being to be regarded as 
psychological. One consequence of the view that to be a person one must be able to enter 
into conversations would seem to be that if language is lost by people with dementia, then 
those affected are no longer 'constituted as people'. The acquisition of skills for entering 
conversations is a question of 'attaining mindedncss', which is construed as 
C constructing private miniaturized versions, microcosms, of the great conversations that 
constitute civilizations. 113 Again, the emphasis is on the ability to enter into 
conversation. This is a threat to the personhood of those with dementia, which may 
explain why Sabat and Hari-6 are keen to demonstrate the extent to which some dementia 
patients can enter into conversation. 114 A broader view of what it is to be a 
psychological being, however, obviates the need to insist on the ability to enter into 
conversation as constituting a defining feature of personhood. Hari-6 has concluded that 
'Discourse and person are mutually constituted beings. They are internally related'., 15 
Yet it can readily be objected that discourse just is not a being in the concrete way that 
seems to be suggested. Furthermore, if there is an internal relationship it is grammatical, 
whereas the talk of beings makes it sound ontological. The relationship is better put by 
saying that the precondition for human discourse is the human existent. 116 
113 Harr6 (1992). 
114 Sabat and Harr6 (1992). 
115 Harr6 (1992). 
116 1 have used "human existent" to be redolent of Heidegger's notion of Dasein and in anticipation of 
my remarks about hermcneutic philosophy in the next chapter. 
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To summarize the argument of this section so far, whether pursuing an idealist or realist 
version of social constructionism, the emphasis is on an understanding of psychological 
concepts in terms of interaction and a social context. This is as opposed to trying to 
understand psychological phenomena as purely intra-subjective, which was the approach 
of both the disease and cognitive neuropsychology models. Parallel to this move, from 
the individual to the social, is an emphasis on discourse or conversation. This 
represents, in part, an appreciation of meaning as understandable in the context of use. 
Now the move from the individual to the social and the emphasis on contextualized 
meaning have support in Wittgenstein. For instance, Wittgenstein wrote: 
'-To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are 
cusloins (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a 
language. 'I 17 
This conveys both the tendency in Wittgenstein to emphasize the social custom or 
institution and the inclination to understand meaning as given within a broader context. 
Hence, too, 'Our talk gets its meaning from the rest of our proceedings'. I Is 
Despite these laudable moves in social constructionism, however, constituting the mental 
as the social comes up against the need for transcendental normativity. Whether the 
emphasis is on human conversation or human consensus, normativity is reduced by 
accounts which try to explain it further, rather than notice it as an irreducible, 
transcendental and constitutive feature of intentional psychological states. Social 
constructionism does not suggest that normativity shapes discourse, that it allows some 
things to be said meaningfully and disallows others; rather, the discourse is the 
psychological phenomenon and, therefore, normativity is reduced to discourse. 
Normativity seems to be a mere conseqiwnce of human discourse and activity, rather than 
an intransigent feature of intentional mental life. 
117 PI § 199. 
118 OC § 229. 
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It is a latent recognition of the fact that normativity is a feature of the world, not just an 
ePiphenomenon of discourse, I suggest, that led Harr6 to talk so much of the person, 
despite his primary reality being discourse. Human existents, pace Harr6, rather than 
conversations, are the "intransigent background" and "ontological basis" of our 
psychology. The benefit of this broader view, from the clinical perspective, is that this 
counts (rather than discounts) people with severe dementia. Harr6's inclination towards 
realism might be regarded as an inclination towards the sort of individualism that seems 
to stand over against social constructionist thought. The second clarification, derived 
from the Wittgensteinian analysis, asserts that social practices, customs and institutions 
cannot be constitutive of mental states, because of the consequences for nonnativity. 
Calculation involves consensus, but the normativity that is a constitutive feature of 
calculation must be there as a prerequisite for calculation to be possible. The corrective of 
the second clarification is, therefore, fatal to the philosophical standing of social 
constructionism. For, as in the first clarification (which concerned causes) what it is to 
be normatively constrained in the having of intentional psychological states cannot be 
constituted solely by social practices or customs. Into the constitutive account must come 
the physical and psychological descriptions of what it is to be a human being of this sort. 
This is not to say that normativity is caused by physical or psychological dispositions, 
but rather to make the point that a broad perspective is required in order to encompass the 
embedding context of the practices that constitute normativity. For, as I argued in 
Chapter 2, the practices that underpin thought and language must be worldly, embedded 
practices. To be subject to normativity in the having of intentional mental states just is to 
be a person of this type in this ivorld. It might be other things for as-yet-undiscovered 
creatures, but this is what it is for us. We cannot, therefore, be reduced to a constitutive 
account that only encompasses the social. 
77ze upshol of the clarifications and Me eliminalion of Ille nzind 
In this chapter I have: 
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" Offered an account of social constructionism; 
" Shown that social constructionism construes psychological phenomena as social 
constructs; 
- Highlighted an ambiguity concerning whether social constructionism offers a 
causal or constitutive account of intentional psychological states; 
* Suggested first, by way of clarification, that if it is a causal account, it is not 
broad enough; 
- And, secondly, argued that, as a constitutive account, it is deficient in its 
treatment of normativity. For it makes normativity a matter of aclual public 
practices and no more than such practices: normativity is purely a social matter. 
Alternatively, transcendental normativity involves potenfially public practices and 
these, moreover, to be understood, require the perspective of their worldly 
embedding context. On this view, normativity cannot be constituted simply by 
the social. 
The clarifications, which clarified by separating the causal and constitutive accounts, have 
ultimately acted as condemnations of social constructionism, by showing that it is 
deficient as a way of conceptualizing dementia. This is so because of social 
constructionism's construal of intentional psychological phenomena. But in the last 
section I hinted at the tendency in Harr-6 to emphasize the person, - inevitably, because 
persons are necessary for conversations and discursive stances. In this section I shall 
pursue a little further Harr6's construal of the mind as a way of expanding on the 
Wittgensteinian account of intentional mental states. My aim is to re-focus our attention 
on the correct view of mental states. That view sees them, in line with the 
Wittgensteinian analysis, as both inner and outer. Harrd is right to move us away from 
an inner view of the mental; but something is lost if the view is simply outer. I have 
already quoted Harr& '... there is no mind-substance. 'l 19 Gadenne criticizes this view: 
'While some psychologists seem to think that all can be explained by or reduced 
to cognitive processes, Harr6 goes to the opposite extreme by trying to eliminate 
119 Haff6 (1989b). 
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the mental. This seems to me hardly more convincing. '120 
Gadenne finds it unconvincing partly because he accepts the representationalist account of 
cognitivism. This causes him to reject the emphasis placed by Harrd on conversations 
and the rules of discourse. Whereas Harr6 stresses the rules which govern the use of 
language to do with the mental, Gadcnne wishes to hold to the notion of causal cognitive 
mechanisms. He suggests, for instance, that 'Global events like speech acts or other 
social actions presuppose cognitive mechanisms specified by general causal 
hypotheses'. 121 Whilst in the previous chapter I have been critical of mental 
representationalism (and would accordingly find some of Gadenne's suggestions 
uncongenial), like Wittgenstein, I would not wish to deny that there are mental processes. 
For, '... To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that 
anyone ever remembers anything'. 122 So, an interesting question to ask is: does Haff6 
deny that anyone ever remembers anything? 
At one level he does not: 'remembering is a task for people'. 123 But at another level 
Harr6 regards memories as social representations: they are 'created discursively' and 
9 remembering is paradigmatically a social activity'. 124 Hence, willy-nilly, Harr6s 
discursive psychology plays down the experience of remembering inwardly. Whatever 
the difficulties of construing 'remembering inwardly' in a philosophically robust way, it 
seems phenomenologically naive just to plump for 'remembering outwardly'. 
This tendency, to eliminate the inner in favour of the rule-governed outer, is evident too 
120 Gadenne (1989). 
121 ibid. 
122 PI §306. 
123 Harr6 (1994) p. 37. 
124 ibid. p. 36. HarrCs talk of social representations is another example of his meritorious corrective to 
the notion of internal representations. The corrective, however, seems to go too far. He speaks of the 
I mental' as involving 'skills for handling symbolic interactions' which are bound up with 'the norms of a 
culture and their social representations' (1989b). He goes on to say there are 'very many ways in which 
normative representations actually exist as representalions sociales in the social world' (ibid. ). But this 
sounds as if the normativity demonstrated by intententional psychological phenomena is nothing more 
than whimsical, cultural norms. 
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(for again very laudable reasons) in the work of Sabat and Harr6 with AD patients. 125 
Their intention is to show that people with AD are still agents acting with meaning. This 
they convincingly demonstrate in particular patients. However, it leads them to suggest 
that, 
ca person suffering from Alzheimer's condition is like someone ... trying to play 
tennis with a racket with a warped frame. The basic intentions may be there, but 
the instrument for realizing them is defective'. 126 
This analogy was criticized by Hope on the grounds that AD 'can damage the inner 
mental life as well as its expression -- the player as well as the fackct'. 127 The tendency 
to regard the mental as created by discourse underplays its reality within human life. That 
reality is shown in sharp relief in AD when it begins to disintegrate. This is not to 
underestimate the importance of social constructionism as a counterweight to the attitude 
that people exist independently of social norms. My 'selfl' may well be destroyed by 
AD, but (at the very least) I still exist as a person through my 'selVeST. So too, my mind 
may be destroyed by the disease in a very real sense and this is not just a matter of 
discourse. If it is also not a matter of the destruction of some thing, it is similarly not a 
matter of the destruction of no-thing. 
In response to, on the one hand, the tendency to look for inner processes, Wittgenstein 
points to their outer manifestations. But, on the other hand, when he accuses himself of 
denying mental processes, he responds by saying 'naturally we don't want to deny 
them'. 128 For Wittgenstein, it is even misleading to conceive the outer and the inner as 
being cheek by jowl. They are just conceptually intertwined in psychological concepts 
and teasing them apart should be avoided lest the full meaning of such concepts is lost: 
' "I noticed that he was out of humour. " Is this a report about his behaviour or 
his state of mind? ... Both; not side-by-side, however, but about the one via the 
125 Sabat and Harr6 (1994). 
126 ibid. 
127 Hope (1994b). 
128 PI § 308. 
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other. '129 
Talk of the inner and the outer is potentially misleading. Psychological concepts, such as 
"the mind", involve both outer and inner aspects. Social constructionism, puts all the 
stress on the outer manifestations of mental concepts and, in particular, on discourse. In 
doing so it seems, as Gadenne suggests, to eliminate the mental. What is required is an 
understanding that does justice to the inner realities (both physical and psychological) and 
the outer manifestations of mental phenomena. 
According to McDowell, one way to understand Wittgenstein is to place him 'in the wider 
context of German philosophy after Kant'. 130 Kant positioned himself between 
empiricism, involving what he called the faculty of intuitions, and rationalism, which 
emphasizes the concepts of the understanding. For Kant, a synthesis of intuitions and 
concepts was necessary: 
'Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no 
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without 
concepts are blind'. 131 
In Wittgenstein, the synthesis is between language (or thought) and the world. This is 
another way of putting the point about the inner and the outer. For me to remember 
inwardly, nevertheless involves certain outer things being the case. The phenomenon of 
remembering cannot be fully understood in isolation from the normativity that constrains 
what will, or will not, count as remembering. That normativity is a matter of embedded, 
shaping, worldly practices. So the inner and the outer are both constitutively involved. 
About the "inner" world, McDowell wrote: 
'That it is inner consists in there being nothing to its states of affairs except the 
instantiation in consciousness of the relevant concepts; the instances of the 
concepts, unlike the instances of concepts of the outer, have no being 
independently of the fact that the concepts that they instantiate figure in the content 
129 PI p. 179. 
130 McDowell (1991) p. 156. 
131 Kant (1929) A 51, B 75. 
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of consciousness. ... But that 
is not to say that these states of affairs have no 
being. ... The concepts set up 
internal links between the states of affairs which are 
their instantiations and publicly accessible circumstances: circumstances linked 
Gnormatively' to the states of affairs in one kind of case, circumstances linked to 
them as their normal expression in another. '132 
To recall Chapter 2, McDowell's interpretation amounts to quietism, a straightforward 
description of how the language actually works. What we see is that our 'internal' 
concepts make links between language and the world. 
To return to social constructionism, there are links to be made between discourse and the 
world. Discourse and the social cannot be ignored, even when it comes to a discussion 
of the mind. Just as Kant argued that concepts require the world if they are to have 
content, so discourse requires that there are real things - such as mental phenomena on 
the one hand, and actual bodies on the other - for the discourse to be about. Similarly, 
the world of bodily and mental things must be grasped by discourse to be understood. 
For example, Wittgenstein wrote: 
'How do I know That ibis colour is red? - It would be an answer to say: "I have 
learnt English". '133 
Or again, 
'You learned the concept 'pain' when you learned languagc. '134 
So, discourse and social interaction are central to our understanding of the world and a 
part of it; but not its totality, which also includes neurons and the feeling of loneliness. 
Memories (or calculations and other intentional mental states) are not created by 
discourse, but the concept of memory links internally both to the state of affairs described 
by my saying 'I remember... ', and to the essentially public circumstances to which my 
words refer. 135 But memories are mediated by discourse, since discourse makes the 
132 McDowell op. cit. p. 160. 
133 PI § 381. 
134 PI § 384. 
135 Even if the circumstances are not actually public, they are potentially so. 
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normative (that is, transcendental, irreducible and constitutive) link between the inner and 
the outer. Similarly, loss of memory is not socially constructed. It is a matter of 
particular states of affairs (both psychological and physical) no longer holding, on the 
one hand, and certain words no longer having meaning to an individual on the other. But 
loss of memory is manifested socially, in that certain social interactions are not possible. 
Conclusion: to the person from social constructionism 
There is much to commend in social constructionism. It has been useful in clinical 
practice as a way of focussing attention on ethical issues, the practice of caring and the 
nature of the person. Its Wittgcnsteinian roots are seen in its discussion of rules and 
practices. But, as I have just described, the over-emphasis on discourse (at least in 
Harr6) does not leave room for the transcendental account of normativity suggested by 
the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological concepts, It has to be said, too, 
that as regards psychological concepts, social constructionism does not embed them in 
the world in a way that allows easy reference to their psychological and physical 
correlates. They are embedded first and foremost in conversations, but this simply seems 
too narrow a view of psychological reality. 
A further flaw in the model is that, stemming from the restricted view of psychological 
phenomena, the notion of the person is also made highly dependent upon discourse. 
Thus Harrd asserts: '-persons are discursively produced'. 136 I have already noted the 
upshot that people with sevcre dementia, who cannot take part in conversations, might be 
denied personhood on that basis. But this assertion might be countered by saying that 
persons are produced bodily. Similarly, Harr6 and Gillett state: 
'We will therefore identify a person as having a coherent mind or personality to 
the extent that individuals can be credited with adopting various positions within 
different discourses and fashioning for themselves, however intentionally or 
unintentionally, a unique complex of subjectivities (essentially private discourses) 
136 Harr6 (1992). 
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with some longitudinal integrity. In this sense, there is a psychological reality to 
each individual. '137 
Whether this allows someone with severe dementia to have a personality or psychological 
reality must be in doubt. 
To be fair, Harr6s agenda is to broaden the perspective: 
'In the restoration of personal psychology, I want to bring back the study of 
endeavour, conatus, striving, trying and the like. In the conditions for the use of 
these concepts I feel the presence of persons as agents rather than as passive 
passengers on a mental vehicle directed and powered by subpersonal vectors (or 
information-processing modules) of various kinds'. 138 
As well as being agents, persons arc embodied: '... human bodies sustain persons. 
... People are aware of themselves as embodied'. 
139 And they are situated, or embedded, 
'in historical, political, cultural, social, and interpersonal contexts'. 140 
In conclusion, social constructionism is flawed because of its over-emphasis on social 
practices and discourse. It fails to give a correct account of intentional psychological 
phenomena, because it reduces normativity to that which is public. In this model, 
normativity appears as a mere consequence of discourse. Over against social 
constructionism, according to the Wittgensteinian analysis, normativity involves 
potentially public practices, embedded in the world of human existents. What is essential 
is that the normativity is transcendental, cannot be reduced solely to social practices and is 
constitutive of the conceptual understanding of what it is to think, to calculate and the 
like. Nevertheless, the broadening, corrective tendency of social constructionism (shown 
by the quotations from Harrd above) impels us towards the account of the person as a 
situated, embodied agent, to which I now turn. 
137 Harr6 and Gillett (1994) p. 25. 
138 Harr6 (1983). p. 185. 
139 ibid. p. 11. 
140 Ffarr6 and Gillett ibid. 
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Chapter 6. 
A hum an-person-perspective on dementia: 
the outcome of the Wittgensteinian analysis 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to broaden understanding of dementia. I have pursued this aim 
by considering models of dementia and subjecting them to a critique using an account of 
intentional psychological phenomena derived from Wittgcnstein. I have found the 
models of dementia, which I have considered, wanting in different ways, but chiefly 
inasmuch as they have misconstrued the transcendental normativity that is a constitutive 
and irreducible feature of intentional mental states. 
In Chapter 1,1 characterized the main plot thus: 
- an analysis of intentional psychological states as a way of understanding 
dementia. 
I shall shortly proceed to summarize the results of this analysis. The sub-plot was as 
follows: 
* an account of how we understand the person in the light of our understanding of 
dementia. 
In this concluding chapter, I shall present an account of the person which is supported by 
the Wittgcnsteinian analysis of intentional psychological states. Given this support, it is 
no surprise to find that this account of the person turns out to be useful as a way of 
understanding dementia. That is, not only does the main plot have implications for the 
sub-plot, but the sub-plot then informs the main plot. Moreover, the upshot is that our 
attitude towards the person with dementia, qua person, can be maintained even in severe 
dementia. 
Central to the understanding of dementia, which emerges from this thesis, is what I shall 
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term the human-person-perspectivc. This is the broad view of dementia that I have 
commended throughout the thesis. Our view of dementia cannot be separated from 
where we stand, but our standing involves sharing in the normative concerns of the 
human world. In short, we are not disengaged observers and, moreover, whatever the 
particular view that we adopt, there will always be the broader perspective of the world, 
which we inescapably share. I shall flesh out these comments in the rest of this chapter. 
There are four further sections, before I conclude the thesis. 
1.1 shall offer a brief summary of the main plot. This will conclude with the 
thought that we need a perspective of dementia that allows a recognition of the normative 
nature of the world. 
2. The main plot emphasizes the embeddcdness of practices in the world as a 
means of underpinning the normativity of intentional psychological states. I shall discuss 
what this amounts to by considering dcmcntia-in-thc-world. Then, having made some 
preliminary observations about persons, I shall pursue the sub-plot by showing how the 
main plot suggests that we should move from the Locke-Parfit view of the person, as 
described in Chapter 1, to the situated-cmbodicd-agent view. Much of this section is 
devoted to an elucidation of this broader view of the person. It is a view supported by 
the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological states. 
3. This view of persons, as situated-embodicd-agents, Icads me to discuss (what 
I shall call) the human-person-perspective of dementia. I shall flesh out the connotations 
of this perspective, which squares with the Wittgensteinian analysis and allows the broad 
understanding we need. Thus, it is from this perspective that we must judge our models 
of dementia. 
4. It is from the human-pcrson-pcrspcctive, too, that we must make decisions 
about people with severe dementia. I shall contend that the human-person-perspective 
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allows us to regard people with even severe dementia as persons. The analysis of 
intentional psychological states, therefore, has relevance to the severely demented too, 
mostly because of the human-person-perspectivc it suggests. 
In my conclusion, I shall indicate some of the clinical implications and areas of possible 
future research which stem from the present work. First, there is a need for further 
exploration of the relevance of hermeneutics to clinical practice; secondly, this thesis 
suggests future modes of enquiry in medical ethics; finally, the human-person- 
perspective of dementia might be useful in connection with scientific research on the 
ageing brain. 
6.1 Intentional psychological states and dementia 
In this section I shall summarize, albeit briefly, the main plot, which comprises an 
analysis of intentional psychological states as a way of understanding dementia. That 
analysis was carried out mainly in Chapter 2. There I considered Wittgenstein's rule- 
following considerations and concluded that they demonstrate a transcendental, 
constitutive and irreducible normativity. When I remember, for instance, my memory is 
o something and, at the moment of remembering, the content of the memory makes 
contact with the world so as to constrain it. At the moment I remember your face, prior 
to meeting you at the station, it becomes true that when I see you (presupposing that my 
aim is to meet you, that I want to do so, etc. ) I shall greet you. This constraining of the 
world, which happens at the time the mental states occurs (whether or not the mental 
content is instantiated), is a constitutive feature of intentional mental states. It is, as it 
were, built into the concept. The normativity of intentional psychological states is not 
something that can be worked out later, because, for example, of the requirement for 
there to be constancy of meaning. Nor, as I argued in Chapter 2, is it worked out in a 
platonic heaven; nor is it a matter of human dispositions being rolled out as a continuous 
process (as in constructivism); nor is it a matter upon which the community can decide; it 
is neither a causal, nor a mental, process. For normativity is a prerequisite of meaning; it 
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is transcendentally present as a feature of the intentional mental state. We cannot reduce 
this by any further explanations. Normativity just is part and parcel of what it means to 
intend, to understand, to think, to know, to remember or to calculate. 
As Thornton suggests: 
'Content-laden mcntal states fit into a systematic normative and rational structure 
with which we make sense of ourselves and of others. They are holistically tied 
into the fabric of our lives through their normative consequences. 'I 
The normativity of intentional psychological states, by which they are tied to and 
constrain the world, is a situated phenomenon, in the sense that it is inescapably a fact of 
how things are in the world. Normativity itself cannot be further explained; hence 
quietism. This is not to say, however, that normativity cannot be further understood. It 
is understood in terms of worldly embedded practices, but this just repeats the point that 
normativity is a constitutive matter and as real as rocks or rainbows. Hence, there are 
three points to notice about intentional psychological states: 
" first, they show transcendental, constitutive and irreducible normativity; 
" secondly, this involves an understanding of such states as being contextually 
embedded; 
- thirdly, they can be given an externalist construal. 2 
With these thoughts in mind, in Chapters 3,4, and 5,1 asked the question, do these 
models of dementia allow an account of intentional psychological phenomena that shows 
normativity? 
In each case, the answer is that the models arc deficient. The problem with the disease 
model is that it can be interpreted in an extreme physicalist manner, in which case 
normativity is eliminated. As I suggested, the physicalism of the disease model can be 
accommodated by the Wittgensteinian analysis by recognizing that, in addition to causal 
I Thornton (1998) p. 28. 
2 In Chapter I (p. 13), 1 defined 'externalism' as the view 'that what is thought or said (content) depends 
in part on factors external to the mind of the thinker or speaker' (Davidson, 1995). 1 have also cited 
Luntley (see Chapter 2, p. 61) who states that externalism suggests 'content is not characterizable 
independently of that (the environment) which it represents' (Luntley (1999) p. 9). 
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explanations, there is room for a constitutive account of intentional psychological states. 
This constitutive account brings in others, points to external factors that help to constitute 
what it is to remember and locates our physicalist explanations within the broader context 
of constitutive normativity, which is seen to be just as -much a part of the world as the 
neurons and synapses of the brain. So too, cognitive ncuropsychology fails, inasmuch 
as it attempts to explain intentional psychological states by discussing the internal 
processing of inner representations. That route leaves no room for normativity, which is 
tied to outward practices in the field of persons. Whilst the sub-personal account of 
cognitive neuropsychology can legitimately claim to describe sub-personal function, the 
meaning of mental representations is a matter of the outer, worldly context in which 
intentional mental states are embedded. Finally, social constructionism makes much of 
the outer, social world, but in so doing it effectively reduces normativity by making it no 
more than a matter of public agreement. Alternatively, the Wittgensteinian analysis of 
intentional psychological phenomena suggests that the normativity, which is constitutive 
of such phenomena, is transcendental. It is not that understanding is essentially a public 
phenomenon, it is rather a conceptual point: as a (transcendental) prerequisite (without 
which it is not a concept that is embedded in the human worldly context and is not, 
thereby, normative) it must have the potential for public instantiation; but whether or not 
that potential becomes an actuality is a secondary matter. 
Having recapitulated the arguments concerning the three models of dementia I 
considered, it is clearer what the understanding of dementia subsequent to the 
Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological states must do. It must furnish an 
account of intentional psychological states that allows them transcendental, constitutive 
and irreducible normativity. It must allow that such states are contextually embedded and 
that they can be given an extcrnalist construal. I have already suggested that the disease 
model of dementia might be compatible with, but in itself does not provide, such a broad 
understanding. Cognitive neuropsychology helps us to understand function, but its 
perspective is otherwise limited. Social constructionism, even if its focus on the role of 
practices in the world is broadening, would have to give up its central tenet, namely that 
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intentional mental states (and, therefore, normativity) are socially constructed. What is 
required instead is a perspeclive of denzentia that alloivs a recognition of 1he nonnative 
naftire of Me world. I shall leave this thought hanging and in the next section I shall 
discuss the notion of the person. This is a move to the sub-plot, since I shall give an 
account of how we understand the person in the light of our understanding of dementia. 
Having done this, I can return to give more substance to the perspective of dementia, 
which will allow a broader understanding. 
6.2 Dementia-in-the-world and the situated-embodied-agent view 
In this section I shall do three things: 
- first, I shall discuss dementia, in the light of the Wittgcnstcinian analysis, as a 
feature of the world; 
- secondly, building on comments about the human world, I shall make some 
preliminary (and necessarily circumscribed) observations about persons; 
9 thirdly, I shall argue that the Wittgensteinian analysis must lead to a broadening 
of the Locke-Parfit view of the person and I shall suggest that the situated- 
embodied-agent view is supported by the analysis of this thesis. I shall then 
elucidate this view of the person in order to encourage a perspective that allows a 
recognition of the normative nature of the world. 
For clarification, Figure 2 outlines the argument of this chapter. The Wittgensteinian 
analysis of Chapter 2, which suggests an extemalist account of intentional mental states, 
supports an understanding of dementia as dementia-in-thc-world. In turn, this 
understanding supports the human-person-perspective as the correct way to understand 
dementia. This is the main plot of the thesis. Meanwhile, dementia-in-the-world also 
supports the situated-embodied-agent view of the person, which is the sub-plot. But the 
human-person-perspective and the situated-cmbodied-agent view of the person are 
mutually supportive. So main and sub-plot coalesce beneath the 6nderstanding of 
dcmentia-in-the-world. 
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Figure 2. Plan of Argument 
Main plot Wittgenstcinian 
analysis of 
intentional mental 
states (Chapter 2) 
IF 
Dementia-in-the-world 
The human- A 
person-perspective 
of dementia 
Sub-plot 
The situated- 
embodicd-agent 
view of the 
person 
Dementia-in-the-world 
As I described in Chapter 1, dementia involves a loss of cognitive function. The person 
with dementia is, to a lesser or greater extent, no longer able to enjoy the intentional 
mcntal states of understanding certain things, of remembering others, or of making 
calculations. The main argument of this thesis has been that, to understand dementia, we 
have to understand that the failure is not just of the brain, nor is it simply a functional 
failure of internal processing, nor is itjust a failure in the field of social practices. 
Dementia is a failure in the realm of normativity too, where normativity has to be 
understood as a transcendental, constitutive and irreducible feature of the world. I want 
now to flesh out a little what I mean by "world". 
I want to do this by focussing on dementia. To have dementia entails a loss in the 
rational and normatively-structured realm. In other words, if I have dementia I make 
mistakes: I refer to my daughter as my wife. This is a mistake in the rational realm and 
/ 
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part of its being a mistake is the fact that it ignores certain normative constraints that 
operate. But the rational, normativcly-structured realm has to be understood, in 
accordance with the Wittgcnsteinian analysis, in terms of embedded practices. According 
to this analysis, intentional psychological states involve, at a conceptual level, 
transcendental normativity as an embedded feature of the rational world. This rational 
shaping of the world (which involves normativity and is potentially, but not essentially, 
publie)3 gives sense to the notion of failure of memory. 
Furthermore, the description of the realm that I (as someone with dementia) and others (at 
least potentially) inhabit must be rich in order to capture the full sense of normativity. 
The embedded practices that underpin the normativity that is transgressed in dementia will 
involve a history and cultural environment. This will itself depend upon individual 
histories of people, which will in turn depend upon numerous physical (both biological 
and geographical), psychological, social and spiritual factors. In other words, because 
normativity involves contextual embedding and because (as the Wittgensteinian analysis 
implies) intentional psychological states require an externalist account, the rational 
requirement for normativity entails the world. It is not that these factors are a necessary 
condition for normativity, it is simply that normativity brings into play (potentially) all 
that we mean by the world: its places, practices, traditions, cultures, history, physical 
features and whatever else makes up the world. So, an understanding of dementia entails 
an understanding of the world. This is itself a transcendental claim: in order to 
understand dementia - as a prerequisite to such understanding - we must have an 
understanding of the world in all its features. In short, to understand dementia is to 
understand demcntia-in-the-world. 4 
So, in the light of the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional psychological states, an 
understanding of dementia involves, at a conceptual level, an understanding of the 
3 As discussed in Chapter 5. 
4 The point here is akin to the point Rhees (1967) made about Wittgenstein's builders: to understand a 
language (including - in the case I am considering - to understand what dementia means) involves 
understanding a whole culture, or way of being in the world. 
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Nvorld. 5 So much so, in fact, that dementia, in order to be fully understood, is best 
thought of as dementia-in-the-NN, orld. But it is the hiunan world or, at least, the world 
from the human perspective. The shared background, context, culture, history and life, 
in which the practices that underpin the normativity of thought and language embed, is 
human. It is also true that we share the world with dolphins and primates, but the 
normative realm in which dementia is understood is specifically human. Although for 
other reasons we might wish to keep such anthropomorphic sentiments in check, 6 it is 
important to note, with respect to the normativity of intentional psychological 
phenomena, that the issue is how such phenomena relate to the human realm, even if that 
realm is a part of (and only properly understood in the context of) the world we share 
with dolphins and primates. It might be that one day we have to acknowledge that other 
worldly creatures and extraterrestrials have a perspective on normativity. That will 
require an extension of our concepts and our thoughts, but there is no reason at present to 
deny the fact that our understanding of dementia-in-thc-world is, unavoidably; an 
understanding of the human world, by which I mean an understanding from the human 
perspective. With these thoughts in mind, I move now to make some preliminary 
observations about persons. 
7be hianan person 
I have just argued, in effect, that the person with dementia is unavoidably (at a conceptual 
level) situated in the human world. I shall now say more about the concept of the person. 
I shall not attempt to rehearse the arguments about the concept of the person in any 
comprehensive way. Instead, this section amounts to philosophical cherry-picking in 
order to sustain the move, in the next, to the situated-embodied-agent view of the person. 
What I say about persons, however, is supported by the Wittgensteinian analysis. 
The first important point is, as Strawson says, that to see each other as persons, 'is a lot 
51 have not stipulated whether, by "the world", I mean simply The earth" or "the cosmos". I think 
either would do, but my arguments are more readily applicable to a parochial view of "thc world". 
6 See, for example, 'Is a dolphin a personT in Midgley (1996) pp. 107-117. 
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of things, but not a lot of separate and unconnected things. '7 The concept of a person 
marks these connections. We can say of the concept "person" much the same as 
Wittgcnstein says of "number": 
we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on 
fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one 
fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibrcs. '8 
Wittgenstein accepts that boundaries can be drawn around our concepts, but this is 'for a 
special purpose'. He continues: 'Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! 
(Except for that special purpose. )'9 
What this establishes is that the concept of a person is multifarious, but none the less 
usable. Am6lie Rorty notes that we want our concept of the person to fill a number of 
functions. 10 Being a person, she suggests, means that we are taken seriously, with 
respect, 'on grounds that can't be lost through illness, poverty, villainy, inanity, or 
senility. '11 She lists other functions that must be performed by the attribution of 
personhood: it has a legal function; it defines us as agents; and as social, interacting 
beings; it suggests norms which shape our lives; it reflects biology; and it encompasses a 
metaphysical stance towards human beings. She concludes that there cannot be a single 
concept of the person. Similarly, Morton states: 
'there is nothing we can analyse and define and present as 'the concept of a 
person'. Nothing whose sense will settle in advance the status of all the beings 
we might value for the reasons we value human persons. For these values are not 
any single thing. '12 
Now, whilst the point that the concept of a person is multifarious is certainly correct, it is 
7 Strawson (1959). p. 112. 
8 PI § 67. 
9 ibid. § 69. 
10 Rorty (1990). 
11 ibid. 
12 Morton (1990). 
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not clear that the concept becomes thereby problematic in the everyday setting, any more 
than the concepts "number" or "game" are problematic. As Wittgcnstein suggests, 
concepts such as these can have a humble and everyday use. 13 Indeed, the concept 
"person" seems not to have caused Wittgcnstcin much worry at all: 
'For the ordinary use of the word "person" is what one might call a composite use 
suitable under the ordinary circumstances. '14 
But those who are worried by the suggestion that there is some single concept of a person 
usually have other concerns in mind. For instance, for Morton it is the suspicion that 
"person" is to be characterized in too parochial a fashion: 
'The reason why we can easily give the concept of a person definiteness that it 
does not really have is simple. We import into it more biologically parochial 
characteristics of human beings than we realize. '15 
The problem is that "person" has been used ffor a special purpose') as a way of 
excluding some people (slaves and women, for instance) and some other creatures (such 
as dolphins) from certain sorts of concern and consideration. 16 It has been argued, 
similarly, that people with severe dementia are not persons. 17 So there are ways in 
which the use of this concept, as if it refers to some single clear entity, might be 
pernicious. But rather than denying it the status of a concept, or changing it, an 
alternative tactic is to emphasize the breadth of the concept. In connection with "person", 
Rorty spoke of 'respect' and Morton mentioned 'values'. Part of the usefulness of the 
concept is that these fibres are involved and should not be discarded. 
Wilkes, for one, sees no problem with parochialism: 
'Speciesism 
... 
is not unreasonable; ... there just are no persons around who are 
13 cf. PI §§ 97 and 116. 
14 BB p. 62. It is relevant to note that Wittgenstein was discussing here the possibility of defining the 
identity of a person by his memories. If the memories were different on even days than they were on odd 
days, would that mean that there were two persons in the same body? Wittgenstein didn't really mind 
how the use of the word "person" went under such circumstances. But under the ordinary circumstances 
we have the ordinary use. 
15 Morton op. cit. 
16 Midgley op. cit. 
17 Brock (1988). 
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not human beings, and so on solid inductive grounds Nve are usually justified in 
assuming that all humans arc persons and vice versa. That is, membership of the 
species hoino sapiens is taken to be, and usually is, all we need to validate the 
ascription of personhood, and hence there is an a prion reason for adopting the 
cpcrson stance' to them alone'. 18 
There might, then, be reasons for accepting the link between "person" and "human 
being" and Wiggins suggests that these reasons are not just empirical but conceptual: 
'if the references of 'person' and 'human being' were theoretically discernible bill 
... delennined the saine prhiciple of individiialioiz, ' then the word 'person' will 
inevitably 'lean secretly for its support upon our understanding of 'human being' 
and our empirical notions of what a human being is. '19 
Rather than pursuing this argument directly, it is more fruitful to consider the context in 
which we use these concepts. We use them in particular contexts for specific, but 
multifarious, tasks. Smith recognizes, too, that it would be difficult to define the notion 
of a person independently of our understanding of human beings. Hence, he commends 
the notion of a 'human person' understood 'in terms of ... 
its manner of living. '20 A 
'human person' is someone who stands in the Right Relation to one of us: 
'someone stands in the Right Relation to count as one of us if he shares with us 
enough of the human world constituted by interpersonal relationships. '21 
Examples of such relationships are: 
'Jack and Jill talk to each other, habitually read each other's face and gestures, go 
out together for meals, lend each other books, laugh together at the same silent 
movies, occasionally play tennis, and so on and so forth - these and many more 
are the sort of ties which go to make up the web of our shared human life'. 22 
18 Wilkes (1988) p. 97. 
19 Wiggins (1987). 
20 Smith (1990). 
21 i bi d. 
22 ibid. 
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So there is a way of unifying the multifarious strands of the concept "person", as well as 
its connection with the concept of "human being", by considering instead the notion of 
the "human person". For Smith, this notion is one that is embedded in the shared human 
world. It is in that world, after all, that people wish to show respect and concern. The 
Wittgensteinian analysis and the present discussion of persons, therefore, are mutually 
supportive. Both require an appreciation of the contextual embedding which underlies 
the different concepts with which they deal. This is, after all, unsurprising. For the 
concept of a person makes links with the concept of intentional mental states. I do not 
think this link entails that to be a person requires there are aclually intentional mental 
states (which might not be the case in severe learning disability, head injury or dementia), 
but the potential for such states is typical of these human persons. At a conceptual level, 
certain, typically human, normatively-structurcd concerns must be implicit. Otherwise, it 
would not be possible to construct the notion of a human person from norm-free data. 
This thought lies behind Strawson's claim that the concept of person is primitive. 23 
Wiggins characterizes this claim thus: 
'if you did not have the idea of a person from the start, then you could never build 
up to it from any combination of ideas like those of experience, material body, 
and causality. '24 
Explanations act as elucidations of the concept; there is no sense in which a definition of 
stperson" will suffice. The claim of primitiveness has the status, says Wiggins, of an 
elucidation, '- or a reminder, helpful only to those who already know what a person is, 
of whal it is that they already know. '25 The elucidation, according to Strawson, is that, 
'the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that boill predicates 
ascribing states of consciousness [P-predicatesland predicates ascribing corporeal 
characteristics [M-predicates], a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a 
single individual of that single type. '26 
23 Strawson op. cit. p. 101. 
24 Wiggins op. cit. 
25 ibid. 
26 Strawson op. cit. pp. 101-102. 
-205- 
StraNvson argues there is a type of P-prcdicate, - 'going for a walk', 'coiling a rope' etc. - 
that mostly involves a characteristic bodily movement rather than a particular sensation or 
experience. So, in these cases, bodily movements will dominate the ascription of such P- 
predicates to others. 27 
This takes us back to Wiggins, who suggests that, although we cannot build up from the 
notion of persons as objects of biological inquiry to the notion of persons as subjects of 
consciousness, yet we may be able to build do)vn from persons as subjects of 
consciousness to persons as biological objects. Just as P-predicates can involve bodily 
movement and gesture, so the concept of person inevitably seems to involve, or rely on, 
the concept of the human being. Wiggins finally argues that the actual extensions of the 
two concepts, 'human being' and 'person', will coincide, whether or not we wish to say 
that the concepts themselves coincide. 28 
This discussion of the concept of person demonstrates four points. 
- First, as the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional mental states suggests, the 
analysis of "person" requires attention to the embedding context. 
e Secondly, they are situated, or embedded, in the human world. Whilst there are 
undoubtedly good reasons for cautioning against the use of a restrictive notion of 
the person, it is still the case that there are empirical and conceptual ties between 
being a person and being a human being. The concept of a person reflects a 
human perspective and involves the concept of the human being. 
o Thirdly, ascriptions of P-predicates involve the ascription of bodily movements 
and behaviours. Persons are beings to whom states of consciousness and 
corporeal characteristics can be ascribed. That is, being a human person, 
embedded in the context of the world, involves physical embodiment. It also 
entails (again at least potentially) the agentive ability to participate in the practices 
(such as those that underpin the norinativity of language and thought) that help to 
27 ibid. p. I 11. 
28 Wiggins op. cit. 
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constitute what it is to be a human person. 
- But appreciating this point requires, fourthly, an appreciation of the multifarious 
nature of personhood. 
According to Wiggins, 
'there is no clear limit to what concerns and capacities and perception[s] and 
feelings ... we shall have to credit our fellows with if we are to make sense of 
them. '29 
Persons must experience an uncircumscribed possibility of agreement. 
'To treat a person like a thing (like a billboard), what I have to be ready to do is to 
suspend all the impulses on which that uncircurnscribed possibility precisely 
depended. '30 
I am suggesting that those impulses are a matter of the shared concerns of the human 
world in which persons are embedded. Furthermore, the human world, as the 
Wittgensteinian analysis has suggested, is the bedrock for the potentially public practices 
that underpin the normativity of thought and language. The account of intentional mental 
states, therefore, given in the main plot of this thesis supports the account of the person 
as a situated-embodied-agent, which I shall now consider. 
From Locke-Parfit to Ilie silimted-embodied-agent 
So far, in this section, I have discussed the notion of dementia-in-the-world, by which I 
imply that dementia itself has to be considered within the broad context of the world. 
That is, dementia cannot be abstracted from its worldly context and cannot be fully 
understood apart from the rational and normatively-constrained world. Similarly, the 
concept of the person is embedded in the human world, because (as in dementia) inherent 
to our understanding of persons is the potential for rationality, which requires a 
normative structure underpinned by human worldly practices. Taking part in these 
29 Wiggins op. cit. 
30 ibid. 
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practices, or at least potentially doing so, requires that the human person is an embodied 
agent. Finally, the characterization of the person must be open-ended, to allow for the 
multifarious nature of personhood (because the concerns and ways of understanding 
other human beings cannot be circumscribed). 
In Chapter 1,1 described the Lock-e-Parfit view of the person. I indicated that this view 
needs to be broadened. Subsequently, by taking an externalist view of intentional mental 
states, I have shown how this can be achieved. For even if the person is characterized 
solely, as in the Locke-Parfit view, in terms of the continuity and connectedness of 
intentional mental states, the normativity of such mental states makes reference to factors 
external to the mind. Now, there clearly is a link between the concept of the person, 
being human, the having of intentional mental states and the external world of emebedded 
practices. The link is made by the notion of transcendental normativity. As I have 
shown, the concept of the person is linked to the human world in which thought and 
language arc underpinned by normativity, which is cashed out in terms of embedded 
practices. But, in which case, a broader view should suggest that the person is a 
situated-embodied-agent: situated as a human being of this sort, which involves the 
potential to participate in the normative and physical practices of the world. This 
elucidation of the person remains open-ended and broad. It draws attention to the 
physical, psychological and social features of personhood, but leaves open the possibility 
of aesthetic, cultural, historical, geographical, spiritual and evolutionary aspects. 
Transcendental normativity will not exclude any of these as possible bases for embedded 
practices. The situatedness of the person in the human world encourages 
uncircurnscribable possibilities for further elucidation. 
Having demonstrated the extent to which the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional 
psychological states is supported by the situatcd-embodied-agent view of the person, in 
what follows I shall simply record ways in which that view has been fleshed out. 
Siltiateditess 
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The notion of a situated self stresses context and the external factors that go to make up a 
person. Luntley suggests, 'We become situated selves when we acknowledge the 
existence of principles of substantive rationality'. 31 This notion of 'substantive 
rationality' is to be cashed out in terrns of our 'sensibilities', by which Luntley implies, 
tour capacities not just for feeling, but for knowing what must be done and how 
to deliberate about it. -sensibilities that provide perspectives on 
human goods, 
purposes and our sense of what makes life worth living. 32 
Luntley allies his thoughts to those of Taylor, who considers that a crucial fact about a 
self or person is that we are not selves in the way that we are organisms, 
twe are only selves insofar as we move in a certain space of questions, as we 
seek and find an orientation to the good'. 33 
Taylor asserts that a basic condition of making sense of ourselves is, 'that we grasp our 
lives in a narrative. 34 He uses this conception to counter the Lock-c-Parfit view of the 
person. For Taylor, human persons as selves, 
cexist only in a certain space of questions, through certain constitutive concerns. 
... And what is in question 
is, generally and characteristically, the shape of my life 
as a whole. '35 
Taylor rejects the Parfitian notion that there are successive selves. Rather, 'there is 
something like an a priori unity of a human life through its whole extent. '36 He accepts 
that this is not quite true, because we can imagine cultures in which a conceptual split 
could (in theory) be made between the younger and older person, but there is no such 
cultural understanding in our world: 'It runs against the structural features of a self as a 
31 Luntley (1995) p. 188. 
32 ibid. p. 195. 
33 Taylor (1989) p. 34. 
34 ibid. p. 47. 
35 ibid. p. 50. 
36 ibid. p. 51. 
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being who exists in a space of concems. '37 So, again, persons are situated in a 'space of 
concerns', but also in a narrative. Understanding a person must now involve an 
understanding of the narrative in which they are embedded. 
Maclntyre also suggests that the notion of the unity of the self 'resides in the unity of a 
narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end. '38 He 
suggests that, 
'the histories of individual agents not only are, but have to be, situated, just 
because without the setting and its changes through time the history of the 
individual agent and his changes through time will be unintelligible. '39 
Maclntyre then emphasizes 'that what the agent is able to say intelligibly as an actor is 
deeply affected by the fact that we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co- 
authors of our own narr-ativcs. '40 He, too, criticizes the Locke-Parfit view of personal 
identity. According to Maclntyre, both cmpiricists and analytical philosophers have 
failed to see that, 
'a background has been omitted, the lack of which makes the problems [of the 
connections between psychological states and events and strict personal identity] 
insoluble. That background is provided by the concept of a story and of that kind 
of unity of character which a story rcquires. '41 
One danger in the way that Taylor sometimes puts things (from my perspective)142 is that 
he seems to allow that a conception of past or future is constitutive of the self, in which 
case (since this suggests that the self requires psychological continuity) the Parfitian 
argument takes hold. But this is clearly not Taylor's intention and, elsewhere, he has 
made it clear that the exercise of the sort of capacities to which he refers must be a 
37 ibid. 
38 1ý4aclntyre (1985) p. 205. 
39 ibid. pp. 206-207. 
40 ibid. p. 213. 
41 ibid. p. 217. 
42 E. g. Taylor (1989) p. 47: 'In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have p notion of how 
we have become, and of where we are going. ' 
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possibility in principle, if not in fact: 
'A person is a being who has a sense of self, has a notion of the future and the 
past, can hold values, make choices; in short, can adopt life-plans. At least, a 
person must be the kind of being who is in principle capable of all this, however 
damaged these capacities may be in practicc. '43 
The importance Taylor has attached to the notions of 'embodied agency and social 
embedding'44 means that the concept of a person is tied to external contextual factors, 
which become themselves constitutive of our conception of the person. 
One final reflection on the notion of persons as situated beings is that it is an idea 
contained in Heidegger's characterization of the human existent (Dasein) as 'Being-in- 
the-world'. Not only is it a necessary feature of Dasein, but this embeddedness means 
that Dasein is 'bound up in its existence with the Being of those entities which it 
encounters within its own world'. 45 As Heidegger puts it: 'There is no such thing as the 
9 sidc-by-sideness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world'. '46 Our 
acquaintance with other humans is also a matter of 'Being-with' and this raises the 
possibility of a type of 'pre-understanding47 in our encounters in the world. There is a 
transcendental argument here: certain prerequisites are presumed in our encounters in the 
world. Specifically human encounters involve significance or meaning as part of what it 
is for things to be understood. And understanding, or making things intelligible, is (for 
Heidegger) a matter of 'Discourse'. 48 This parallels the Wittgensteinian thought 
(demonstrated in the analysis of Chapter 2) that understanding meaning is a matter of 
grasping a practice in a form of life. 49 
43 Taylor (1985) p. 97. This is the point I have made about the transcendental nature of non-nativity. 
What is important is the conceptual point that the normativity is such that it is, in principle, shareable in 
terms of embedded practices, whether or not it actually is shared in such practices. 
44 Taylor (1995) p. 169. 
45 Mulhall (1990) p. 110. 
46 Heideggcr (1962) Section 12, p. 81. 
47 To use an expression associated with Gadamer (1960). 
48 See Mulhall op. cit. p. 119. 
49 cf. PI §§ 238-242. 
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Embodiment 
There is a straightforward sense in which I know what it is to be a body. But the 
descriptions that follow are part of the elucidation of the concept of person. To be a body 
means that I am susceptible to causal (including pathological) processes. To this extent, 
then, disease models provide us with an understanding of dementia. But, in addition, to 
be a body means that I occupy a space and, as a matter of fact, I share that space with 
others. Moreover, through my body I impinge on others, physically and verbally. So, 
how I communicate is a matter of my embodiment. The space occupied by our bodily 
selves and others is also a space in which values and concerns become known. This 
sense of 'public space' depends on having a language by which we can communicate our 
concerns. It is 'a common vantage point'. 50 In other words, our bodily involvement 
(our situatcdness) in the space of language amounts to an involvement with shared 
concerns and values. 
Taylor discusses the notion of embodiment as an important antidote to 'monological 
consciousness'. 51 According to this monological view, 
'We are in contact with an "outside" world, including other agents, the objects we 
and they deal with, our own and others' bodies, but this contact is through the 
representations we have "within ... ... But what 
"I" am, as a being capable of 
having such representations, the inner space itself, is definable independently of 
body or other. '52 
This sort of consciousness leaves out 'the body and the other'. 53 It is an intemalist and 
not an externalist account of the person because of the emphasis it places on 
psychological phenomena being understood solely from the point of view of internal 
(representationalist) function. Against this, asserts Taylor, philosophers such as 
50 Taylor (1985) p. 259. 
51 Taylor (1995) pp. 168-173. 
52 ibid. p. 169. 
53 ibid. 
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Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein, have seen the person (as an agent), 
(not primarily as the locus of representations, but as engaged in practices, as a 
being who acts in and on a world. '54 
Not only does this description capture the sense of persons as being situated agents, but it 
also leads Taylor to emphasize the importance of embodiment. Thus, 
'Our body is not just the executant of the goals Nve frame, nor just the locus of 
causal factors shaping our representations. Our understanding is itself embodied. 
That is, our bodily know-how, and the way we act and move, can encode 
components of our understanding of self and world. ... My sense of myself, of 
the footing I am on with others, is in large part also embodied. '55 
The importance of the body is also emphasized by Slors, who contends that 'the body 
can play the part that is usually ascribed to the immaterial ego; it can provide a deeper 
psycho-biographical unity ...... 
56 Slors makes use of the notion of narrative to give a 
fuller account of psychological connectedness than that given by Parfit, because - 
according to the narrative view - connectedness must also take into account the content of 
psychological states in virlue of which successive states have meaning: 
'Narrative connectedness between particular psychological contents, then, is a 
relation between contents such that one or more contents arc a necessary 
prerequisite for another content's full meaning and the intelligibility of its 
occurrence. '57 
According to this view, whereas our psychological lives may be 'gappy' (lacking in the 
ideal fluidity and coherence and occasionally disrupted by loss of consciousness), there is 
a 'basic narrative ... represented 
by our consecutive perceptual contents'. 58 And, 
gsuccessivc perceptions acquire narrative coherence in virtue of the fact that we 
54 ibid. p. 170. 
55 ibid. pp. 170-171. This quotation is thoroughly in keeping with Merleau-Ponty. For a summary of C, 
his notion of the 'body-subject' see Matthews (1996) pp. 89-94. 
56 Slors (1998). 
57 ibid. 
58 ibid. 
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know them to be caused by one body's movements through a stable (not static) 
physical world with whose character and proceedings we are acquainted. ' 
So we must be situated in the world, of which we have an understanding (or a pre- 
understanding), in order to make sense of our perceptions, which are, however, the 
bodily perceptions of a situated being. Hence, 
gwe cannot but think of our past experiences and thoughts as being bad by a 
person-stage whose objective whereabouts were represented by perceptual 
contents that are narratively related to our present oncs. '59 
Slors links the embodiment of persons to their situatedness through the notion of 
narrative. Moreover, he shows that the Lock-e-Parfit view needs to be expanded to take 
into account the reality of mental content, which acquires meaning (via narrative 
connectedness) within the context of the world in which the person, qua body, perceives 
and moves. Hence, according to philosophers such as Slors and Taylor, the body cannot 
just be thought of as standing over against psychological states. It is inextricably 
involved in such states. 
Agency 
An agent acts 'in and on a world. '60 Moreover, it is the human world and, therefore, it 
follows that the agent is both situated and embodied. Discussing the move from a 
linguistic turn to a practical turn in philosophy, Luntley suggests that this shift, 
'makes visible a concept of practice and practical know-how that is not merely 
descriptive of socially constituted ways of doing things. ... it also offers a fresh 
way of understanding the practical and seeing how the practical is not rooted in 
the social, but in the way the individual relates in thought to the world. '61 
For, according to Luntley, the subject of thought is an agent, engaged with the world. 
Wilkes makes the point that Aristotle's account similarly stresses that the human being is 
59 Slors op. cit. 
60 Cited above: Taylor (1995) p. 170. 
61 Luntley (1999) pp. 344-345. 
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active. 62 Aristotle's human is an agent whose highest good is to live and do well. Thus, 
'We become the people that we arc by choosing, deciding, acting; we have the 
responsibility for shaping ourselves, our characters, and our lives'. 63 
Human beings are considered as active agents in the world, not as passive observers. An 
agent acts from a point of view and with a purpose. A human agent demonstrates 
intentionality, which (as Luntley suggests), 
9 consists not in its capacity for surveying and rearranging its inner symbols, but 
in its capacity for acting in and manipulating the world'. 64 
Furthermore, actions are causal and may well involve others, whether directly or 
indirectly. Agency involves context too. 
It is these considerations that Taylor has in mind when he discusses agency. According 
to Taylor, Heidegger and Wittgenstein had to overcome the "disengaged", "view from 
nowhere"65 approach to the human being. They had to recover, 
'an understanding of the agent as engaged, as embedded in a culture, a form of 
life, a "world" of involvements, ultimately to understand the agent as 
embodied. '66 
By 'engagement', Taylor implies that 'the world of the agent is shaped by one's form of 
life, or history, or bodily existence. '67 Later he suggests that the arguments against 
disengaged agency tend to emphasize the notion of a background or pre-understanding 
which make the actions of the agent intelligible, but which remain largely unarticulatcd. 68 
Thus, the notion of agency itself involves a sense both of the embeddedness and 
embodiment of human persons. 
62 Wilkes (1988). 
63 ibid. p. 213. 
64 Luntley (1999) p. 319. 
65 cf. Nagel (1986). 
66 Taylor (1995) pp. 61-62. 
67 ibid. p. 62. 
68 E. g. ibid. p. 70. 
Summary 
-215- 
In this section I have stressed the notion of dementia-in-the-Avorld and the extent to which 
the person, too, must be conceived as embedded in a human worldly context. This led 
me to consider and expand upon the notion of the situated-embodied-agent. This 
elucidation of the person broadens the Locke-Parfit view, but remains open to further 
elucidation in the context of the human world where what counts, the meaning or 
significance of things, cannot be circumscribed and reflects the normatively-structured 
thoughts and language of human beings who must engage as agents in the world of 
concern and values. 
6.3 The human-person-perspective and modeIs of dementia 
At the start of this chapter I left hanging the thought that what is required is a perspective 
of dementia that allows a recognition of the normative nature of the world. I am now in a 
position to suggest such a perspective. I shall make four points concerning this human- 
person-perspective: 
" It is the perspective from and in which we understand demcntia-in-the-world. 
" It brings into view the normative nature of the world and makes use of the 
conception of persons as situated-embodied-agents. 
9 It can accommodate other models of dementia, inasmuch as they are genuinely 
useful, but it is the lack of this perspective that makes them otherwise 
circumscribed. 
o It is uncircurnscribable, because what it is to be a person is open-ended. 
77ie hianan-person-perspective and dementia-in-the-world 
Dementia is dementia-in-the-world. It is a situated phenomenon. It has to be regarded in 
this light. To try to undertsand dementia without the background context of the world 
might succeed in explaining something, as (for example) the disease model clearly does, 
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but it cannot give us the broad understanding that will allow the different views - those of 
Mrs. Z as well as those of the neuroscientists - to come into focus at once. The broad 
understanding needs to accommodate the normative as well as the physical rcalms; it will 
provide a constitutive account as well as a causal one. , For the point about dementia-in- 
the-world is precisely that a full understanding of dementia involves the world, with all 
that this entails when described in norm-rich detail. 
The message from the historical survey of Chapter 1 was that our judgements about 
dementia will reflect background understandings. Not only, therefore, does dementia-in- 
the-world imply that dementia has to be regarded as an embedded phenomenon, but, in 
addition, we (as persons) are embedded in the selfsame world. The importance of this 
point is that our understanding of the world, our grasp of the normatively-structured 
concerns and worldly points-of-view, will impinge upon our understanding of dementia. 
If our view of the world is one in which we have a limited idea of what constitutes 
cognitive phenomena, and cannot see that the normative structuring of such phenomena 
reaches right up to the world in which they are situated, if we operate with the limited 
9 cognitive paradigm', which the historical survey picked out, then our understanding of 
dementia will be limited too. 
Dementia-in-the-world, therefore, highlights the importance of the worldly context from 
which and in which dementia must be understood if it is to be understood broadly. But 
the previous section also helped to establish that this worldly context is the human context 
of persons. The perspective from which and in which dementia-in-the-world has to be 
understood becomes, accordingly, the human-person-perspective. Dementia occurs, is 
studied by neuroscientists; and dealt with by Mrs. Z, in the context of human persons. 
Judgements about Mr. Z are made in comparison with other human persons: the 
normative constraints that allow us to judge that he is profoundly disoriented reflect 
human practices deeply embedded in the world. Furthermore, our understanding of Mr. 
Z will reflect our grasp of the significance of the concerns and values that surround him 
and which are rooted in the world. It is partly our shared grasp of the concerns and 
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values that shape the world that allows us to understand Mr. Z. What we share, 
therefore, is the human-person-perspective, which is the perspective required to 
understand dementia-in-the-world. 
77ie hinnan-person-perspective and the situated-embodied-agent view 
Now, the situated-embodied-agent view of & person helps us to understand dementia, 
because it helps to elucidate the human-person-perspectivc of dementia-in-the-world. 
This perspective involves all of the considerations that I outlined in considering the 
situated-embodied-agent view in the last section. So, the person is situated in a richly- 
textured context of culture, time and place; in a narrative history which has a past and 
future and which interconnects with the narratives of others; in a world shaped by certain 
normative concerns, which are themselves based upon deeply rooted practices and 
customs. And the situatedness is also a matter of embodiment, since to be a human 
person is to have a human body, which helps to provide the narrative continuity and 
connectedness that is a part of the wholeness of our lives. But our embodiment also 
contains the causal possibilities that explain and determine our lives (at least at a causal 
level). Meanwhile, as persons we are agents too: acting within the framework of our 
crnbodicd and situated natures; reflecting both our experience of causal interactions with 
the world and our understanding of the world as structured in a systematic way by our 
thoughts (since the having of certain thoughts precludes others and means that our 
understanding of the world must be so to accord with such normative constraints). 
Our understanding of persons helps to flesh out our understanding of dementia because 
both notions are embedded in the world. I have worked towards that embeddedness by 
an analysis of intentional mental states, an understanding of which is crucial to our 
understanding of both dementia and persons. Coming to understand that intentional 
psychological phenomena show a transcendental, constitutive and irreducible normativity 
has provided a means of assessing models of dementia. It has also led us to the human- 
person-perspective as the way to understand dementia most broadly. This is the work of 
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the main plot. The analysis of intentional psychological states is supported by the 
situatcd-embodied-agcnt view of the person, which was the concern of the sub-plot. I 
have now shown that taking the situated-embodicd-agent view seriously is a means of 
enhancing the human-pcrson-perspective, that is, of enhancing our understanding of 
dementia, by seeing that dementia has to be understood as an embedded feature of the 
human world, which brings into play constitutive as well as causal factors, not only 
physical features of the world, but normative features too. Thus, the sub-plot informs 
the main plot. 
The human-person-perspective allows an understanding of dementia, which recognizes 
the normative nature of the world. For what it is to see dementia from this perspective is 
to see it within a normatively-structured context, in which we too are situated. The world 
of human persons is underpinned by, because thought and language are underpinned by, 
normatively-structured and deeply embedded worldly practices, where normativity is 
transcendental, constitutive and irreducible. The question I now wish to consider is how 
this perspective relates, both critically and constructively, to the models of dementia I 
previously considered. 
7be hwnan-person-perspeclive and models of dementia 
As I commented in connection with each of the models I considered, there are ways in 
which these models provide useful clinical infori-nation. There is a useful account to be 
given concerning atrophy of the medial temporal lobe, concerning the loss of semantic 
memory and the malignant social environment in dementia. Where the first two models 
went wrong was in their inability to give an account of the normativity of intentional 
psychological states. Social constructionism allowed room for normativity, but 
misconstrued it by failing to recognize the importance of its transcendental nature. The 
human-person-perspective requires that the partial explanations of these models should be 
relocated in the normative realm of the situated-embodied-agent, where the situatcdness 
involves an understanding of normativity as a transcendental, constitutive and irreducible 
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feature of intentional psychological states. 
From this perspective, the brain can be studied as an organ of the body, but conclusions 
about dementia are reached within a context that sees embodiment as linked conceptually 
to the person's place in the world of others. The conclusions about the brain will be the 
same, but our attitude towards the conclusions cannot be reductionist. The conclusions 
will tell us about how the brain works and goes wrong, but will not tell us about what it 
is for a person to have dementia. Nothing in thebrain can tell us that, because this is a 
matter of constitutive, non-native concerns. What has significance for us is more clearly 
seen in the human-person-perspective. Because, this perspective immediately involves 
the realm of transcendental normativity, which is the reality that shapes our encounters 
and concerns in the world. This is a perspective of dementia-in-the-world. Once we 
have this perspective, the disease model of dementia can be viewed as circumscribed by a 
broader field of normative concerns. 
Similarly, the cognitive neuropsychology model might still tell us about the functioning 
of parts of the organism, but it cannot tell us about personal level attributes, because it 
cannot accommodate normativity. The human-person-perspective allows us to note that 
there are losses of semantic memory in AD, and will allow us to hypothesize about and 
investigate the neuronal bases of such functional losses, but will also note that the losses 
are a matter of failure in the rational and normative realm. If cognitive neuroscientists 
retort that the proper concern of their study is the functional underpinning of personal 
level attributes and no more than that, the response must be that talk of representations 
and inner processing hold no significance without the contextual embedding provided by 
the human-person-perspective. Their talk, that is, is meaningless without the broader 
context. But the more fatal point is that their talk of internal representations, as if these 
carry mental content, is senseless without the perspective of mental content as embedded 
phenomena within an external context. 
Talk of a 'malignant environment' by social constructionists can certainly be useful as a 
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guide to caring for people with dementia, but the human-person-perspective, as a 
development from the Wittgensteinian analysis of intentional mental states, is precisely 
intended to be cognizant of the need for transcendental normativity. Therefore, the 
human-person-perspeCtive, when applied to the models of social constructionists, 
continues to have a broadening effect, bringing into focus a broader view of the world in 
which the person with dementia is situated. It is a view which involves normative 
constraints as embedded and transcendental features of the world, broadly conceived, not 
just as a consequence of discourse and social practices. 
Having discussed each model in turn, it can now be seen that these particular models can 
be regarded as embedded within the broader human-person-perspective. Any particular 
model may contain errors, which will need to be corrected or jettisoned from the model, 
such as the extreme physicalist conception of the disease model, the representationalism 
of cognitive ncuropsychology, or the over-emphasis on discourse in social 
constructionism. There is a general point, however, about what is genuinely, clinically 
and scientifically useful in such models: I suggest that if there is such genitille usefulness, 
then it is likely that the model can be accommodated within the human-person- 
perspective. Our more causal models, which tend to supply specific explanations, tell us 
only part of the story. The human-person-perspective will take these explanations into 
account, but will be more concerned with a broader understanding of what constitutes 
dementia. 
77ie uncircianscribable hiutian-person-perspeclive 
A similar line of argument was presented by Engel, whose recommendation of the 
'biopsychosocial model' aims to counter the 'crippling flaw' of the 'biomedical model' 
which, 'does not include the patient and his attributes as a person, a human being. Yet', 
as he says, 'in the everyday work- of the physician the prime object of study is a person 
... within the framework of an ongoing human relationship ... '. 69 Engel uses a systems 
69 Engel (1980). 
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approach to locate the person in a hierarchy or continuum of natural systems that 
ultimately includes the biosphere. He explicitly discusses the interaction between 
different levels of the hierarchy and the movement between the different systems. Even 
this important account, however, of how models might be conceived in medicine does 
not appear, to me, to go far enough. 70 
Whilst Engel allows permeability between the boundaries of different systems or levels, 
the human-person-perspective suggests that the notion of boundaries is too concrete. The 
potential for a mistake here, I am suggesting, is made at the first step: talk of "models" 
itself brings to mind something definite and concrete. Talk of "systems" again suggests 
something circurnscribable. As my earlier discussion of the concept of a person made 
clear, this is a concept which is uncircurnscribable. There is always another field of 
concern, another way to describe the encounters between persons. It is not enough to 
expand outwards towards the biosphere, as Engel does, since the new fields of concern 
and ways of describing personal encounters should also add depth, precisely at the level 
of the person. Engel talks of experience and behaviour at the personal system level, but 
we also need to consider, inter alia, ethics, aesthetics, spirituality, sexuality, race, culture 
and politics at the personal level. Speaking of these things as different systems, rather 
than as involved in the one perspective, allows the possibility of a mistake, as if the 
human person can be thought of as separate from, say, political concerns. The person as 
a system within a hierarchy of systems needs to be regarded instead as a being whose 
embedding in the world means that others and the environment are not separate systems 
with which the person can interact, but arc constitutively involved (at least potentially) in 
the very notion of the human person. This conception of the human-person-perspective 
reflects the reality of dementia-in-the-world, which itself shares roots with the 
Heideggerian notion of the human being as 'Being-in-the-world'. But the nature of our 
engagement with the world, in which we are embedded, means that the human-person- 
perspective cannot be circumscribed 
70 McLaren (1998) has recently argued that ' framework* is a better notion than 'model' here. For the 
biopsychosocial framework is less than a model, since it does not reflect a well-formulated theory capable 
of making predictions. 
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Summary 
In the above paragraphs I have presented the human-person-perspective, which is the 
broad perspective intended to answer the central question of this thesis: how are we to 
understand dementia? I shall now summarize the points I have made: 
- Dementia-in-the-world suggests the rich context into which dementia fits. 
Dementia is understood within and from this context: the context in which, as 
situated-embodied-agents, we are all located. And it is this worldly context that 
provides the human-person-perspective within which we understand dementia. 
- The human-person-perspective allows an understanding that recognizes the 
normative nature of the world. Our understanding of persons, as situated- 
crabodied-agents, helps to flesh out the human-person-pcrspectivc. So the main 
plot and the sub-plot are mutually supporting. 
- It is a failure to recognize the transcendental, constitutive and irreducible 
normativity of intentional psychological states that accounts for the circumscribed 
nature of other models of dementia-, but this suggests the possibility that other 
models might be accommodated within this broader human-person-perspcctive 
too. 
-, The human-person-perspective is uncircurnscribable, because what it is to be a 
human person is open-ended. That is, the concerns that shape our understanding 
of ourselves as persons cannot be pinned down once and for all. Instead, it is 
always possible for new fibres to be added to the thread that makes up our 
conception of ourselves as human beings. 
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6.4 The person with severe dementia 
I have still not specifically answered the question about people with severe dementia. 
The question is: can they be considered as persons at all? The Locke-Parfit view 
suggests that they might not qualify for consideration as persons. I suggest that the 
human-person-perspectivc supports the opposite view. It does so partly because it is 
premissed upon the Wittgcnsteinian analysis of psychological mental states, which 
broadens our conception of what constitutes such states. An externalist construal of 
intentional mental states suggests that we do not have to rely solely on a person's verbal 
ability to describe inner psychological phenomena. What it is to be in a particular mental 
state can be shown externally. This does not just apply to intentional states, but might 
also apply, for instance, to being in pain. Even in severe dementia, however, leaving 
aside signs of distress, there might be some evidence of comprehension, of recall, of 
intention or of motivated action. 
Moreover, even in the most severe cases of dementia, from the human-pcrson- 
perspective the situated nature of persons means that there is a sense in which 
personhood is sustained by our embeddedness. Thus, we are embedded in our histories 
or narratives and these are kept alive to some extent by those who care for us. Maclntyre 
suggests that the notion of the unit), of the self 'resides in the unity of a narrative which 
links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end. '71 Behaviour (the 
behaviour of someone with severe dementia perhaps) has to be characterized, on his 
view, within a setting with a history, 
'a history within which the histories of individual agents not only are, but have to 
be, situated, just because without the setting and its changes through time the 
history of the individual agent and his changes through time will be 
unintelligible. '72 
Moreover, 'The narrative of any one life is part of an interlocking set of narratives. 73 
71 MacIntyre op. cit. p. 205. 
72 ibid. pp. 206-207. 
73 ibid. p. 218. 
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We are embedded, at root, in a realm of shared human concerns which it is practically 
and rationally difficult to set aside. On these grounds, when Wiggins considers wilful 
killing, he states: 
'consider how much, how many habits of mind and feeling, ), on ... 
have to put 
aside coolly to contemplate simply cutting off ... another person. 
Obviously, all 
these things can be laid aside. But the point is not that they cannot be put aside, 
but the psychic and visceral cost - and the prima facie irrationality - of doing 
So. '74 
We simply cannot help acknowledging our mutual cmbeddedness in a context of shared 
concerns, interrelated narratives and normative constraints. 
I wish to pursue this by considering how the notion of 'care' intersects with the notion of 
a situated being. The notion of 'care', as it relates specifically to humans, involves some 
sense of shared concerns and the potential for interaction at a human level. Therefore, to 
care for someone with severe dementia is to recognize a mutual situatedness. This will 
reflect a variety of factors, from the shared culture and history, to the shared human form 
and the agentive acts that are made sense of in the context of human exchanges. 
Of course, it is open to anyone to deny that it makes sense to talk in terms of these factors 
in connection with Mr. Z when he reaches the terminal stages of his illness. But, in that 
case, an account must be given of situatedness that does not accommodate those with 
even severe dementia. What this will involve is a restricted account of situatedness and, 
by implication, a restricted account of what it is to be a person, which is not open to the 
full elucidation of personhood from the human-person-pcrspectivc. Since intentional 
psychological phenomena are constitutive of persons, the extcmalist view implies that 
persons cannot be regarded solely in terms of their inner states and must be situated in the 
human world of which they arc a part. Hence, a full elucidation of what it is to be a 
person, involving as it does (on my view) an externalist view of the person as a situated 
being, will also involve a notion of the mutual sharing of concerns which is characteristic 
74 Wiggins op. cit. 
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of caring between persons, even caring for persons with severe dementia. 
Engagement with Mr. Z, for instance, whether as wife or nurse, even if this involves 
little more than careful feeding or cleaning, exemplifies the values of care as understood 
in our culture. But such actions also help to construct care: 'It is in our actions and the 
way we treat one another that values come into being and are preserved in being'. 75 
Murphy, for example, has suggested that through good clinical care dignity and the 
identity of a person may be preserved: 
'Loss of dignity derives from the way we care for our sufferers from dementia, 
not from the illness itself... More than at any other time of life the sufferer needs 
his personal identity preservcd'. 76 
This, then, is an example of how, through care, which is a reflection of our engagement 
with the world in which we are situated, personhood can be preserved even in severe 
dementia. This requires that the elucidation of 'care', which involves an 
acknowledgement of our. situatedness, intersects with our notion of the person as a 
situated being. 
The idea that care is constructed might seem more in keeping with the tenets of social 
constructionism and, accordingly, at odds with arguments I used earlier against that 
model. This is not the case, however, since social constructionism is correct to look to 
our public, shareable practices. The point against social constructionism is that those 
practices have to be regarded as embedded in the world in such a way as to secure 
transcendental normativity, so that their publicity is a secondary feature, rather than in 
itself the ground of the normativity. In the present case, our notions of care need public 
instantiation, by careful attention to Mr. Z, but they also reflect a deeper engagement 
between the values that underpin care and the manner in which the world is non-natively 
structured by our embeddcdness in it. The normativity of our thought and language is a 
feature of the world and helps to shape it. 
75 Luntley (1995) p. 218. 
76 Murphy (1984). 
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I have already noted that the whole notion of situatedness derives support from 
Heidegger, but he also used the notion of care precisely to establish and highlight the 
engaged nature of a Dasein's being-in-the-world. Taylor put it thus: 
'Heidegger argues that things arc disclosed first as part of a world, that is, as the 
correlates of concerned involvement, and within a totality of such 
involvements'. 77 
Macquarric summarized Heidegger by saying: 
'Dasein is always in a world, and Heideggcr talks of "Being-in-the-world" as the 
basic constitutive state of Dasein. Thus the Dasein is considered in concrete, 
embodied existence.... The "Being-in" which characterizes our everyday relation 
to the world is called by Heidegger "concem"... '. 78 
The full technical meaning Heidegger gave to "concern", or "care", need not detain us, 
except to notice that the concept was used to tic the human existent into the world (i. e. to 
situate Dasein) and what was stressed was embodied existence. The nurse's caring for 
Mr. Z is not in a simple sense the same sort of care as that to which Heidcgger refers, but 
there is a relationship between the two. The care given to Mr. Z is given against the 
background of engagement with the world, which is characterized by Hcidcgger's 
concept of "care". It is a background which is impervious to facile change: 
'the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see 
any action'; and it is this background which 'determines ourjudgment, our 
concepts and reactions'. 79 
Conclusions and Implications 
In this chapter, building on the Wittgensteinian analysis of Chapter 2,1 have given 
substance to and supported the view of the person as a situated-embodied-agent. I have 
suggested that this human-person-pcrsrýc-ctivc is necessary for our understanding of 
77 Taylor (1995) p. 73. 
78 Macquarrie (1968). pp. 14-15. 
79 Z§ 567. 
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dementia-in-the-world: it accommodates the models that shape our understanding already, 
but broadens the perspective to include the normativity that is a feature of our world. 
There are implications to the human-person-perspectivc- of dementia. The perspective is 
practically helpful. It is clinically helpful in that it allows us to make sense of personhood 
in - and the work of caring for - those with severe dementia. We can ground our 
approach to such patients in a context of shared norms and values, where a person's 
narrative and the care given to them coalesce. The perspective becomes helpful, too, in 
our dealing with ethical dilemmas. The view of persons as situated in interconnecting 
histories helps us, for instance, to discuss advance directives, end of life issues 
generally, the involvement of families in matters of consent and the notions of best 
interest and autonomy. In addition, regarding the patient as a situated-embodicd-agent 
might help to make our care more attentive to the nuances of what is of value to people 
with dementia. This is the 'missing dimension' of care alluded to by Murphy8O and the 
person-centred approach of Kitwood. 81 
There is still, inevitably, much left undone. I shall emphasize just three implications for 
further research that stem from this thesis. First, at various points, and repeatedly in this 
chapter, I have made reference to hermeneutic philosophers, such as Hcideggcr, 
Gadamer and Merleau-Ponty. There is room for further work along two plains: first, the 
analogies between hermeneutic philosophy and the work of Wittgenstein are already 
fruitful and might be more SO; 82 secondly, hermencutic philosophy seems a promising 
area for making further connections between philosophy and clinical practice. 83 
Connected to this point is a second general implication of this thesis. The notion of the 
person I have put forward suggests that in medical ethics we should concentrate on actual 
80 Murphy (1988). 
81 Kitwood (1997). 
82 E. g. Glendinning (1998). 
83 See Philpott (1998) and Widdershoven (1999). Both papers are followed by a number of 
commentaries and replies, which further emphasize my point. See also Bracken (1999). 
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cases because of the crucial importance of context and the narratives in which persons are 
inevitably embedded. What people, including people with dementia, actually say is 
important in understanding their values. Shared values, in particular, arc worked out in 
discourse. This suggests, therefore, both the importance of good communication in 
clinical practice and the utility of qualitative research methods in medical ethics. There is 
a difficulty here, since I would not wish to suggest that what is ethical is decided by what 
people say; nevertheless, what they say and do reveals their concerns and values. There 
is work to be done, therefore, on two further fronts: first, there is qualitative empirical 
work to understand best the root concerns and values of people; secondly, there remains 
the conceptual work of a metaphysical nature to help delineate the links between the 
normativity of thought and language and the norms and values that inform actual human 
practices. 84 
The third implication of the thesis concerns research on the ageing brain. If we are to 
understand dementia from the human-person-perspective, what impact does this have on 
clinical research? There is an immediate sense in which the human-person-perspective 
simply makes clear the limited, but perfectly respectable and still rather vast, field in 
which brain research is carried out. Brain research itself tells us nothing about meaning, 
but it is carried out within the broader realm of normative and meaningful concerns. 
More than this, however, the human-person-perspective does not make things more 
simple, but more complex. It tends to suggest that individual brains have to be 
understood within an individual context and narrative. How this human brain relates to 
this narrative becomes just as important as anything that can be said about this brain 
simply as one amongst many human organs. The really difficult task would be to link 
each brain to each individual human life. Indeed, research on the ageing brain is tending 
to show that nothing is simple: some dementias break the mould and involve delirium as 
an essential feature; 85 many cases of Alzheimer's disease involve vascular damage or 
vascular risk factors; 86 30% of cases meeting clinical criteria for vascular dementia show 
84 Cf. Luntley (1995) and Taylor (1989). 
85 McKeith et al. (1996). 
86 See Esiri (1997) and Skoog (2000). b 
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Alzheimer's pathology; 87 new criteria for different types of dementia emerge. 88 The 
complexity must, to some extent, reflect individuality. The human-person-perspective 
encourages the view of the individual by making us consider the situated nature of 
dementia-in-the-world. To this it might be objected that brain research will remain a 
causal enterprise, whereas the human-person-perspective is intended to provide a 
constitutive account of dementia. But, the view of what it is for Mr. Z to have dementia, 
with all that this entails in the rational and normative realm, must influence our 
understanding of Mr. Z's brain, precisely because it is the brain of this particular human 
person. The particularity here leads to an appreciation of the complexity. 
I started the thesis with the question, how are we to understand dementia? My answer is: 
from the human-person-perspective. This perspective, as is clear from this chapter, is 
multifarious, uncircurnscribable, anthropomorphic, extcmal-involving, normatively- 
constrained, potentially public, narratively-driven and able to accommodate models that 
seek to understand specific aspects of the condition. Such models, however, must relate 
back to the broader human-person-perspectivc if they arc to avoid philosophical and 
clinical tunnel vision. This is a feature that stems from the two-way traffic between 
philosophy and medicine. 89 I have to conclude that there is no one way to understand 
dementia, but any understanding must be from the human-person-perspective, which is 
in accord with the situated-embodied-agent view and reflects an externalist construal of 
intentional psychological states, as suggested by the Wittgensteinian analysis. Within 
this broader perspective, the human-person-perspectivc, the elucidation of what it is to 
have dementia, is as open-ended as the elucidation of what it is to be a person. 
87 Kalaria (2000). 
88 Bums and Hope (1997). 
89 Fulford (1991a). 
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